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Metta World Pass

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=45GdbMfNSOk&feature=youtu.be w=700 h=400]

Really cool play from the Lakers tonight. LA was up by 3 points on the Hornets with 28.5 seconds to go in the game and just 3.2 seconds left on the shot clock. They were without Kobe Bryant, their best shot creator, so Mike Brown drew up a play that gave Metta World Peace – the trigger man – multiple options to choose from.

With Peace taking the ball out of bounds underneath the basket on the left hand side, the Lakers stationed Andrew Bynum on the left block, Steve Blake on the right block, Pau Gasol just above the left elbow and Ramon Sessions at the right elbow.

Right away, Peace is presented with three options. After Blake clears out from the right side of the lane and heads toward the left corner, Sessions cuts from the right elbow to the middle of the lane. He’s technically Peace’s first read on the play, but it doesn’t look like the play is really designed for him to get that pass. Bynum posts up his man on the left block as option number two, and Blake heading to the corner is the third option.

Having not received the pass from Peace on his cut to the basket, Sessions changes course and sets a cross-screen for Bynum, who loops around for a possible alley-oop lob or bounce pass from Peace to get him in good position underneath the hoop.

Both Sessions’ man and Bynum’s man stick with Bynum off the pick. This creates separation between Sessions and his man as he heads toward the perimeter, aided by a pin-down screen from Pau Gasol. This is what’s commonly known as the “screen the screener” play. On this particular sequence it’s the outlet option for Peace; a last resort if nobody comes open quickly and if the lob to Bynum is covered as well. It’s the fifth possible pass he can make on the play. But it’s the one he made and it’s the one that sealed the victory for the Lakers. Gasol’s screen created just enough space, Sessions drained the 3 stretching the Laker lead to 92-86 and they held on to win by 2 points.

Weighing In On HoopIdea: Tanking vs. Rebuilding, The Thunder Model & Changing the Lottery

There is a difference between tanking and rebuilding. Both involve losing as part of the overall strategy, but they really aren’t the same. What the Golden State Warriors are doing this season is what I consider to be “tanking.” They are intentionally trying to lose more games this one season so they can keep their draft pick, which is only top-7 protected. This kind of tanking isn’t thought very highly of. Intentionally putting an inferior product on the court in an effort to lose games isn’t fun for anyone, especially fans, and especially if it’s not as part of a dedicated long-term rebuilding strategy (more on this below). The Portland Trail Blazers, with their moves at the trade deadline, also seemed to be engaged in this practice, only they’ve managed to go 7-7 since the deadline and have torpedoed their hopes for two potential top-5 picks (One of which would come from the Nets provided it doesn’t land in the top 3. But even they have won 6 games since their deadline deal for Gerald Wallace).

Both of these situations are different than the one in Charlotte, where the Bobcats are engaged in a long-term rebuilding project that involves “being bad to get good.” The ‘Cats made the playoffs two seasons ago as the East’s 8th-seed, but after trading Gerald Wallace, Stephen Jackson and others are now the worst team in the league. This has been a truly terrible season for fans of the team (especially Bobcats blogger Ben Swanson, who has watched something like 25 games in a row without seeing a win). But, as Sports Illustrated’s Zach Lowe put it on Twitter the other day, what should Charlotte have done with that nucleus?

That team was never going to contend for a championship, and while they could have been a middling playoff team for a few seasons, entertained their fans and made some money out of it, it ultimately wouldn’t have been worth it because there would be no payoff at the end. Admirably, Charlotte’s much-maligned front office recognized this fact, blew the team up and started over from scratch. While it is admittedly not so much fun for the fans of the team to watch the product on the court this season – and might not be next year if they don’t land franchise-changer Anthony Davis in the lottery – it’s better for the Bobcats’ long-term future that they have cleared their books, begun stockpiling young players and draft picks and seem to be prepared to be patient with the rebuilding process.

There has been a lot of chatter about how the so-called Thunder Model – the stockpiling of young players, draft picks and cap space I described Charlotte using above – isn’t repeatable. I both agree and disagree with this line of thinking. While the results of the Thunder’s rebuilding project aren’t easily repeatable (because, seriously, how many times do you get lucky enough to land four top-5 draft picks within a 3 year span, nail 3 of them with surefire All-Stars – Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook, James Harden – and pick up the league’s best shot-blocker – Serge Ibaka – in the mid-20s? And how many times can you turn the fourth top-5 pick – talented but flawed tweener forward Jeff Green – into the last piece of the puzzle to be your starting center – Kendrick Perkins?), the process and ideas behind the Thunder’s rebuilding project absolutely are.

Sam Presti and his staff valued the acquisition of young players, draft picks and cap space above all else and the patience in using that cap space, waiting for exactly the right player at exactly the right time to splurge on, even while the team was getting better fast and many prominent media members were practically begging him to make a move, was the most important part of the plan. Just because you have a lot of room under the cap to spend money doesn’t mean you absolutely need to. Just look at what happened to the Pistons after they threw money at Ben Gordon and Charlie Villanueva, the two biggest names in an otherwise weak free agent market a few years back. Spending money on the wrong players can paralyze a franchise for years (Also see: 2000′s New York Knicks). The Thunder got lucky with lottery balls, even luckier with their selections and doled out their money smartly. That’s how you build a team from the ground up. Yes, it takes an insane amount of luck. But unless you’re the Lakers, Celtics, Knicks or Bulls, you’re going to need either an insane amount of luck or Pat Riley to go from bad to good as quickly as the Thunder have. We can deny that fact all we want, but it’s true.

Where the tanking debate really gets interesting is with ESPN TrueHoop’s HoopIdea and their crusade to either change or abolish the draft lottery and the draft altogether. This is the rare issue on which I don’t really have a strong opinion. I’m perfectly fine with the current system the way it is, but I’m also fine with changing the system because I’m all for any changes that can even possibly make the game better. I’m fine with the current system because it provides an avenue for bad teams to get better – something many of us seem to have forgotten we were extremely concerned about while the lockout was in effect – without guaranteeing them a reward specifically for being bad. With all the anti-tanking ideas out there, it’s easy to forget that the current lottery system gives the team with the worst record just a 25% chance of getting the first overall pick in the draft. In other words, they have nearly three times as much of a chance at not picking number one as they do of actually picking number one.

As an aside, I do vehemently disagree with prevailing thinking among hardline anti-tanking folks that the current lottery system rewards being bad. It doesn’t. It simply provides those teams who lose most with a larger chance at an indirect reward in an effort to improve competitive balance. Again, this was a huge issue in the lockout. On the other hand, I also vehemently disagree with the prevailing thinking among the “we can’t change the system” diehards that changing the system will punish teams specifically for being bad. It’s not like the NBA will be saying, “Hey, Bobcats. You’re terrible! We’re punishing you with the 14th pick.” It only seems to be a punishment because it’s a worse position to be in relative to where they are now.

Changing the system from the current arrangement, whether by unweighting the lottery system, using the “reverse order lottery” where the team with the best record that misses the playoffs gets the first pick, or abolishing the draft altogether could – again, could, not will - remove what has been proven as one of the best avenues for rebuilding a team. Securing multiple high lottery picks to get young, cheap, good players in the draft is one of the core tenets of the so-called “Thunder Model” referenced earlier. The problem is that part of that model involves losing, which sucks for the fans of the team. So the idea is to find a way to give teams a better shot at improving, even while they’re already getting better, rather than necessitating that they be bad to get good. It’s also important to think about the teams that get left behind in the current system, those fringe contenders who can make the playoffs but aren’t really competing for a championship. They’re in limbo and they need a way to improve too.

Changing the system can benefit those teams that are stuck in limbo; like the Bobcats were just a few years ago, and the Blazers were this year, and the Sixers or Rockets or even the Knicks may be in the next few years. Finding ways to get those fringe playoff teams to move up a level could be beneficial for the league. But just as those teams are wanting for ways to improve now, who’s to say that the really bad teams won’t soon be out of ways to improve if the system is changed? That push and pull, and the realization that there will always be bad teams, always be teams that appear to be stuck without a way to improve, always be fans or writers who are unhappy with the way the system works, is why I’m so Switzerland-esque neutral on this particular issue.

A Beautiful Miss

The Knicks and the Bulls played an amazing game yesterday. There were some terrific plays made down the stretch, including Carmelo Anthony’s game-tying 3-pointer in regulation as well as his game-winning 3-pointer in overtime. It wasn’t either of those plays that really stuck out in my mind as being particularly impressive though, at least from an X’s and O’s standpoint. Rather, it was the Knicks’ first attempt at tying the game when they were down 3 points with just over 30 seconds to go in regulation that caught my eye. The shot didn’t wind up falling, but the play design by Mike Woodson and the execution was marvelous.

The play starts with J.R. Smith taking the ball out of bounds and  being guarded by Ronnie Brewer. Carmelo Anthony, Tyson Chandler and Steve Novak are stacked left to right at the free throw line and are guarded by Luol Deng, Joakim Noah and Taj Gibson, respectively. Iman Shumpert lines up in the middle of the lane and is guarded by Derrick Rose.

Shumpert takes off from the middle of the lane and heads past the top of the key in order to receive the inbounds pass from Smith. He receives what I like to call a “gate screen” from both Anthony and Chandler. Shumpert runs through the space between them, and they each slide over toward each other, closing the gate before Rose can chase Shumpert through to the top of the key. This allows Shumpert the separation he needs to receive the inbounds pass.

After he sets the screen for Shumpert, Anthony starts looping around to the other side of the court, aided by what appears to be a screen from Novak. The Bulls are expecting Anthony to get the ball, being that he is the Knicks’ best offensive player, had scored the last 7 points for the Knicks in this game and is generally regarded as the guy who will be taking the last shot for the Knicks.

Right here, you can see that Luol Deng and the Bulls expect that this play will be an isolation for Anthony on the right wing. Deng, boxed in blue in the middle of the screen, sees Anthony headed for that right wing and motions to Gibson and Noah that the entire right side of the court is open and that they should move to cut off Anthony’s driving lane. With 33.4 seconds to go in the game, it was a reasonable expectation that the Knicks would design a play to try to get Anthony a quick basket in order to go 2-for-1.

As Anthony receives the pass from Shumpert, both Deng and Gibson follow him out to the wing. Unfortunately for the Bulls, what appeared to be a screen from Novak designed to get Anthony the ball on the move for a quick two was really a mirage. Novak slips the screen and receives one of his own from Chandler as he heads toward the opposite side of the court. Smith, the inbounder, brings Brewer toward the baseline to draw him away from where Novak is headed.

Now, Anthony is occupying two men on the right side of the court as Novak heads to the opposite wing. Novak’s man is all the way on the opposite side of the court cutting off the baseline driving lane that Anthony never intends to use. Because Gibson followed Anthony, Chandler instead sets the screen on Noah, the closest help defender the Bulls have.

The result of the play is Anthony sending the ball across the court to Novak on the opposite wing for a wide-open 3-pointer. Getting the best 3-point shooter in the NBA a look with nobody within 10 feet of him in a 3-point game is just about as ideal as it gets for a late-game sideline out of bounds play.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h6yJiqKKfW8&feature=youtu.be w=500 h=350]

Credit should be given where due to Mike Woodson for coming up with a creative way to get a wide-open look for the best shooter in the league. He used the Bulls’ and everyone else in the arena’s expectations against them and designed a play to get a knockdown shooter in great position to tie the game. Anthony also deserves credit for both his willingness to be a decoy in a close and late situation even though he had it going all game long and for making a more-difficult-than-it-looks cross-court pass to find Novak on the opposite wing. The result wasn’t ideal (and I have absolutely no idea how that ball did not stay in the basket), but the design and execution of the play was flawless.

Iman Shumpert Can Get Better on Defense

I have made no secret of my love for New York Knicks rookie shooting guard Iman Shumpert. While his offense has been inconsistent and erratic for much of the season (though it has been both better and more consistent of late), his defense has been a bright spot for the Knicks all season. Shump’s hounding one-on-one defense on the perimeter, along with the inside presence and versatility of both Tyson Chandler and Jared Jeffries, has been one of the biggest reasons for the Knicks’ vaulting from the bottom 10 in defensive efficiency last season to the top 5 this year.

Already in his short career, Shumpert has become a lockdown isolation defender. According to mySynergySports, he allows just 0.6 Points Per Possession (PPP) against on isolation plays, good for 28th in the NBA and better than noted defensive stalwarts such as Luol Deng, Andre Iguodala and Tony Allen. Shump has allowed opposing players to score on just 30.7% of their isolation plays while forcing turnovers 28.4% of the time. He uses his quick feet to stay in front of his man and his long arms and lightning-fast hands to bother opposing players off the dribble and once they put up their shot. His ridiculous athleticism – he had a 42 inch max vertical at last year’s draft combine – along with his insanely long arms – at 6’5″, Shumpert has a 6’9.5″ wingspan – conspire to make him nearly impossible to beat in one-on-one situations.

His ability to defend perimeter scorers one-on-one is where his reputation as an excellent defender comes from, but he is far from perfect on defense. In fact, there are still many ways he can improve on that side of the floor.

Pick-and-roll defense is probably the weakest area of Shumpert’s game so far. He tends to get caught in screens way too much for a guy who is 6’5″ and 220 pounds. Too often, he either doesn’t see a pick coming or doesn’t react quickly enough when he does. Now, one may think this could be attributable to communication problems by whoever the big man defender is, but with Chandler or Jeffries acting as those defenders much of the time, I doubt it.

Let’s take a look at a few different plays that illustrate some of the problems Shumpert has defending pick-and-roll ball-handlers. Here’s a play from the Knicks’ most recent victory over the Magic. Shumpert is guarding Hedo Turkoglu.

As Shumpert gets screened by Glen Davis, you can see that he neither tries to fight over the top of the pick or go under it and recover to get back to Turkoglu, he just kind of accepts that he is being screened and switches onto Davis. This allows Turkoglu to turn the corner and receive another screen from Dwight Howard on Carmelo Anthony, and he gets right to the basket for an easy lay-up. While the Knicks’s strategy of defending pick-and-rolls often meant manic switching earlier in the season, Mike Woodson has de-emphasized that approach and preached staying with your man since he became the interim head coach.

Below, Shumpert is guarding J.J. Redick, who cuts to the wing where he receives the ball from Jameer Nelson. This time, Shumpert does a good job of anticipating Davis’ screen and tries to force Redick away from it.

However, Shumpert fails to recognize that once he forces Redick away from Davis’ original location for the screen, that one is soon coming on the other side.  It also appears that Shumpert didn’t know Carmelo Anthony, Davis’ defender, would be hedging hard on the pick to cut off Redick’s driving lane, so forcing him away from the screen probably wasn’t the best move. Once Anthony hedged and Shumpert forced Redick away from that hedge, the Magic had already won on the play. Shumpert runs right into Davis’ pick and Redick, a knockdown shooter, gets a wide open 3-pointer.

Another problem Shumpert tends to have when navigating pick-and-rolls is that he tends to not know whether he should try to fight over a screen, go under and then recover to his own man or switch the screen altogether. Because the Knicks change up their strategy of depending pick-and-rolls from time-to-time, this is more excusable than his tendency to get caught in screens, but he should still be more decisive.

Here, Shumpert is guarding Lou Williams as he brings the ball up the floor. Evan Turner comes up from the block to set the screen on Shumpert. He tries to fight over the top of the screen while Jeffries hedges to cut off Williams’ driving lane. Jeffries shows on Williams’ driving lane and Shumpert, now confused, runs back to cover Turner instead of staying on his path and picking up his man, Williams. Jeffries then stays on Williams and is screened by Turner again. Shumpert gives away how he’ll be defending that screen too soon, and rather than taking Turner’s second pick, Williams crosses over and releases a 3-point jumper.

Another problem Shumpert has shown on the defensive end so far in his career is tunnel vision, better known as ball-watching. Sometimes, he’s watching the ball-handler too intently and strays too far from his man and gives up a spot-up opportunity. Others, he’ll get blind-sided by a backdoor cut.

Here, Dwight Howard is posting up against Tyson Chandler. Chandler, an excellent defender, possibly the best in the entire league this season, doesn’t necessarily need help in the post against Howard. And he especially doesn’t need it from Shumpert, who again is guarding Redick, one of the best shooters in the NBA. Baron Davis, guarding Jameer Nelson at the top of the key, who has struggled from the field for much of the year, is and should be the primary help defender in this situation. But Shumpert starts watching Howard back Chandler down and strays too far away from Redick, which leads to an open spot-up opportunity and a basket. Plays like this are why Shumpert has allowed 0.92 PPP against Spot-up shooters, which places him 158th in the NBA. This is still in the top half of the league, but you can see he can get even better.

A few weeks ago against the Toronto Raptors, Shumpert showed how he’s sometimes susceptible to being backdoored. He’s guarding DeMar DeRozan, who starts the play at the elbow extended. When the Raptors run a pick-and-roll on the opposite side of the floor, Shumpert is again caught ball-watching, and DeRozan slips behind him to the corner.

Because he strayed so far away from his man, Shumpert had to go to a full-on sprint to challenge what would have been a wide-open jumper by DeRozan. DeMar instead pump-fakes and Shump can’t recover in the other direction in time to stop DeRozan from knocking down the mid-range shot.

These plays are indicative of the problems that Shumpert has been having on the defensive side of the court this year. The good news for Knicks fans is that he’s already an excellent on-ball defender, and that his performance in team defensive concepts like the pick-and-roll, rotating out to shooters and help defense should improve with time. Shumpert has excellent instincts on the defensive end and should only get better. His lockdown wing presence provides a solid foundation from which to build, but he’s nowhere near complete yet. He has an incredibly high ceiling as a defender, he just has to put in the work to reach it.

You Better Recognize: Rajon Rondo Shredded the Heat

Welcome back to the ongoing series here at Hardwood Paroxysm, You Better Recognize. In each edition, I take a look at a specific aspect of a specific player’s (or team’s) game and tell you just how and why they are so successful (or unsuccessful). Previously, I covered Roy Hibbert’s hook shot. Today, I’ll show how Rajon Rondo shredded the Heat’s vaunted pick-and-roll defense. 

The Miami Heat have played smothering defense all season against the pick-and-roll. Their strategy is very aggressive, as they always call upon the screener’s man to make a hard show agains the ball-handler, looking to drive him away from the middle of the lane and toward the half court line, the sideline or the baseline. The Heat are willing to take the gamble that their athletic wings and bigs can rotate in time to contest shots either at the rim or on the perimeter.And for most of the season, it has brought them great success. Here’s how it looks when it works the right way.

Above, Joel Anthony is guarding the screener, Brandon Bass. Anthony’s objective is to force Rajon Rondo toward the baseline where he and Mario Chalmers can execute a trap. To beat the trap, Rondo either has to turn the corner quickly and get directly into the lane or head toward the deep wing and draw both defenders before turning around and zipping the ball back to Bass at the top of the key.

Rondo heads to the deep wing and draws both defenders. Right now his move should be to hit Brandon Bass at the top of the key, where he can take a jumper, drive the lane or swing the ball around to Paul Pierce on the opposite wing. Anthony is still trying to force Rondo toward the baseline, and Chalmers is on his way over to complete the trap.

This is exactly what the Heat want. Rondo is trapped in the corner by Anthony, Chalmers and the baseline. Paul Pierce and Greg Stiemsma are covered by Dwyane Wade and Chris Bosh in the lane. Rondo can either try to hit Bass at the top of the key or Avery Bradley over the top of the defense, but look who is standing between them playing center field: LeBron James. The Heat are willing to bet he can rotate in time to contest a shot by either man or get there quick enough to pick off the pass and create a fast break basket.

Rondo tries to keep his dribble alive but winds up nearly falling out of bounds. He attempts to throw the ball off Anthony’s leg to save the play, but he misses and the pass gets intercepted by Wade. Wade immediately chucks the ball down the court to LeBron, who released on the play, for an easy dunk.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyRhNTM0JXY&feature=youtu.be w=700 h=450]

This play (which is actually from earlier in the game) has the Celtics running the same left side pick-and-roll action, this time with Kevin Garnett as the screener.

Again, Joel Anthony is guarding the screener and Mario Chalmers is guarding Rondo. Anthony’s objective is to force Rondo toward the baseline so he can be trapped, but Rondo turns the corner quickly and attacks the lane. This is one downside to the Heat’s strategy of defending the pick-and-roll; for a split second after the screen is set, the point guard has the ball on the move against one of their bigs, and if the big doesn’t force the point guard to the right spot, he can get beat to the rack.

Rondo beats Anthony off the dribble and he’s headed into the lane rather than toward the baseline, so there is no trap. The Heat have Dwyane Wade there as a last line of defense, but Rondo puts up the lay-up over Anthony, and Wade never even challenges the attempt.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4f83-7hXkAE&feature=youtu.be w=700 h=450]

On the first possession of the game, after a Paul Pierce-Brandon Bass pick-and-roll yielded no open shot (and look how far out Chris Bosh forces Paul Pierce before he has to turn around and pass it in the video below), the Celtics ran a dribble-handoff pick-and-roll between Bass and Rondo.

On this play, Rondo comes up from the left baseline and is basically getting a downscreen. Bosh, still guarding Bass, is supposed to force Rondo back outside the 3-point line so his only options are to reset the play or pass the ball back across his body to Bass. Rondo again wants to get into the lane.

Instead of forcing Rondo back outside the 3-point line, Bosh basically just follows him to the middle of the lane for a couple of seconds and then leaves to go recover back onto Bass. Chalmers is still coming over to pick Rondo back up, Anthony has left Kevin Garnett alone in the corner because he’s on rim-protection duty and Wade is sagging off Avery Bradley to disrupt Rondo’s driving lane. This leaves Rondo on the move and in the teeth of the defense with the option to drive to the hoop or hit one of three wide open teammates.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gL20ODgc87w&feature=youtu.be w=700 h=450]

In the second quarter the Celtics run a Rondo-Garnett pick-and-roll on the right side of the court. Bosh is guarding Garnett while Norris Cole is now on Rondo. Bosh wants to force Rondo to the sideline so he and Cole can trap him there. This time, Rondo dribbles directly into the trap.

This really just isn’t fair. Rondo takes the Heat’s bait and dribbles directly into the trap, only he fires a behind-the-back bounce pass to KG while Cole is still on the move. Bosh is all the way out toward the sideline and about 8-10 feet away from Garnett, so he doesn’t have enough time to recover before KG sinks the jumper.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qD_Z1ss7f5o&feature=youtu.be w=700 h=450]

Later on in the game, the Celtics ran some 1-3 pick-and-roll action with Rondo as the ball-handler and Paul Pierce as the screener. This time, LeBron was responsible for forcing Rondo either toward the sideline or the half court line. Again, as ever, Rondo’s main objective is to get to the lane and into the teeth of the Miami defense, where he can either get to the basket or draw defenders and open up passing lanes.

LeBron doesn’t do a very good job re-directing Rondo away from the lane. That’s actually putting it lightly; LeBron just lets Rondo turn the corner and get into the lane. He practically escorts him there and then just lays back and sticks on Paul Pierce. He doesn’t really do anything the man covering the screener is supposed to do in the Heat’s system of defending the pick-and-roll. This allows Rondo to get right into the teeth of the defense.

Rondo attacks the basket with abandon as Avery Bradley cuts from the weak side corner into the open space right next to the hoop. Rondo draws the defenders close and dumps it off for a wide open lay-up.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XpUfOz2mppQ&feature=youtu.be w=700 h=450]

Eventually, the Heat got tired of getting beat on the hard show and decided to go with the soft show strategy of pick-and-roll defense, a drastic change from their usual strategy. Rather than hedging hard and trying to force Rondo back outside the 3-point line, Bosh lays back in the lane and dares Rondo to take a mid-range jumper.

Rondo decides to ignore Bosh’s polite suggestion that he take a pull-up jumper and instead ventures into the middle of the lane yet again. This time he draws three defenders. Bradley again cuts from the weak side corner into the open space near the hoop, and Rondo again hits him with the dump off pass for an easy lay-up.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgm1UdBZ2v0&feature=youtu.be w=700 h=450]

The soft show works only if the entire defense is committed to making Rondo beat them. If even one guy strays from the strategy, it’s very easy to get beat.

Even later in the third quarter, the Celtics go back to the Rondo-Bass pick-and-roll, and the Heat again try the soft show and dare Rondo to take a mid-range jumper. Rondo takes the bait and pulls up just like the Heat want him to.

LeBron gets caught napping – and ball-watching – here and allows Garnett to sneak in behind him for a backdoor lay-up. Twice in a minute and a half the Celtics took advantage of LeBron loafing on the defensive end instead of filling his responsibilities in the pick-and-roll defense. One time it was as an on-the-ball defender and once it was off the ball.

Rondo and the Celtics pulled out one last trick late in the third quarter. This time they went with a double screen for the pick-and-roll. Rondo, being guarded by Cole, gets picks from both Stiemsma and Sasha Pavlovic. Ronny Turiaf and LeBron are guarding the screeners. Turiaf makes a hard show and tries to force Rondo towards the half-court line, but Rondo goes right around him.

Because Turiaf got beat on the hedge, LeBron is now responsible for guarding both roll men. Rondo is way past Turiaf and Cole is still trailing him and trying to recover, so Bradley’s man has to slide over to cut off Rondo’s driving lane. Bradley is left wide open in the corner, and when he gets the ball from Rondo, has an open driving lane against an on-the-move defender. Bradley gets right to the hoop for a lay-up, which is goaltended for a basket.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nwqWIkYYHns&feature=youtu.be w=700 h=450]

The Heat are third in the NBA in defending pick-and-roll ball-handlers according to mySynergySports. They force turnovers 24.3% of the time and allow a score on only 35.3% of P&R ball-handler possessions. Yesterday, Rondo made 3 of his 5 shots as a pick-and-roll ball-handler and had 5 assists that came off pick-and-roll plays. He systematically destroyed the Heat’s pick-and-roll defense by getting into the lane with relative ease. He was so effective that the Heat eventually changed the way their defense defends the pick-and-roll, and then he torched them some more.

Mystery Statistics Theater: Power Forward Edition

Welcome to the fourth edition of Mystery Statistics Theater, an ongoing series here at Hardwood Paroxysm. In this space, Conrad Kaczmarek and I will be attempting to do the previously impossible; we’ll be removing all personal bias from our conclusions. Here and in the subsequent editions of this series, this is what you’ll find: a comparison of the per-36 minutes and advanced statistics lines of two different players – one from this season and one from a randomly selected season – with no names attached. Our task was to decide which of the two players was better, or more valuable, or which we’d rather have on our team; whatever you want to call it, we chose between the two players without knowing who they really were. You can see the comparisons, conclusions and corresponding player names below. Enjoy.

(NOTE: We used per-36 minutes rather than per-game stats to marginalize and/or eliminate any differences in playing time. Additionally, we recognize that these comparisons do not account for team context or player roles. Rather, this exercise intends to demonstrate how simply looking at the numbers can lead you to conclusions that may seem counter-intuitive, for better or worse, and that surface opinions and bias can lead to drastically different conclusions than simply analyzing the stats. Also, we whited out the player names so you can play along for fun! All stats current through March 30, 2012.)

Comparison #1 – Created by Jared, Analyzed by Conrad

Player A seems like a pretty obvious call to me. He’s got a better TS% and is just about even in total rebounding rate. What he lacks in blocked shots, he makes up for with steals. I can’t really find anything wrong with Player A when it comes to what I want out of a power forward. Furthermore, he doesn’t take three-pointers while Player B occasionally does. For that alone, I hate Player B.

(Player A – Carlos Boozer 2011-12, Player B – Pau Gasol 2011-12)

Note: Highlight the line above this to reveal player names

Comparison #2 – Created by Jared, Analyzed by Conrad

Not much to dislike about Player B. He’s a wildly efficient scorer, solid rebounder, and a fantastic offensive rebounder. I’m terrified of picking him because I think I know who it is and it might be a result of a small sample size. Regardless, based on these stats, there’s no reason for me to take Player A over Player B. Give me Player B, even though I’m really scared.

(Player A – Tim Duncan 1997-98, Player B – Kenneth Faried 2011-12)

Note: Highlight the line above this to reveal player names

Comparison #3 – Created by Jared, Analyzed by Conrad

These guys are virtually identical in a number of statistics, except for one of the most important: true shooting percentage. In that area, Player B can’t come close to Player A’s efficiency. Similarly, while ORtg and DRtg aren’t the most accurate ways to determine a player’s value, the 107-99 gap in ORtg is somewhat significant. Because I’m a huge nerd, I know who Player B is and I absolutely love him. I also know that these stats don’t come close to explaining what he does on the court. The assist % of 20.6% is wildly impressive, but Player A is right there behind him. Going off of these numbers, I’m forced to take Player A and I’m okay with that, because he’s an incredible player as well.

(Player A – Kevin Garnett 2011-12, Player B – Josh Smith 2011-12)

Note: Highlight the line above this to reveal player names

Comparison #4 – Created by Conrad, Analyzed by Jared

Let’s see here. Player B seems like the kind of player you can build your offense around. He’s got a 29+ usage, gets to the line a good amount and has solid percentages from everywhere. Player A is a long-range sniper – 8.0 of his 14.0 FGA per-36 come from behind the 3-point line and he hits at a 41.5% clip. Player A is the better offensive rebounder and turns it over less (though the TOs might have something to do with their usage). Player B, though, is a much better passer, defensive rebounder and is better at shooting inside the arc and getting to the line. This is insanely close, but I’ll take Player B, the more well-rounded player, as the foundation of the offense.

(Player A – Ryan Anderson 2011-12, Player B – Dirk Nowitzki 2011-12)

Note: Highlight the line above this to reveal player names

Comparison #5 – Created by Cornad, Analyzed by Jared

I hate bad free throw shooters. Player A’s 54.3% mark from the line is hella-concerning. That said, he does get to the line an awful lot, which is a plus. And he’s shooting over 8.0% better from the field than Player B. Then again, Player B is a better rebounder and free throw shooter. But since Player A has the advantage in everything else (passing, TOs, blocks, usage, D-Rtg) and he isn’t deluded into taking two 3′s a game at just 33.0%, I’ll take him despite the awful FT%.

(Player A – Blake Griffin 2011-12, Player B – Kevin Love 2009-10)

Note: Highlight the line above this to reveal player names

Comparison #6 – Created by Conrad, Analyzed by Jared

HOLY BLOCKS, PLAYER A!!!! You seem like more of a complementary piece than a foundational player, but what you do, you do ridiculously well. Offensive rebounding, blocking shots and making your own FGs. Player B doesn’t have the defensive counting stats but does have a similar D-Rtg, gets to the line more, makes his own fair share of shots and seems like he’s a better passer and point producer. He’s got a higher usage, by a lot, gets to the line more and makes a higher percentage of his FTs. Player B is probably the better player, but I’m going with Player A because of the blocks and rebounds. Hopefully I have other scorers on my squad.

(Player A – Serge Ibaka 2011-12, Player B – Amar’e Stoudemire 2011-12)

Note: Highlight the line above this to reveal player names

Comparison #7 – Created by Conrad, Analyzed by Jared

This is really tough, but I’m going with Player B because of his ability to simultaneously crash the offensive boards and kill it from the 3-point line. The two players seem to be about equal in the defensive counting stats, and I’m willing to guess Player A just plays on a better team and that’s why his D-Rtg is better. Player A is a lot better passer, but that’s really his only big time advantage. So Player B it is.

(Player A – Kevin Garnett 2011-12, Player B – Ersan Ilyasova 2011-12)

Note: Highlight the line above this to reveal player names

Two Minutes And Forty-Five Seconds

Donte Greene made a 3-point jumper to cut the San Antonio Spurs’ lead over the Sacramento Kings to 99-96 with 5:11 left in the game last night. After trading empty possessions with the Kings, San Antonio would score on five of their next six possessions in 2:45 of game time to seal the victory. Below, I’ll show you exactly how it went down.

Possession 1 (Stephen Jackson fast break lay-up, 1-1)

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMYkF-ZdWGY&feature=youtu.be]

The first basket was the easiest of the bunch. Tim Duncan grabs the rebound and makes an outlet pass to get Tony Parker out in transition. Parker pushes the ball up the court and finds a streaking Stephen Jackson on the wing, who lays it in. The Spurs stretch their lead from three back to five.

Possession 2 (Kawhi Leonard baseline jumper, 2-2)

On the next possession, Jackson grabs the rebound and quickly gets the ball to Parker to start the break with the Spurs still up by five. Parker sees he has no numbers so he swings the ball to Manu Ginobili on the opposite wing. Ginobili hits Kawhi Leonard underneath the hoop to see if they can get a quick-hitting lay-up. Leonard doesn’t have enough room to get off a shot, so he kicks it back out to Ginobili. Now, the Spurs run the first of four pick-and-rolls that result in easy baskets.

The play calls for a side pick-and-roll with Ginobili as the ball-handler and Duncan as the roll man. Parker has cleared out the top of the key and moved toward the opposite corner, while Jackson spaces the floor at the elbow extended and Kawhi Leonard occupies the strong side corner. Ginobili is an incredible dangerous scorer off the pick-and-roll – his 0.92 Points Per Possession (PPP) ranks 19th in the NBA according to mySynergySports – so both his man and Duncan’s follow him off the screen. This causes Leonard’s man to have to rotate off and cover the rolling Duncan, leaving Leonard open in the corner.

Ginobili drawing two defenders and thus forcing Leonard’s man to rotate onto Duncan opens up the baseline for Leonard once he receives the pass. All he has to do is throw a pump fake at the recovering defender, and he gets right into the teeth of the defense.

As it is, Leonard gets right to the basket for a lay-up and a seven point lead. As you can see, however, he also has open passing lanes to Ginobili at the top of the key and Parker in the corner for wide open 3-pointers.

Here’s the play in real time.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOvoqj8vmes&feature=youtu.be]

Possession 3 (2-3)

Kawhi Leonard traveled.

Possession 4 (Stephen Jackson elbow extended jumper, 3-4)

After the Kings cut the lead back to five, the next possession has the Spurs running a high pick-and-roll with Parker and Duncan. Parker, like Ginobili, is a big time threat to score out of the pick-and-roll. His 0.87 PPP ranks 28th in the NBA according to mySynergySports. This time, Ginobili spaces the floor in the weak side corner, with Leonard on the strong side and Jackson underneath the hoop.

Because Parker is such a threat to score, like on the previous play both his defender and Duncan’s chase him after he uses the pick. Both Leonard’s man in the corner and Jackson’s man in the lane get pre-occupied with protecting the paint from either a driving Parker or a rolling Duncan. Duncan, with 1.06 PPP as a P&R roll man, is obviously a big threat to score as well.

Knowing how much attention Parker and Duncan attract, the Spurs bring Stephen Jackson from his spot on the low block up toward the top of the key, where he’ll receive a screen from Duncan as well. The initial pick-and-roll action distracts the defense from the target of the play, and Jackson has plenty of space with which to work once he receives the pass.

Jackson winds up with a wide open jumper due to Duncan’s good screen, and the Spurs’ lead is once again seven points. With how fast the defenders are closing on him, however, he could have easily thrown up a pump-fake and gotten himself right into the teeth of the defense as well.

Now, in real time.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G63Jve_5ma0&feature=youtu.be]

Possession 5 (Tony Parker corner three, 4-5)

Still up by seven, the Spurs run another high pick-and-roll here, and this time they go back to Ginobili and Duncan. Leonard is again in the weak side corner, Parker in the strong side corner and Jackson coming up from the block to space the floor at the strong side elbow extended. Again, both defenders initially chase Ginobili off the screen.

This time, rather than popping out off the screen, Duncan rolls directly to the free throw line. Once he receives the pass from Ginobili, the entire Kings defense collapses around him.

As you can see, there are four Kings defenders in the lane surrounding Duncan. He has Jackson wide open for a three at the elbow extended, Leonard in the weak side corner and Parker in the strong side corner. He chooses to hit Parker.

Parker’s not that great of a 3-point shooter, but he has just about all the time in the world to line this one up, and he wound up making it to push San Antonio’s lead to 10 points.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eoDn_eBQL0&list=UUrH0cFTogF5bW0j6MdThQcA&index=2&feature=plcp]

Possession 6 (Manu Ginobili driving lay-up, 5-6)

DeMarcus Cousins cut the Spurs’ lead down to eight points with exactly 2:00 to go in the game. The Spurs’ next possession, another high pick-and-roll between Ginobili and Duncan, looks almost exactly like the others at the start. Leonard occupies one corner, Parker the other, and Jackson spaces the elbow extended.

Duncan sets this screen for Ginobili much further out than the previous few. Right here, the Kings are already beat on this possession. Instead of showing hard off the screen and re-directing Ginobili, DeMarcus Cousins does a soft show and gives too big of a lane to drive through.

Cousins gets caught flat-footed and not in the right position, and Ginobili takes advantage by streaking through the wide open lane toward the basket.

Having gotten into the teeth of the defense yet again, Ginobili has options. He can hit Jackson at the elbow extended or Parker in the corner, or he can just go right up for the lay-up. He chooses the latter option and extends San Antonio’s lead to ten points, effectively ending the game.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDByKFwMEAo&list=UUrH0cFTogF5bW0j6MdThQcA&index=1&feature=plcp]

In 2:45, by executing one easy fast break and then running the same basic action four times (albeit with a slight twist once), the Spurs were able to turn a dwindling lead into a commanding victory. When people refer to the Spurs as the most well-coached team in the league, it’s because Gregg Popovich gives his players a distinct plan to work with and nearly always gets them to execute it to perfection. That was certainly the case down the stretch against Sacramento.

You Better Recognize: The Hibbert Hook

Roy Hibbert is an unusual player in today’s NBA, but he would have fit right in back in the olden days. As NBA bigs move farther and farther away from the basket, Hibbert has broken the mold by instead operating mostly out of the post. His back-to-the-basket-heavy game is a throwback to the more ‘traditional’ centers of yore.

According to mySynergySports, 52.9% of Hibbert’s offensive possessions are of the Post-up variety. His 0.92 Points Per Possession (PPP) ranks 26th in the NBA, placing him comfortably in the top 10 percent of all NBA players. Hibbert’s favorite weapon in the post – the hook shot – is also a bit of a throwback move. Hibbert’s full-season pace of 309 hook shots attempted  - he had taken 158 through 42 games as of last Friday, according to Basketball-Reference - would make him just the third player to attempt at least 300 hook shots since 2000 (the others are Dwight Howard and Andrew Bogut), but he likely won’t get there due to the shortened season.

There are a great many things to like about the Hibbert hook, but we’ll start with positioning. Hibbert is a battler; he’s constantly fighting his man for good position in the post, using a variety of different actions to get himself to the spot he wants. Sometimes he’ll get a cross-screen from David West, Tyler Hansbrough, Lou Amundson, Paul George or Danny Granger. Other times he’ll simply beat his man down the floor on the break and take up whatever position he wants. Still other times Hibbert simply engages in arm fighting and uses his posterior to clear out the requisite space needed to receive an entry pass. Look at Hibbert’s shot chart for hook shots; over 80% of them have come inside the lane. You don’t get to take good shots like that without first getting good post position.

Hibbert’s preference when working out of the post is to catch and hold the ball while he surveys the court, then go about backing his man down. He’ll take a couple of dribbles and then quickly spin and drop a hook shot (he has a few different varieties) before the defender can react. As you can see in the shot chart above, he usually prefers to turn into the middle of the lane to unleash his hook. This is generally a good strategy for two reasons. First, the shot is easier to make because it tends to be closer to the basket than if he were to turn baseline. Second, spinning into the lane and thus closer to the basket puts Hibbert in better offensive rebounding position. Hibbert is averaging a career-high 3.4 offensive rebounds per game this season.

Below, Hibbert fights Tyson Chandler, possibly the best defensive center in the league this season (Dwight Howard’s effort on defense has been hit or miss), for position before catching, taking a quick power dribble and putting up a baby hook in his face. Very simple, very effective.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YvIyagLBVug&feature=youtu.be]

Later in the same game, he easily gets good post position on Jared Jeffries to unleash a sweeping lefty hook shot in the lane. The main reason I include this video is to show how well Hibbert receives the ball in the post. He gets a wide base and provides a big target for the passer to hit when throwing an entry pass.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOdmeTm7-VA&feature=youtu.be]

Below, watch as Hibbert attacks Nene with another very simple move. This is a common play for the Pacers. The ball is entered to Hibbert in the post, while Granger and George each make a cut around him. Granger goes baseline and George comes out to the top of the key as they criss-cross in X-like motion (Zach Lowe describes the action in bullet number 5 here). If a defender overplays, Hibbert can hand-off to either Granger or George as they go past. If neither comes open, as is the case here, Hibbert can then isolate his man in the post.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=doQuUrQyt5A&feature=youtu.be]

Hibbert waits for Granger and George to finish their cuts and backs Nene down. There’s really nothing fancy going on here. He uses his large, wide body to back the defender down, and when he gets to the spot he likes on the floor, turns over his inside shoulder and drops a hook shot.

Although turning into the lane tends to be Hibbert’s preference, he does have the ability to quickly counter with a baseline hook if his defender overplays. Watch below as he goes to work on Marcin Gortat, one of the best post defenders in the NBA.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8pn3YI7KIEE&feature=youtu.be]

Gortat forces Hibbert to catch the ball a little farther from the basket than he normally likes to, but he’s still just a step outside the lane. Hibbert, as is his preference, catches and holds the ball while waiting for Danny Granger to cut through the lane and clear out that side of the court for him. Gortat, knowing Hibbert prefers to turn toward the middle when working out of the post, completely shuts off that option. He is forcing, basically daring, Hibbert to go baseline. Hibbert, however, proceeds as if he will still go ahead and try his go-to move. His left shoulder is dipped and he’s acts like he is trying to back Gortat down far enough into the lane so that he can spin toward the middle and drop the hook over his head. But at the last minute, just as Gortat completely turns his body, Hibbert spins over his outside shoulder and nails a lefty baseline hook.

Hibbert’s wide frame, extremely long arms and deft touch around the basket have made his hook shot one of the deadliest shots in the league today. Out of players who have attempted at least 50 hooks, Hibbert’s 62.7 FG% on the shot ranks second behind only LaMarcus Aldridge, who has attempted 93 less of them this season. It’s a traditional, old school, throwback, plain and simple shot, and Hibbert has perfected it.

This Is Indiana

“Co-dy Zel-ler!” was the thunderous chant that rained down from the 2,000-plus strong crowd at Kilroy’s Sports Bar in Bloomington, Indiana. Zeller – the younger brother of Tyler and Luke of North Carolina and Notre Dame fame – carried the Indiana Hoosiers on his slight, 19-year old shoulders all year. The freshman savior’s face was getting the zoom-in treatment on every television in the house, and the raucous Hoosier nation was showering him with love. So, “Co-dy Zel-ler!” went the chant, and it was about as loud as it could have possibly been. You would have thought it was the middle of an intense game, but it was still 7:00 PM Eastern, about two hours and 45 minutes before the (scheduled) start of Indiana’s highly anticipated match-up with the hated University of Kentucky in the Sweet 16.

My younger brother is a senior at Indiana University and he’s been waiting for me to visit him since he was a freshman. Little did either of us know when I booked this trip two months ago that I’d be in Bloomington for the biggest Hoosier game in a half decade. The program had been floundering since the sudden departure of former head coach Kelvin Sampson due to recruiting violations, but new steward Tom Crean’s bunch had exceeded even the wildest expectations this season. Moderate improvement and a possible NIT berth was a reasonable projection for the Hoosiers this year, but Zeller – along with juniors Christian Watford and Jordan Hulls, sophomores Will Sheehey and Victor Oladipo and seniors Matt Roth, Tom Pritchard and the since-injured Verdell Jones III – carried the team to unexpected heights.

Indiana’s shocking and dramatic one point victory over the Wildcats earlier in the season gave the Hoosier faithful an unusual amount of confidence heading into their tilt with the nation’s best college basketball team. “Cody is gonna murder AD again tonight,” a random, drunk bar-goer screamed in my general direction about an hour before tip-off. Exaggerated euphemism aside, his statement did provide a window into what was undoubtedly seen as the key match-up in this game: Zeller against the presumptive number one overall pick in the NBA Draft, UK freshman phenom Anthony Davis.

In their previous meeting, Zeller and the Hoosiers got Davis in early foul trouble and he was limited to just 24 minutes of playing time. His absence opened up the middle of the lane for Hulls and Jones to penetrate, which drew defenders, which opened up easy baskets for Zeller at the hoop and Watford and Sheehey behind the 3-point line. Indiana was leading for most of the evening, but they fell behind with about two minutes to go. Free throw problems down the stretch for Kentucky gave the Hoosiers an opportunity to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, and Watford responded with what has already become one of the most iconic shots in the history of college basketball.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqG7eSRAyfg]

When I got to my brother’s house in Bloomington yesterday afternoon, tornado warnings started crawling across the bottom of the television screen. The mix of 70-plus degree temperature and incoming storm clouds threatened to bring disastrous weather. Then it started hailing. Swirling winds, thunder, lightning, balls of ice and a cable blackout were staples of my first hour in B-Town, as they call it. The consensus among the group that had gathered at my brother’s house before we left for the game was that the storm was a good omen for the Hoosiers. The cable blackout, however, was considered bad news. “If we can’t watch, we won’t win,” one of them said.

There was concern that the bar might have lost cable as well, but those fears were quelled immediately when we pulled up to Kilroy’s and were greeted by the boisterous chanting I described earlier. The bar was playing the Baylor game, but no one there could concentrate on or talk about anything but the one that would follow it on the same court. About ten minutes before tip-off, “FUCK KEN-TUC-KY!” was the new chant of choice.

As usual, Zeller set the tone early on in the game for the Hoosiers. While Terence Jones and Marquis Teague got Kentucky off to a hot start, Zeller scored three times and assisted on two baskets to keep Indiana in it. When Davis collected his second foul just 5:54 into the game, meaning he was likely out for most of the rest of the first half, the confidence of the crew at the bar was sky high. ”Got him in foul trouble early. Just like last time. Now Cody has to just take over,” said our random, drunk bar-goer who earlier in the evening had informed me of the future murder of Davis by Zeller. Indiana was within three points and Oladipo was heading to the line for two. He hit both, and the crowd started perking up. “HOO! HOO! HOO! HOO-SIERS!” chants rained down all around me.

AD in foul trouble. This is how IU won the first game. People are going nuts here.
@JADubin5
Jared Dubin

But the celebratory atmosphere didn’t last very long. Zeller picked up two quick fouls of his own and it became a whole new ballgame. Just a freshman, Zeller is still by far the best and most important player on the Hoosiers, and there’s an audible groan when he has to leave the court. “We’re in trouble now.” Another person standing with us points out what’s painfully obvious to everyone in the bar.

Kentucky went on a 15-7 run after Zeller hit the bench. Terence Jones and Darius Miller were getting wherever they wanted on the court and Indiana’s offense looked stagnant without it’s anchor. Michael Kidd-Gilchrist was grabbing every rebound available. Oladipo was gamely driving to the hoop on every possession, but without Zeller on the floor, Kentucky’s defense collapsed around Oladipo. At this point, the natives were getting restless. “Shit. Now you have to bring Cody back in with two fouls, and if he gets a third, we’re pretty much done.”

But the Hoosiers hung around. Zeller’s re-entry into the game opened up the court for Indiana, especially for Watford, the hero of the previous IU-UK game. He made a lay-up and consecutive jumpers, the latter a 3-pointer to tie the game at 37-37.

I couldn’t even hear the people next to me over the roars of the crowd at this point. After Hulls made a jumper, Watford scored the Hoosiers’ last eight points to keep them within three at 50-47 heading into halftime. While Davis’ early absence in the previous game gave Indiana an opportunity to race out to a sizable lead, Zeller’s early foul trouble this time around gave them a big hole to work their way out of. Indiana was lucky to be as close at they were at the half, especially with how bad their defense had been. For the first time all season, they had allowed 50 points in the first half.

The mood at halftime was mixed. Most of the people I was with considered it a lucky break that they were able to cut the lead back to three after falling behind early on, but they were also disappointed that the team didn’t capitalize on Davis’ absence. That feeling was amplified when Kentucky stretched their lead to back to eight points in the early moments of the second half.

This game could get out of hand really quickly if IU doesn't get control right now.
@JADubin5
Jared Dubin

A Jordan Hulls 3-pointer cut the lead to 5, but that’s the closest the Hoosiers would get for the rest of the evening. Kentucky’s lead vacillated between 6 and 12 points throughout, but it never really felt like Indiana was seriously challenging them. It was a period of long, slow acceptance of defeat. The crowd at the bar collectively went through all seven stages of grief in about half an hour.

It got eerily quiet toward the end of the game, as everyone around me slowly accepted that their magical, underdog season was coming to an end.

Faint cheers now, but we know it's all over.
@JADubin5
Jared Dubin

As we walked the streets of Bloomington after the loss, you could hear random passers by discussing the game, the team and – already – the next season. ”Cody’s definitely coming back. And with the guys we have coming in, we can win the Big Ten,” one said. “We’re taking down the National Championship,” opined one particularly optimistic student.

Me: "As good of a season as you could have asked for." My brother: "Better. Thank you for making my senior year relevant, boys.l
@JADubin5
Jared Dubin

My brother’s freshman through junior year coincided with just about the worst three years of Indiana basketball in the history of the school. The school’s all-time winning percentage is .661, but they went 38-66 in his first three years in college: a .365 winning percentage. This year, he got to see home victories against Kentucky (#1 at the time), Ohio State (#2), Michigan (#13), and Michigan State (#5). They hadn’t beaten a top 15 opponent since February 19, 2008, when they beat #15 Purdue at home. My brother was still in high school.

A team that had been picked by many to finish in the bottom half of the Big Ten won 27 games and went to the Sweet 16, where they lost to the consensus best team in the country. It was the school’s first NCAA Tournament berth since my junior year in college (2008) and their first trip to the Sweet 16 since 2002 when they lost to Maryland in the National Championship.

By all accounts, it was the most successful season they’ve had in the last decade, by far. After years of misery, they were finally relevant again. They were officially on their way back. But nobody was satisfied with that. I asked one of the last few stragglers with us last night why.

His response: “This is Indiana. We should beat everybody.”

I Emailed Some Knicks Fans… Again

A few weeks ago I had a rambling e-mail conversation with two of the funniest and most knowledgeable Knicks fans on the Internet: Seth Rosenthal of SBNation’s Knicks blog Posting & Toasting and the great and powerful netw3rk aka Jason Concepcion. Well, I like e-mailing smart, funny people about the Knicks, so I did it again. This time, I bothered Jamie O’Grady (@LoHudKnicks) of The Journal News’ LoHud Knicks Blog and Dan Litvin (@knicksfanblog) of Knicksfan.net with excessive questions and let them do most of the talking and analysis. What follows is what happened. Enjoy. 

Dubin: Well, it was a quiet week in Knicks land. Not really too much to talk about. I have no idea how we’re going to make an article out of us e-mailing each other with all this boringness and lack of activity. OH WAIT, this week was absolutely insane, even by Knicks standards. My bad.

We’ll start, obviously, with the jettisoning of head coach Mike D’Antoni. Where do you guys stand on this? Is it the result of New York’s maniacal savior complex? Was it a case of a coach who should have been able to make things work with Carmelo Anthony and instead let his stubborn refusal to alter his system to suit the talent on his team do him in? Was he a coach set up for failure and then wrongly held accountable for doing exactly that? How do you feel about his Knicks tenure as a whole?

Litvin: This is the first I’m hearing about this! WHAT!??! In all seriousness, I’ve always been a big Mike D’Antoni fan, and I was upset that he left.

D’Antoni was definitely set up for failure. The Knicks lured him to New York with the promise of an embarrassment of riches in terms of talent if he’d suffer through two years of Nate Robinson and Chris Duhon. That and actual riches. As he sullied his coaching record leading a revolving door cast of goons and talentless hacks, the press and fans talked about the “so-called” free pass Donnie Walsh had given him, but always in the context of why he was a crappy coach that couldn’t maximize the “talent” he was provided, like Larry Hughes, or Darko. From day one it seemed as though these observers would hold D’Antoni to the exacting standards to which it holds every coach, despite the common knowledge that we were all supposed to just be biding our time for LeBron James. Indeed the “FIRE D’ANTONI” chants parroted down from the rafters in D’Antoni’s first year.

But intelligent people knew that he would never be terminated unless he failed after the Knicks provided him with some, you know, decent basketball players.

Donnie Walsh did that in the summer of 2010. It wasn’t LeBron James, but Amar’e Stoudemire and Raymond Felton blended nicely with some of the pre-existing young talent like Danilo Gallinari and Wilson Chandler and the Knicks were seen as a rising young squad that was playing with confidence.

But then Carmelo came along. He knew he could join the Knicks as a free agent in the summer of 2011 but he wanted to be paid under the then-existing collective bargaining agreement. So he and his people convinced James Dolan to gut the team for him. Thus, shortly after it seemed like the Knicks were living up to their promise to D’Antoni by giving him a chance to succeed, they knee-capped him by getting rid of his favorite players and replacing them with a guy who fans believed could have made it work with D’Antoni, but probably should have known better.

Carmelo just didn’t fit. Or maybe, D’Antoni didn’t fit anymore. I guess it doesn’t matter. Neither showed any inclination to change but one had to be sacrificed to Moloch. Of course it’s always easier and quicker to jettison the coach, but the way it went down left a bad taste in my mouth because Carmelo’s arrival twice led to upheaval of good vibes and pretty basketball (once after the trade and the other when he throttled Linsanity).

And why couldn’t it work with Carmelo? I mean, what was Mike D’Antoni asking Carmelo to do that was so awful and that he just couldn’t do? Move the ball? Move without the ball? Space the floor? Stop impinging on the point guard’s space?

For whatever reason Carmelo didn’t feel like doing those things. That would lead the D’Antoni Knicks to be 25-38 (including playoffs) in 2010-11 and 2011-12 with ‘Melo and 35-30 in games without him (including the February 6, 2012 game in which Carmelo strained his groin and played less than 6 minutes).

Clearly I’m using this question for some catharsis, and that’s why this answer is so long-winded, so I’ll just close out by saying that I’m not trying to completely absolve D’Antoni. Could he have done something different? By all means. He could have bent to Carmelo’s will and just played how Carmelo wanted to play. He could have done that and won more games with Carmelo than he did, bided his time, and bounced at the end of the year at the expiry of his contract. But D’Antoni believes the game should be played a certain way and he stuck to his principles instead of giving in to a pampered star’s petulance.

D’Antoni’s next team will play his way, and win a bunch of games.

O’Grady: Ugh. I’m already on-record as being mostly disgusted with the premature cessation of D’Antoni’s Knick tenure, but the team’s play since his departure has only reenforced the fact that the relationship had devolved into a marriage made in an NBA Hades, at best. Hades, as you know, is the land of .500 records, a purgatorial weigh station of sorts, where you’re not good enough to win a championship, nor are you bad enough to obtain an elite player in the draft. In other words, almost every Knicks season since “the frozen envelope” brought Patrick Ewing to New York.

But I digress…

In the end, D’Antoni was part victim of circumstance, part slave to his own stubborn philosophies, and unfortunately for him, Gotham is the one place where time is never an ally. Whether fair to proclaim that the ‘stache-lovin’ coach either got what he deserved or was dealt a bad hand certainly remains open to debate, but it is impossible to deny that rare were the opportunities for D’Antoni to work with a cohesive, drama-free roster for any extended period of time.

In fact, other than the first half of the 2010-’11 season, when the team was starting to coalesce around the pace and style of play favored by D’Antoni, at no time was the former Knick coach able to do his job under even a modicum of normalcy. And judging three and a half years at the helm of a mostly rudderless ship, based solely upon a one-month stretch in which the team’s “All-World, superstar” small forward had undeniably taken it upon himself to submarine D’Antoni seems unfair, at least to me. Ironically, though D’Antoni was ultimately held accountable – if you think this was a pure resignation, I’ve got a mustache trimmer to sell you – one his actual failures was that he never held his players publicly accountable. In this town, it’s all about perception. Perhaps if D’Antoni had called Carmelo Anthony out in the media for his unwillingness to “play ball,” so to speak, the coach might have established some cover for himself.

Either way, D’Antoni is gone, and now the players have no more excuses.

Dubin: This particular bit of Dan’s response interested me, “He could have bent to Carmelo’s will and just played how Carmelo wanted to play. He could have done that and won more games with Carmelo than he did, bided his time, and bounced at the end of the year at the expiry of his contract. But D’Antoni believes the game should be played a certain way and he stuck to his principles instead of giving in to a pampered star’s petulance.”

Do you think he should have given in for the sake of winning games rather than sticking to his principles? If he had, would he still be here? Or was this – teaming D’Antoni, Anthony and, to a lesser extent, Stoudemire – a doomed experiment from the start?

Litvin: Well, maybe it’s a distinction between could and would. I think he could, but he seems very principled, doesn’t he? Too principled to change for the sake of one player. And I guess one could argue that this makes D’Antoni a poor coach, for lack of flexibility. But D’Antoni probably wants his identity to be associated with what we saw during Linsanity, and I bet that’s part of the reason he felt comfortable quitting. Applying for his next job, he can declare, “look what I can do if you give me the right pieces”. On the other hand, if he sacrificed his system and led the Knicks to a good record with Carmelo, that would probably look even better on his résumé.

And so I guess it does beg the question, was teaming these guys a doomed experiment from the start? Two rigid, headstrong principals vying for supremacy clearly was not good for the locker room. And it was probably misguided for fans to ever think that Carmelo would be willing to change for a coach that he clearly did not respect.

O’Grady: The question of MDA’s stubbornness v. roster construction is not an easy one. Let’s break it down separately.

The conventional wisdom that D’Antoni was unapologetically hard-headed in refusing to bend his will to the “needs” of his star players is based mostly on supposition, not fact. I can confirm that defense and rebounding were consistently preached by MDA and his staff, even before the addition of Mike Woodson this season. When ‘Melo was first acquired last February, D’Antoni made it a point to focus his efforts on the defensive end of the floor, and though the offense was a work in progress, we heard nothing about the system not being viable. Only when the losses piled up in January – pre-Linsanity, mind you – did whispers of Carmelo’s dissatisfaction begin to surface. And yes, we all saw the point forward experiment fail miserably with ‘Melo earlier this season, but can we at least acknowledge that ‘Melo himself is on-record as saying he likes the offense run through him? Tough to run it through him any more often than the Knicks tried to for the first month of the season, though I realize being a distributor is (GASP!) different than being a scorer.

On the ability of STAT ‘n ‘Melo to make things work, the statistics thus far are conclusive. And not in a good way. Check out Zach Lowe’s fine work on how the pair meshes. Notwithstanding the last four games – all convincing Knick wins – Stoudemire and Anthony may very well be a poor fit together. That they don’t play a lick of defense – again, the last four games reek of coaching change-anomoly – certainly doesn’t help matters, either. I would argue that any offensive system not run by Phil Jackson needs a serviceable point guard to function, and since we only got to see Jeremy Lin play with both ‘Melo and Amar’e for a brief stretch of time, we will never know what the group could have achieved under MDA.

The sample size under Woodson is small, but the effort on display is anything but. Is is disturbing that professional athletes, paid tens of millions of dollars, were apparently not exerting maximum energy for their previously coach? Yup. Surprising? Not really.

Dubin: We’re going to go deeper in Carmelo, but just to finish up with him and D’Antoni here, let me ask a few more questions: Even if Carmelo didn’t change his game, do you feel that he could have been successful in D’Antoni’s system if he bought in entirely?

After coming over in the trade from Denver last season, he played what was arguably the best stretch of basketball of his NBA career (his 22.8 PER in those 27 games would have represented a career-high). Is there any particular reason you think that success didn’t carry over to this year? The always-doomed Point Forward experiment? Stubbornness? Did Stoudemire’s poor play just mean that too much defensive attention was paid to Melo and he couldn’t find his offense as easily (remember, Melo and STAT were the highest scoring duo in the league after the trade last season)? In short, what happened? 

O’Grady: I have no doubt that if Carmelo bought into D’Antoni’s system, he would have met or exceeded his career scoring output and a whole lotta wins would have been forthcoming. Has there ever been a player not named Starbury who has played under D’Antoni that didn’t see his offensive production increase? Under Woodson thus far, the Knicks have basically ran the same motion offense as they did under MDA, with a few more isolation and post-up plays for ‘Melo thrown in. Maybe that’s all Anthony ever wanted all along – and if that was the case, D’Antoni should have appeased him – but ‘Melo is still shooting just as poorly under Woodson as he was under MDA. It’s his all-around effort and energy that have improved, and those should have been there all along.

Litvin: I agree with Jamie on this one. What could have really changed so dramatically between around 10 or 11 AM when news broke that Mike D’Antoni would resign, and later that night when the Knicks manhandled the Portland Trailblazers? If all it took was a bunch of platitudes about accountability and defense to get this team to play hard then Mike D’Antoni was a miserable failure for not providing the requisite lip service.

But I don’t think that’s what happened. Again, the team did play hard and give all out effort during Linsanity. Again, ‘Melo wasn’t around for that. When he returned, team effort vanished into the ether and I think D’Antoni knew it wouldn’t come back as long as ‘Melo continued to play disinterested, aloof ball, which he would continue to do so long as D’Antoni was his coach. That disinterested, aloof ball rubbed off on teammates and affected them mentally, undermined their confidence, which is an attribute that has clearly returned to the team in spades. Clearly a weight has been lifted off of ‘Melo’s teammates backs.

That’s because ‘Melo – the team’s captain, who is also perceived to be their best player – has no excuses anymore for his failure to compete.

And in the three games since D’Antoni left, what’s been different about ‘Melo? It certainly hasn’t been his dreadful shooting, which has continued. No, instead we’ve seen ‘Melo hustle for loose balls, be aggressive on defense, and play more physically than we’ve seen him play as a Knick, period. If people want to think that’s because Mike Woodson fed the press some sound-bites, well, then I don’t know what to tell ‘ya. The reality is that ‘Melo knows it’s his butt on the line now.

Dubin: You’ve both mentioned Melo’s increase in effort level since the coaching change, which is something that I’ve noticed too. It’s definitely a good thing, but I also feel like that’s not really enough for a lot of New York fans. I still get tweets before, during and after games about how “Melo sucks, he’s a bust and a bum and he needs to be traded and he’ll never win.” Do you feel like he has to score at a superstar level to win with fans in this town? Or can he get by being part of the overall team concept, hustling, making plays and scoring when he needs to? Basically, if he’s not the Melo we thought we traded for, and the team is still good, will NY be okay with that? I think they (we) should be, but I get a hunch that plenty of people won’t see it that way.

O’Grady: You bring up a great point and it all comes back to that infamous NY perception-game. We’ve seen Big Apple fans be fine with “superstars” playing more like role players – the 90′s Yankee teams come to mind – but we’ve also seen their ire directed at players whose individual performance doesn’t translate to the team’s overall success, ala ARod and even Ewing to some degree.

‘Melo, like Big Pat and ARod before him will ultimately be judged – and therefore embraced or derided – based on his ability to bring the team to the promised land. Anything short of a Garden-championship for Gotham on Anthony’s watch will be met with scorn as intense (if not more so) as the hype was before his ballyhooed arrival.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qarH-PTKulQ]

Dubin: Do you think Melo is in the same type of situation that LeBron is, though, where he doesn’t just have to win, but be the most important and best player on the team and make all the big shots while winning or people won’t really care? LeBron is in such a precarious situation in Miami because he has Wade with him, and if he’s not literally the one to carry the team to victory all by himself, there will be many who feel he hasn’t accomplished enough. I feel like people in New York are so starved for a (basketball) title that it won’t matter, but there’s also such palpable Melo hate from some people here that I really don’t know. Thoughts?

Litvin: I think if he can be a good player on a winning team, people should accept it. I could care less if he scores 30 points as long as we win. I’m not convinced we need to waste bandwidth on this though since there’s really been no indication that ‘Melo is going to be anything other than the Knicks’ primary scorer. It’s true that in the last few games, the raw numbers suggest that ‘Melo has sacrificed shots and points. But in the games since Woodson took over, which have all been blowout wins, ‘Melo has played just 24, 22, and 29 minutes.

O’Grady: I am not sure LBJ’s and Melo’s situations are analogous in that the former’s team is a championship contender regardless while the latter is a sub .500 player with HIS “super team.” The style v. substance debate may be irrelevant here if the wins don’t come. This is actually the opposite of what most expect from Anthony, in that he’s been pegged as a player whose “gets mines” trumps wins. Now he’s losing and no longer getting his.

Litvin: I can’t speak for the “haters” out there who won’t be happy even if the Knicks win a title if ‘Melo isn’t “the man” on that hypothetical squad. That makes no sense to me. Is it possible that if the Knicks win the title and ‘Melo isn’t the hero, that people will question him the same way they do LeBron? Sure. People will say he’s not like Jordan or Kobe or Tim Duncan. But that’s not a valid baseline assumption anyway as far as I’m concerned.

Personally, if the Knicks win a title I’ll be permanently exhilarated to the point of incoherence. I won’t be able to entertain such thoughts, or tie my shoelaces, or chew my food.

O’Grady: The Knicks will never win a title as long as I’m alive. Sorry, but I made a deal with the devil in 1996 – seriously, he’s ghaslty – in exchange for that Yankee ring. I feel horrible about this, my bad.

Dubin: Let’s go here now: is Melo the most divisive Knicks player of your lifetime? You guys are a little bit older than I am, but I really can’t remember another Knick drawing such a clear dividing line between fans. I’ve said this before, but in the last few weeks leading up to D’Antoni’s exit, it felt like Knicks fans had to choose one of D’Antoni and Melo and defend them to the death. You couldn’t get away with blaming things on both or people from each side would come at you. Can you remember another Knick causing this kind of reaction and dichotomy between fans?

Litvin: I don’t know if ‘Melo is the most divisive Knicks player of my lifetime or if it just feels that way because now we have blogs but especially because now we have Twitter. Imagine if Twitter was as popular as it is now when Marbury manned a Knicks uni (or if it existed in Ewing’s heyday – “He’s not clutch!”).

My recollection is that the vast majority of Knicks fans (including myself) were thrilled when Isiah gave up so many assets (expiring contracts and draft picks) to bring in Steph. Somewhere along the line though the perception turned and during that process I remember there being division between the pro- and anti-Marbury people (obviously with the benefit of hindsight there is almostunanimous agreement amongst Knicks fans that Stephon was the wrong guy to whom to hitch our wagon.)

You’re right though: to this day, even with some time to cool off, it’s difficult to get folks to parse out blame other than exclusively to one or the other party. For example I have followers on Twitter engaging in semantical gymnastics to interpret the following quoteby Carmelo as something other than “I wasn’t trying for 2/3 of this season”:

“The last three games my focus was to have an energy that I haven’t had so far this season, especially on the defensive end,” Anthony said after practice on Monday.

Look, it’s clear that D’Antoni didn’t motivate ‘Melo to play hard but doesn’t ‘Melo also have a professional responsibility?

O’Grady: There was ALWAYS a sharp divide amongst the fans and media alike when it came to Patrick Ewing. Ironically, he was a ball-stopper, too, and a stubborn one at that, but his defense, rebounding and willingness to play hurt alleviated much of the consternation. Patrick’s teams also won because of his contributions, not despite his lack of them, so ‘Melo will be viewed more critically until he consistently puts forth maximum effort on both ends of the floor every single night. We can live with failure from a player, but not indifference. Also, keep in mind, we now live in the instant-access, 24/7 Twitter-sphere, where any schmuck with a blog, no offense intended, gets to speak his mind. It’s just the way of the world now.

Litvin: “We can live with failure from a player, but not indifference.”

Bingo. That’s why Ewing will forever be a legend while ‘Melo still has a lot to prove.

Also, Jamie, go easy on yourself. You’re more than just a shmuck with a blog.

 

Dubin: Speaking of failure and indifference… let’s talk about Amar’e Stoudemire. Seemingly, he just gets a big ol’ pass from both the New York media and a lot of Knicks fans. Whether this is because he was the first one to sign up for the cause or because they view Melo as a much bigger problem, I’m not sure. What I am sure of is that he’s been just as bad, if not worse – okay, worse – than Melo this season, and it hasn’t been nearly as big of a story. How worried about STAT are you going forward? Are you okay with him getting this “free pass” from fans and media? Is there anything that can be done to bring last year’s STAT back?

Litvin: I happen to think STAT has lost a step so, in my opinion, we can forget about ever seeing last year’s STAT again. I mean, he got rejected by the rim against the Pacers on Saturday. WHEN HAS AMAR’E EVER BEEN REJECTED BY THE RIM? It’s sad, really.

He has to adjust to be more effective below the rim and I actually think we’re seeing some of that now. He’s still quick enough to make moves around the basket and the last few games we’ve seen him repeatedly employ a nifty little spinning reverse lay-in (he used to have a spinning reverse dunk). And I do think the shot will come back – it seems like that’s already starting to happen – and his numbers will improve.

Amar’e does get somewhat of a pass from fans because he “saved” the franchise from suffering the same fate as the 2000 Chicago Bulls team that employed a similar cap-clearing strategy to target Tracy McGrady and Tim Duncan and instead came away with Ron Mercer. He may also get somewhat of a pass because he’s more skilled than ‘Melo at saying the right things to the press, because he seems to be a genuine person, and because maybe, just maybe, he duped us into thinking that he’s just incapable of playing defense (it’s still not great but it’s improved under Woodson), boxing out, and performing other, non-offense related duties, when in reality he may have just been neglecting to try.

Note though how he only gets “somewhat” of a pass. That’s because I think fans are cognizant that Amar’e's been poor on offense and piss poor on defense. It just isn’t talked about as much, owing to the variety of factors (above) enabling him to come across as likeable, combined with ‘Melo’s tendency to attract controversy.

O’Grady: The key difference between Amar’e and ‘Melo – beyond the fact that the former’s “brave” $100 million arrival bought him some cover with the fans – is that Amar’e knows what to say and when to say it. Stoudemire, who ironically put his foot in his mouth repeatedly during his Phoenix tenure, is always accountable nowadays and rarely offers excuses for his poor play. ‘Melo, on the other hand, has been something of a drama queen since he manipulated his trade to New York, and as such has a far shorter leash from the fans.

There is no denying that both players have disappointed with their play this season, but for whatever reason, Amar’e is viewed as a more sympathetic figure. It’s worth nothing that D’Antoni himself believed that the Suns would have won at least 1 or 2 rings if they had a power forward with even half of Stoudemire’s basketball-IQ. He simply isn’t an intuitive player, and no amount of coaching will ever fix his inadequacies. His supreme athleticism has carried him throughout his career until this season, but it remains to be seen whether he can grow from a cerebral standpoint as the physical tools further deteriorate.

This email chain started a few days after Mike D’Antoni left the Knicks in the midst of another long losing streak. That last email was sent just minutes before the Knicks beat the Raptors soundly for the fourth consecutive win. Winning streaks can often make you think all of your problems have been solved, but we know better. HUGE thank you’s again going out to Jamie O’Grady of The LoHud Knicks Blog and Dan Litvin of Knicksfan.net. They carried me. 

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