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Ryan Hollins and One March Night

Every once in a while in the NBA, there comes an anomaly that makes you wonder if you just had an incredibly vivid dream or if you truly witnessed it occur. Perhaps my favorite example of this was Bobby Sura’s inexplicable outburst at the tail end of the 2003-04 season when he posted not one, but two consecutive triple doubles for the Atlanta Hawks. Remarkably, he thought he had notched a third straight 3×2 before the league decided that the Ricky Davis approach to racking up stats would not be allowed. One year later, he retired from the league marking the end of a ten year career, never to be thought of again until this post. But this isn’t about Bobby Sura; it’s about another player whose name will also most likely be forgotten to the annals of time with ten years: Ryan Kenwood Hollins.

Acquired in the summer of 2010 from Minnesota with Ramon Sessions in exchange for Cleveland Cavalier fan favorite Delonte West and Sebastian Telfair, Hollins proceeded to spend the better portion of a season and a half frustrating Cavalier faithful to no end. By the third week of this season, my iPhone had begun to autocorrect “Hollins” to “HOLLINS” due to the amount of times I tweeted in earnest imploring Byron Scott to stop playing him at center. It’s not that Cavs fans had anything against Hollins personally; it’s just that there were five times a game that he would do something that would make you want to throw your remote through the television. Specifically, it became increasingly difficult to understand how a seven foot tall center could be allergic to rebounding at the rate Hollins performed. To wit, in the past two seasons, there have been 60 instances of a player 7’0” or taller playing in at least 20 games in a season. Ryan Hollins’ Total Rebound Percentage in those seasons rank 58th and 59th, edging out only Andrea Bargnani’s 2010-11 campaign. His lack of an offensive game combined with his tendency to foul at inopportune times also drove fans up a wall. In 25 games played this year, Hollins recorded more fouls than points five times. There’s no easy way to calculate how many players record more fouls than points in at least 20% of games played, but at least we know Hollins makes the list. Adding to the constant criticism of Hollins was the fact that you could easily lose count of the number of times he went up for a dunk and was either stripped of the ball or missed the dunk completely. I shudder to think of the number of cases of alcohol poisoning which would have resulted had a dedicated person turned this into a drinking game. Even through all of the aggravation, heartaches, and headaches, Hollins still provided the unequivocal highlight of the Cavs dismal 2010-11 season. On March 29, 2011,Hollins had his Bobby Sura moment.

In true Hollins fashion, there was nothing statistically that he did in that game that would make your jaw drop. He played 36 minutes and finished with 13 points, 3 rebounds, 2 assists, 2 steals, 3 blocks, and 5 fouls. Stat lines like that happen with relative frequency over the course of the year, but it was the things Hollins did in that game which don’t show up in the box score that made it infamous. Getting into a verbal altercation with Dwyane Wade early in the first half earning double technical fouls which energized both the Cavs and the crowd. Frustrating Erick Dampier to the point of Dampier shoving him down prior to an inbounds pass. Rejecting a Chris Bosh shot attempt at the rim and altering Bosh’s follow up shot which led to an Anthony Parker fast break three pointer from the corner. And then the pinnacle of the night, blocking another Bosh attempt and finishing the break by throwing down a dunk which brought Quicken Loans Arena to its feet. After being largely invisible for the entire season, it seemed like Hollins was omnipresent. By the time the dust had settled, the Cavs secured one of their 19 wins of the season. Much like the Sura outburst, fans were left wondering, “How?”, “Why?”, “What?”, and “Really? Him?”

To this day, I’m not sure we ever got an answer to those questions; it was just one of those things that leaves you wondering if it was real or just fantasy. Anyone who watched that team knows that there weren’t many highlights of the 2010-11 Cavs season, but Ryan Hollins played a key part in the biggest one of them all. And no matter what memories my iPhone reminds of the next time I type his name, the night of March 29 is what I will always remember about him.

Goodbye Ryan Hollins.

Hustling Cager Jeff Foster Retires

james m (flickr)

“It’s with deep regret that I have to conclude my basketball career,” said Foster. “I’ve given my all to the Pacers and the community the last 13 years. I had hoped to be able to finish the season, but unfortunately my back problems prevented that from occurring. I want to thank the Simon family and the Pacers’ organization for 13 memorable years.”

- Via Jeff Foster Retires from NBA  from Inside Hoops

And with that, the last link to the last glory years of the Pacers has left the court.

Jeff Foster was a rookie on the 2000 Indiana Pacers that lost in 6 games to the Los Angeles Lakers, although Foster was left off the playoff roster. In a much more prominent role, Foster started alongside Jermain O’Neal for the 2004 Pacers that won 61 games and lost in heart aching fashion to the Detroit Pistons in the Eastern Conference Finals. Then came The Troubles. Brawls, firearms, drug possession and losing.

But this here was a player who gave all the damns you could ever want. Jeff Foster was there hustling his butt off, diving for loose balls, snaring down rebounds and getting under the skin of opponents with his defense. When the Pacers finally returned to the postseason last year, it was a joy for me to see Foster take to the court with the new Pacers and show them a little of the playoff mettle he saw from old-timers like Reggie Miller, Dale Davis and Derrick McKey when he was young and on the bench.

He wasn’t particularly spry with the bad back that forced his retirement today limiting his effectiveness then, but he still dished out some (at-times unnecessarily) hard fouls and caromed rebounds in his limited time on the court. It was enjoyable, but he was a shell of himself.

During his heyday (2002 – 2009), Foster ranked 7th in the league in total rebound percentage and 6th in total rebounds per 36 minutes.  Foster also delivered the 24th most fouls while playing the 110th most minutes. He was really getting his money’s worth and Indiana fans appreciated the effort he always put forth.

In his 13 seasons, Foster managed to climb high in several all-time categories for the Pacers. Unsurprisingly he made the highest ascent in three telling categories.

Games Played – 4th with 764

Rebounds – 4th with 5,248

And, yes, fouls – 4th with 1,921

I’m sad to see him go, but I know Luol Deng can sleep easier at night.

Farewell, Jeff Foster.

Piecing Together A New Tyreke Evans

Photo by Gjon Mili, 1949

Tyreke Evans’ rookie season is easily the worst thing to happen to his career so far. After the 20-5-5 season, expectations inflated to absurd levels and fans championed Evans’ lifelong basketball vices. Even then, Evans was a deeply flawed player, but it’s hard to argue with success. It’s hard to argue with a shaky jumper when there was a LeBron-esque matter-of-factness to his forays to the rim; not so much in the explosion as much as in the inevitability. At his best, he was an absolutely unguardable offensive force capable of making difficult shots under pressure and finishing around the rim with ease, bouncing smaller and larger player around like rag dolls. At his worst, he was a house of cards; his god-given talent neatly layered into something appearing stable and capable of being built upon.

It doesn’t take a genius to realize that the house, as it is and has been constructed, is in shambles.

Since then, we’ve only been met with disappointment; first with his unfortunate bouts with plantar fasciitis and now with his horrifically-bad shooting percentages. And they are truly horrific. Outside of shots taken around the rim, he is shooting below 30 percent from every other area on the court. Blame it on the new system, or blame it on Tyreke never truly buying into changing his game.

Our friends at Cowbell Kingdom recently had Evans’ new shooting coach, Keith Veney, on their podcast. Veney brings up an interesting tidbit about Evans — He wasn’t always a bad shooter.

I mean, the thing is when he was growing up, he could shoot the ball pretty good, so, it’s not like he’s an awful shooter.

via Cowbell Kingdom Podcast Ep 37: Keith “Shot Doc” Veney, Tyreke Evans’ Shooting Coach

It’s a sentiment echoed by Tyreke’s brother, Reggie:

 ”That dribble-drive stuff all started with ‘Cal,’” said Reggie Evans, referring to former Memphis coach John Calipari. “He told Tyreke to just get the ball and drive to the basket because nobody could stop him. Now we’re trying to get Tyreke back to doing what he does best, the way he played in high school. He can shoot, and he can do a lot of other things, too.”

via Ailene Voisin: It’s now up to Evans to make it work | Sacramento Bee (3/18/12)

It’s difficult to imagine something as essential as a jump shot simply vanishing after high school, but they might not be wrong:

From DraftExpress in 2007:

More than just a slasher, Evans is also an impressive perimeter shooter, showing range that extends beyond the 3-point line, and the ability to swish tough shots impressively off the dribble. He’s got a nice mid-range game as well, being able to create separation instantaneously with a sharp pull-up and difficult fade-away. What’s odd is that he chooses to go to this fade-away move even from stand-still positions, something that will probably need to be corrected at some point, much like LeBron James did.

From NBADraft.net in 2007:

Can shoot from anywhere on the court. Streaky, but can be lethal when he’s on … Already has an NBA range from behind the arc … Can create his own shot and is excellent pulling up off the dribble … A very good shooter, however the mechanics on his release are a little funky. He may need to adjust his shooting form some

From ESPN in 2007:

He can shoot it well from mid-range 15′, his 3pt shot needs work. At the present time, he is not a great shooter but certainly makes shots.

Of course, that fade has never left Evans’ shot, and the discrepancy in talent from high school to college and the NBA is significant, but nowhere in the script written for Evans did it say he’d be shooting around 28 percent from areas away from the rim in his third NBA season. It’s an alarming regression, but if Tyreke Evans the reliable shooter ever did exist, it should be possible to extract that player once again, right?

Tyreke is only 22. Despite his regression, there’s still plenty to salvage and plenty to improve. But it’ll be a challenge, especially for a player who has been known as a ball stopper since the beginning of his high school recruitment. Somehow, he’ll have to simultaneously reclaim traits from his past while also seceding from the one constant in his game.

It’s the other part of this new deal – the need to move without the ball, to attack from the baseline and different angles, to rely on teammates – that requires the biggest adjustment. And for Evans to fully capitalize on his size and immense physical tools, whether as a slashing small forward or two guard, he has to make some shots.

“We’re asking him to make sacrifices,” Smart added, “and if he invests, it’s going to help all of us.”

via Ailene Voisin: It’s now up to Evans to make it work | Sacramento Bee (3/18/12)

The adjustment Smart is asking Tyreke to make is a big one; one he hasn’t made at any point in his basketball-playing life. Taking one of Tyreke’s biggest strengths—his devastating first step and shiftiness—and removing the ball from the equation will be an arduous process. It’ll force Evans to reevaluate his place on the floor as he relinquishes some of the control that he had on the ball as an individual to help his team control the entire flow of offense. According to mySynergySports, about 5.4 percent of Evans’ total shot attempts were from cuts. Conveniently, he shot 69 percent on those attempts, 8 percent higher than the second-highest play type. But if anything has been made clear about Tyreke’s game, it’s that tinkering with a player’s nature takes a lot of time and a lot of buying in.

via Cowbell Kingdom

Of course, it’s easy to call Tyreke Evans a selfish player. It explains his isolation-heavy game and his remaining stagnant amid serious team changes. But as the excellent video above shows, Evans is taking the necessary steps. In the video, Kings starting point guard Isaiah Thomas points out the negative perception of Evans as a result of his one-on-one playing style. And it’s true; what we see him do on the court weighs heavily on how we see him on a holistic level. But for Tyreke to destroy the perception, he also has to destroy his current reality. The Kings are evolving. So are the defenses that have grown immune to his tricks. Evans’ future, one that looked so promising only two seasons ago, rests entirely on his ability to let go.

Unexpected Joys

If I were a basketball player (I’m not), there probably isn’t another player in the world I’d rather be complimented by than Kobe Bryant. He’s seen it all. He knows what it’s like to be a struggling rookie. He knows what it means to grow into stardom, and to become one of the most recognized names in sports.  Beneath his perma-serious face, his psychotic competitive drive, his obsessive eye for the game’s nuances, he’s just another fan of the game—a very, very important/scary fan.

So receiving a compliment from Kobe shouldn’t be taken lightly. Unfortunately, I am at a stage in my life where there is absolutely nothing Kobe would compliment me on. And upon closer inspection, it is unlikely that I will ever do anything worth such rare praise. I’ve more or less come to terms with that, and so instead of wallowing, I’ve decided to bask vicariously in the pride of young players who have been bestowed such an honor.

Like, say, Chandler Parsons.

via ClutchFans

Now, it’s no secret that about much of the Hardwood Paroxysm staff is absolutely in love with the guy’s game. It’s hard not to be. The skills Parsons demonstrated in Florida have ported much more quickly into the NBA than most expected, which speaks a lot to how hard he’s worked to get the coaching staff to pay attention to his potential as a facilitator and a defender. Especially when it seemed logical in the extended offseason to develop him as a end-of-the-bench spot-up man. Parsons has been a revelation on defense, using his size, lateral quickness, and extremely active hands to play effective (and fearless) D on some of the league’s most potent scorers. It was enough for Kobe to wipe the generally smug look off his face and dole out some serious praise.

Parsons is having a fantastic March, and people are taking notice. But the newfound attention is made that much better when a player with that amount of influence takes the time to commend your work.

Parsons is of a distinguished few; last season, Kobe took the time to speak about two other young guns in the league.

On Gordon Hayward:

 ”I’m very, very fond of him. He’s a very-skilled, all-around player. I think he’s going to have a very bright future in this league. He reminds me of a more talented Jeff Hornacek. Jeff couldn’t put the ball on the floor as well as [Hayward] can.”

Via Lakers’ Bryant, Jazz praise Hayward | The Salt Lake Tribune (4/7/11)

On DeMar DeRozan:

“I love DeMar,” Bryant said after the game. “I have known him for a long time, obviously with him coming to my camps and things like that…I think he did a great job. He just needs to continue to work on his game, continue to work on his jumpshot and I think he’ll be fine.”

Via DeMar DeRozan: A talent in progress | Holly MacKenzie, RaptorBlog (12/19/10)

It’s good to know that even in the NBA, even for a player of Kobe’s status, there is awareness and appreciation for anyone willing to put in good work. Basketball is a competitive sport, but there is room for respect and acknowledgement. Sometimes, these small gestures are enough to propel good into great. From Kobe, these comments are not only uncommon, but unexpected. Therein lies the joy. Those of power and prestige have an eye for hard work and talent in low places, even when we don’t expect them to.

I Emailed Some Knicks Fans… Again

A few weeks ago I had a rambling e-mail conversation with two of the funniest and most knowledgeable Knicks fans on the Internet: Seth Rosenthal of SBNation’s Knicks blog Posting & Toasting and the great and powerful netw3rk aka Jason Concepcion. Well, I like e-mailing smart, funny people about the Knicks, so I did it again. This time, I bothered Jamie O’Grady (@LoHudKnicks) of The Journal News’ LoHud Knicks Blog and Dan Litvin (@knicksfanblog) of Knicksfan.net with excessive questions and let them do most of the talking and analysis. What follows is what happened. Enjoy. 

Dubin: Well, it was a quiet week in Knicks land. Not really too much to talk about. I have no idea how we’re going to make an article out of us e-mailing each other with all this boringness and lack of activity. OH WAIT, this week was absolutely insane, even by Knicks standards. My bad.

We’ll start, obviously, with the jettisoning of head coach Mike D’Antoni. Where do you guys stand on this? Is it the result of New York’s maniacal savior complex? Was it a case of a coach who should have been able to make things work with Carmelo Anthony and instead let his stubborn refusal to alter his system to suit the talent on his team do him in? Was he a coach set up for failure and then wrongly held accountable for doing exactly that? How do you feel about his Knicks tenure as a whole?

Litvin: This is the first I’m hearing about this! WHAT!??! In all seriousness, I’ve always been a big Mike D’Antoni fan, and I was upset that he left.

D’Antoni was definitely set up for failure. The Knicks lured him to New York with the promise of an embarrassment of riches in terms of talent if he’d suffer through two years of Nate Robinson and Chris Duhon. That and actual riches. As he sullied his coaching record leading a revolving door cast of goons and talentless hacks, the press and fans talked about the “so-called” free pass Donnie Walsh had given him, but always in the context of why he was a crappy coach that couldn’t maximize the “talent” he was provided, like Larry Hughes, or Darko. From day one it seemed as though these observers would hold D’Antoni to the exacting standards to which it holds every coach, despite the common knowledge that we were all supposed to just be biding our time for LeBron James. Indeed the “FIRE D’ANTONI” chants parroted down from the rafters in D’Antoni’s first year.

But intelligent people knew that he would never be terminated unless he failed after the Knicks provided him with some, you know, decent basketball players.

Donnie Walsh did that in the summer of 2010. It wasn’t LeBron James, but Amar’e Stoudemire and Raymond Felton blended nicely with some of the pre-existing young talent like Danilo Gallinari and Wilson Chandler and the Knicks were seen as a rising young squad that was playing with confidence.

But then Carmelo came along. He knew he could join the Knicks as a free agent in the summer of 2011 but he wanted to be paid under the then-existing collective bargaining agreement. So he and his people convinced James Dolan to gut the team for him. Thus, shortly after it seemed like the Knicks were living up to their promise to D’Antoni by giving him a chance to succeed, they knee-capped him by getting rid of his favorite players and replacing them with a guy who fans believed could have made it work with D’Antoni, but probably should have known better.

Carmelo just didn’t fit. Or maybe, D’Antoni didn’t fit anymore. I guess it doesn’t matter. Neither showed any inclination to change but one had to be sacrificed to Moloch. Of course it’s always easier and quicker to jettison the coach, but the way it went down left a bad taste in my mouth because Carmelo’s arrival twice led to upheaval of good vibes and pretty basketball (once after the trade and the other when he throttled Linsanity).

And why couldn’t it work with Carmelo? I mean, what was Mike D’Antoni asking Carmelo to do that was so awful and that he just couldn’t do? Move the ball? Move without the ball? Space the floor? Stop impinging on the point guard’s space?

For whatever reason Carmelo didn’t feel like doing those things. That would lead the D’Antoni Knicks to be 25-38 (including playoffs) in 2010-11 and 2011-12 with ‘Melo and 35-30 in games without him (including the February 6, 2012 game in which Carmelo strained his groin and played less than 6 minutes).

Clearly I’m using this question for some catharsis, and that’s why this answer is so long-winded, so I’ll just close out by saying that I’m not trying to completely absolve D’Antoni. Could he have done something different? By all means. He could have bent to Carmelo’s will and just played how Carmelo wanted to play. He could have done that and won more games with Carmelo than he did, bided his time, and bounced at the end of the year at the expiry of his contract. But D’Antoni believes the game should be played a certain way and he stuck to his principles instead of giving in to a pampered star’s petulance.

D’Antoni’s next team will play his way, and win a bunch of games.

O’Grady: Ugh. I’m already on-record as being mostly disgusted with the premature cessation of D’Antoni’s Knick tenure, but the team’s play since his departure has only reenforced the fact that the relationship had devolved into a marriage made in an NBA Hades, at best. Hades, as you know, is the land of .500 records, a purgatorial weigh station of sorts, where you’re not good enough to win a championship, nor are you bad enough to obtain an elite player in the draft. In other words, almost every Knicks season since “the frozen envelope” brought Patrick Ewing to New York.

But I digress…

In the end, D’Antoni was part victim of circumstance, part slave to his own stubborn philosophies, and unfortunately for him, Gotham is the one place where time is never an ally. Whether fair to proclaim that the ‘stache-lovin’ coach either got what he deserved or was dealt a bad hand certainly remains open to debate, but it is impossible to deny that rare were the opportunities for D’Antoni to work with a cohesive, drama-free roster for any extended period of time.

In fact, other than the first half of the 2010-’11 season, when the team was starting to coalesce around the pace and style of play favored by D’Antoni, at no time was the former Knick coach able to do his job under even a modicum of normalcy. And judging three and a half years at the helm of a mostly rudderless ship, based solely upon a one-month stretch in which the team’s “All-World, superstar” small forward had undeniably taken it upon himself to submarine D’Antoni seems unfair, at least to me. Ironically, though D’Antoni was ultimately held accountable – if you think this was a pure resignation, I’ve got a mustache trimmer to sell you – one his actual failures was that he never held his players publicly accountable. In this town, it’s all about perception. Perhaps if D’Antoni had called Carmelo Anthony out in the media for his unwillingness to “play ball,” so to speak, the coach might have established some cover for himself.

Either way, D’Antoni is gone, and now the players have no more excuses.

Dubin: This particular bit of Dan’s response interested me, “He could have bent to Carmelo’s will and just played how Carmelo wanted to play. He could have done that and won more games with Carmelo than he did, bided his time, and bounced at the end of the year at the expiry of his contract. But D’Antoni believes the game should be played a certain way and he stuck to his principles instead of giving in to a pampered star’s petulance.”

Do you think he should have given in for the sake of winning games rather than sticking to his principles? If he had, would he still be here? Or was this – teaming D’Antoni, Anthony and, to a lesser extent, Stoudemire – a doomed experiment from the start?

Litvin: Well, maybe it’s a distinction between could and would. I think he could, but he seems very principled, doesn’t he? Too principled to change for the sake of one player. And I guess one could argue that this makes D’Antoni a poor coach, for lack of flexibility. But D’Antoni probably wants his identity to be associated with what we saw during Linsanity, and I bet that’s part of the reason he felt comfortable quitting. Applying for his next job, he can declare, “look what I can do if you give me the right pieces”. On the other hand, if he sacrificed his system and led the Knicks to a good record with Carmelo, that would probably look even better on his résumé.

And so I guess it does beg the question, was teaming these guys a doomed experiment from the start? Two rigid, headstrong principals vying for supremacy clearly was not good for the locker room. And it was probably misguided for fans to ever think that Carmelo would be willing to change for a coach that he clearly did not respect.

O’Grady: The question of MDA’s stubbornness v. roster construction is not an easy one. Let’s break it down separately.

The conventional wisdom that D’Antoni was unapologetically hard-headed in refusing to bend his will to the “needs” of his star players is based mostly on supposition, not fact. I can confirm that defense and rebounding were consistently preached by MDA and his staff, even before the addition of Mike Woodson this season. When ‘Melo was first acquired last February, D’Antoni made it a point to focus his efforts on the defensive end of the floor, and though the offense was a work in progress, we heard nothing about the system not being viable. Only when the losses piled up in January – pre-Linsanity, mind you – did whispers of Carmelo’s dissatisfaction begin to surface. And yes, we all saw the point forward experiment fail miserably with ‘Melo earlier this season, but can we at least acknowledge that ‘Melo himself is on-record as saying he likes the offense run through him? Tough to run it through him any more often than the Knicks tried to for the first month of the season, though I realize being a distributor is (GASP!) different than being a scorer.

On the ability of STAT ‘n ‘Melo to make things work, the statistics thus far are conclusive. And not in a good way. Check out Zach Lowe’s fine work on how the pair meshes. Notwithstanding the last four games – all convincing Knick wins – Stoudemire and Anthony may very well be a poor fit together. That they don’t play a lick of defense – again, the last four games reek of coaching change-anomoly – certainly doesn’t help matters, either. I would argue that any offensive system not run by Phil Jackson needs a serviceable point guard to function, and since we only got to see Jeremy Lin play with both ‘Melo and Amar’e for a brief stretch of time, we will never know what the group could have achieved under MDA.

The sample size under Woodson is small, but the effort on display is anything but. Is is disturbing that professional athletes, paid tens of millions of dollars, were apparently not exerting maximum energy for their previously coach? Yup. Surprising? Not really.

Dubin: We’re going to go deeper in Carmelo, but just to finish up with him and D’Antoni here, let me ask a few more questions: Even if Carmelo didn’t change his game, do you feel that he could have been successful in D’Antoni’s system if he bought in entirely?

After coming over in the trade from Denver last season, he played what was arguably the best stretch of basketball of his NBA career (his 22.8 PER in those 27 games would have represented a career-high). Is there any particular reason you think that success didn’t carry over to this year? The always-doomed Point Forward experiment? Stubbornness? Did Stoudemire’s poor play just mean that too much defensive attention was paid to Melo and he couldn’t find his offense as easily (remember, Melo and STAT were the highest scoring duo in the league after the trade last season)? In short, what happened? 

O’Grady: I have no doubt that if Carmelo bought into D’Antoni’s system, he would have met or exceeded his career scoring output and a whole lotta wins would have been forthcoming. Has there ever been a player not named Starbury who has played under D’Antoni that didn’t see his offensive production increase? Under Woodson thus far, the Knicks have basically ran the same motion offense as they did under MDA, with a few more isolation and post-up plays for ‘Melo thrown in. Maybe that’s all Anthony ever wanted all along – and if that was the case, D’Antoni should have appeased him – but ‘Melo is still shooting just as poorly under Woodson as he was under MDA. It’s his all-around effort and energy that have improved, and those should have been there all along.

Litvin: I agree with Jamie on this one. What could have really changed so dramatically between around 10 or 11 AM when news broke that Mike D’Antoni would resign, and later that night when the Knicks manhandled the Portland Trailblazers? If all it took was a bunch of platitudes about accountability and defense to get this team to play hard then Mike D’Antoni was a miserable failure for not providing the requisite lip service.

But I don’t think that’s what happened. Again, the team did play hard and give all out effort during Linsanity. Again, ‘Melo wasn’t around for that. When he returned, team effort vanished into the ether and I think D’Antoni knew it wouldn’t come back as long as ‘Melo continued to play disinterested, aloof ball, which he would continue to do so long as D’Antoni was his coach. That disinterested, aloof ball rubbed off on teammates and affected them mentally, undermined their confidence, which is an attribute that has clearly returned to the team in spades. Clearly a weight has been lifted off of ‘Melo’s teammates backs.

That’s because ‘Melo – the team’s captain, who is also perceived to be their best player – has no excuses anymore for his failure to compete.

And in the three games since D’Antoni left, what’s been different about ‘Melo? It certainly hasn’t been his dreadful shooting, which has continued. No, instead we’ve seen ‘Melo hustle for loose balls, be aggressive on defense, and play more physically than we’ve seen him play as a Knick, period. If people want to think that’s because Mike Woodson fed the press some sound-bites, well, then I don’t know what to tell ‘ya. The reality is that ‘Melo knows it’s his butt on the line now.

Dubin: You’ve both mentioned Melo’s increase in effort level since the coaching change, which is something that I’ve noticed too. It’s definitely a good thing, but I also feel like that’s not really enough for a lot of New York fans. I still get tweets before, during and after games about how “Melo sucks, he’s a bust and a bum and he needs to be traded and he’ll never win.” Do you feel like he has to score at a superstar level to win with fans in this town? Or can he get by being part of the overall team concept, hustling, making plays and scoring when he needs to? Basically, if he’s not the Melo we thought we traded for, and the team is still good, will NY be okay with that? I think they (we) should be, but I get a hunch that plenty of people won’t see it that way.

O’Grady: You bring up a great point and it all comes back to that infamous NY perception-game. We’ve seen Big Apple fans be fine with “superstars” playing more like role players – the 90′s Yankee teams come to mind – but we’ve also seen their ire directed at players whose individual performance doesn’t translate to the team’s overall success, ala ARod and even Ewing to some degree.

‘Melo, like Big Pat and ARod before him will ultimately be judged – and therefore embraced or derided – based on his ability to bring the team to the promised land. Anything short of a Garden-championship for Gotham on Anthony’s watch will be met with scorn as intense (if not more so) as the hype was before his ballyhooed arrival.

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qarH-PTKulQ]

Dubin: Do you think Melo is in the same type of situation that LeBron is, though, where he doesn’t just have to win, but be the most important and best player on the team and make all the big shots while winning or people won’t really care? LeBron is in such a precarious situation in Miami because he has Wade with him, and if he’s not literally the one to carry the team to victory all by himself, there will be many who feel he hasn’t accomplished enough. I feel like people in New York are so starved for a (basketball) title that it won’t matter, but there’s also such palpable Melo hate from some people here that I really don’t know. Thoughts?

Litvin: I think if he can be a good player on a winning team, people should accept it. I could care less if he scores 30 points as long as we win. I’m not convinced we need to waste bandwidth on this though since there’s really been no indication that ‘Melo is going to be anything other than the Knicks’ primary scorer. It’s true that in the last few games, the raw numbers suggest that ‘Melo has sacrificed shots and points. But in the games since Woodson took over, which have all been blowout wins, ‘Melo has played just 24, 22, and 29 minutes.

O’Grady: I am not sure LBJ’s and Melo’s situations are analogous in that the former’s team is a championship contender regardless while the latter is a sub .500 player with HIS “super team.” The style v. substance debate may be irrelevant here if the wins don’t come. This is actually the opposite of what most expect from Anthony, in that he’s been pegged as a player whose “gets mines” trumps wins. Now he’s losing and no longer getting his.

Litvin: I can’t speak for the “haters” out there who won’t be happy even if the Knicks win a title if ‘Melo isn’t “the man” on that hypothetical squad. That makes no sense to me. Is it possible that if the Knicks win the title and ‘Melo isn’t the hero, that people will question him the same way they do LeBron? Sure. People will say he’s not like Jordan or Kobe or Tim Duncan. But that’s not a valid baseline assumption anyway as far as I’m concerned.

Personally, if the Knicks win a title I’ll be permanently exhilarated to the point of incoherence. I won’t be able to entertain such thoughts, or tie my shoelaces, or chew my food.

O’Grady: The Knicks will never win a title as long as I’m alive. Sorry, but I made a deal with the devil in 1996 – seriously, he’s ghaslty – in exchange for that Yankee ring. I feel horrible about this, my bad.

Dubin: Let’s go here now: is Melo the most divisive Knicks player of your lifetime? You guys are a little bit older than I am, but I really can’t remember another Knick drawing such a clear dividing line between fans. I’ve said this before, but in the last few weeks leading up to D’Antoni’s exit, it felt like Knicks fans had to choose one of D’Antoni and Melo and defend them to the death. You couldn’t get away with blaming things on both or people from each side would come at you. Can you remember another Knick causing this kind of reaction and dichotomy between fans?

Litvin: I don’t know if ‘Melo is the most divisive Knicks player of my lifetime or if it just feels that way because now we have blogs but especially because now we have Twitter. Imagine if Twitter was as popular as it is now when Marbury manned a Knicks uni (or if it existed in Ewing’s heyday – “He’s not clutch!”).

My recollection is that the vast majority of Knicks fans (including myself) were thrilled when Isiah gave up so many assets (expiring contracts and draft picks) to bring in Steph. Somewhere along the line though the perception turned and during that process I remember there being division between the pro- and anti-Marbury people (obviously with the benefit of hindsight there is almostunanimous agreement amongst Knicks fans that Stephon was the wrong guy to whom to hitch our wagon.)

You’re right though: to this day, even with some time to cool off, it’s difficult to get folks to parse out blame other than exclusively to one or the other party. For example I have followers on Twitter engaging in semantical gymnastics to interpret the following quoteby Carmelo as something other than “I wasn’t trying for 2/3 of this season”:

“The last three games my focus was to have an energy that I haven’t had so far this season, especially on the defensive end,” Anthony said after practice on Monday.

Look, it’s clear that D’Antoni didn’t motivate ‘Melo to play hard but doesn’t ‘Melo also have a professional responsibility?

O’Grady: There was ALWAYS a sharp divide amongst the fans and media alike when it came to Patrick Ewing. Ironically, he was a ball-stopper, too, and a stubborn one at that, but his defense, rebounding and willingness to play hurt alleviated much of the consternation. Patrick’s teams also won because of his contributions, not despite his lack of them, so ‘Melo will be viewed more critically until he consistently puts forth maximum effort on both ends of the floor every single night. We can live with failure from a player, but not indifference. Also, keep in mind, we now live in the instant-access, 24/7 Twitter-sphere, where any schmuck with a blog, no offense intended, gets to speak his mind. It’s just the way of the world now.

Litvin: “We can live with failure from a player, but not indifference.”

Bingo. That’s why Ewing will forever be a legend while ‘Melo still has a lot to prove.

Also, Jamie, go easy on yourself. You’re more than just a shmuck with a blog.

 

Dubin: Speaking of failure and indifference… let’s talk about Amar’e Stoudemire. Seemingly, he just gets a big ol’ pass from both the New York media and a lot of Knicks fans. Whether this is because he was the first one to sign up for the cause or because they view Melo as a much bigger problem, I’m not sure. What I am sure of is that he’s been just as bad, if not worse – okay, worse – than Melo this season, and it hasn’t been nearly as big of a story. How worried about STAT are you going forward? Are you okay with him getting this “free pass” from fans and media? Is there anything that can be done to bring last year’s STAT back?

Litvin: I happen to think STAT has lost a step so, in my opinion, we can forget about ever seeing last year’s STAT again. I mean, he got rejected by the rim against the Pacers on Saturday. WHEN HAS AMAR’E EVER BEEN REJECTED BY THE RIM? It’s sad, really.

He has to adjust to be more effective below the rim and I actually think we’re seeing some of that now. He’s still quick enough to make moves around the basket and the last few games we’ve seen him repeatedly employ a nifty little spinning reverse lay-in (he used to have a spinning reverse dunk). And I do think the shot will come back – it seems like that’s already starting to happen – and his numbers will improve.

Amar’e does get somewhat of a pass from fans because he “saved” the franchise from suffering the same fate as the 2000 Chicago Bulls team that employed a similar cap-clearing strategy to target Tracy McGrady and Tim Duncan and instead came away with Ron Mercer. He may also get somewhat of a pass because he’s more skilled than ‘Melo at saying the right things to the press, because he seems to be a genuine person, and because maybe, just maybe, he duped us into thinking that he’s just incapable of playing defense (it’s still not great but it’s improved under Woodson), boxing out, and performing other, non-offense related duties, when in reality he may have just been neglecting to try.

Note though how he only gets “somewhat” of a pass. That’s because I think fans are cognizant that Amar’e's been poor on offense and piss poor on defense. It just isn’t talked about as much, owing to the variety of factors (above) enabling him to come across as likeable, combined with ‘Melo’s tendency to attract controversy.

O’Grady: The key difference between Amar’e and ‘Melo – beyond the fact that the former’s “brave” $100 million arrival bought him some cover with the fans – is that Amar’e knows what to say and when to say it. Stoudemire, who ironically put his foot in his mouth repeatedly during his Phoenix tenure, is always accountable nowadays and rarely offers excuses for his poor play. ‘Melo, on the other hand, has been something of a drama queen since he manipulated his trade to New York, and as such has a far shorter leash from the fans.

There is no denying that both players have disappointed with their play this season, but for whatever reason, Amar’e is viewed as a more sympathetic figure. It’s worth nothing that D’Antoni himself believed that the Suns would have won at least 1 or 2 rings if they had a power forward with even half of Stoudemire’s basketball-IQ. He simply isn’t an intuitive player, and no amount of coaching will ever fix his inadequacies. His supreme athleticism has carried him throughout his career until this season, but it remains to be seen whether he can grow from a cerebral standpoint as the physical tools further deteriorate.

This email chain started a few days after Mike D’Antoni left the Knicks in the midst of another long losing streak. That last email was sent just minutes before the Knicks beat the Raptors soundly for the fourth consecutive win. Winning streaks can often make you think all of your problems have been solved, but we know better. HUGE thank you’s again going out to Jamie O’Grady of The LoHud Knicks Blog and Dan Litvin of Knicksfan.net. They carried me. 

LeBron James And The Search For The New Land

Photo by i k o on Flickr

LeBron James is roundly mocked for a wealth of shortcomings: his unwillingness to take the last shot, his hairline, his poor counting skills when it comes to championships he has actually won. But one of the most damning is the idea that his desire to play alongside Dwyane Wade and Chris Bosh in Miami is an affront to former NBA greats who would never consider playing with men they viewed as rivals. Shortly after James took his talents to the Heat, no less a player than Michael Jordan himself said, “There’s no way, with hindsight, I would’ve ever called up Larry [Bird], called up Magic [Johnson] and said, ‘Hey, look, let’s get together and play on one team’ … In all honesty, I was trying to beat those guys.”

Now, competition is inherent in sports. Without it, sports doesn’t exist. But to understand competition in sports as a simple monolithic urge is shortsighted. It’s even shortsighted to only consider sports as only a competition. Isn’t there also a measure of collaboration, of collective improvisation–particularly in basketball–that allows for James’ idea of teaming with the players he feels most akin to? Of all the major sports, basketball is the one most consistently linked to jazz, but jazz wasn’t always a model of understanding and collaboration either.

In the early days of jazz, cornetist King Oliver played with handkerchief over the valves of his instrument and even removed titles from the music sheets on the bandstand to discourage copycats. What began as cutting contests between stride piano players evolved into the practice of cutting heads on stage, with young musicians proving their mettle on the bandstand as veterans called out standards in strange keys and at unreal tempos. And it might be apocryphal, but there’s a story about a young Jackie McLean (now a jazz legend) finally getting up the nerve to ask Miles Davis if he could sit in on a tune. When the teenaged McLean approached Davis at a gig, the trumpeter turned to him, looked him up and down and said, “I’ll kill you, motherfucker.”

It’s no secret that Davis was an often abrasive and cutthroat musician, having grown up in St. Louis in a culture rife with not only competition, but racial issues. In Miles: The Autobiography, he tells the story of Clyde Higgins:

Back during those days a lot of bands that played for white people liked to hire light-skinned musicians, and so Clyde was too dark for them. Eugene said when Clyde went for the audition and told Lunceford he was a saxophone player, everybody laughed at him and started calling him “the little monkey.” They gave him the toughest music they had in their book to play. Clyde, being the great musician that he was, ran right through it like it wasn’t nothing. At least, that’s what Eugene said. When Clyde got through playing, all them cats in Lunceford’s band had their mouths hanging open. So Lunceford said to them, “Well, how y’all like that?”

What Miles ultimately came to be known for was not his sheer instrumental prowess, though, in spite of the lessons he learned in his youth. It’s telling that he ended up having McLean on his album Dig at just nineteen years of age and perhaps his greatest legacy was his ability to create groups of players that moved the music forward through innovative collaboration, specifcally his two great quintets (Davis, John Coltrane (ts), Philly Joe Jones (d), Red Garland (p), and Jimmy Chambers (b) in the first and Davis, Wayne Shorter (ts), Tony Williams (d), Herbie Hancock (p), and Ron Carter (b) in the second). Davis realized early on that the way to produce the best music, the best entertainment, was to assemble the people most capable of driving each other to new heights of creativity as a unit. If this meant hiring performers who were as good as or even better than him as players, then so be it. (Most of the above players were””Davis was a visionary leader and expert of understatement, not a technical wizard.) Duke Ellington ran his band in much the same way, working with dozens of the greatest names in jazz from Ben Webster to Coleman Hawkins to Jimmy Blanton to Cootie Williams.

Jazz, then, has long struck a balance between competition and collaboration. If at first it was tipped more heavily in favor of competition, it began to tip more in the direction of collaboration through the middle of the twentieth century as it grew in legitimacy as an art form.

Is it possible that the team that’s been assembled in Miami is pointing the way towards basketball that’s tipped the balance towards collaboration? As much as a player like Jordan or Kobe Bryant are motivated by a mindset that demands they destroy all opposition (witness Jordan’s Hall of Fame induction speech, where he’s still grinding axes, even after he’s been crowned without serious reservation the greatest player to ever play the game), it’s possible that players like James, Wade, and Bosh are more intrigued by the creative possibilities that teaming up entail than the personal competitiveness of an earlier age.

Before going any further, let me draw a couple lines. First, there’s a difference between team competition and individual competition. A team can be completely focused on beating an opposing team and be in part driven by competition within the team to play better. This happens all the time in music where soloists drive each other to greater heights; two great players don’t bring out the best in each other by being understanding, but rather by being demanding. Cooperation and, by extension, collaboration tend to carry with them a connotation of weakness, of not being strong enough to go it alone. But what if we consider collaboration in basketball terms to be more along the lines of sharpening knives against whetstones, of forging steel with iron and heat, of cutting diamonds with diamonds?

One of the most oft-repeated canards about teams with multiple shooters is that there’s only one ball and not enough shots to go around. Who’s going to have the ball when the game is on the line? But this question presupposes the idea that who scores the winning basket should somehow matter as much, if not more, than that basket happening in the first place. For James to be considered in the elite company of players like Jordan under those terms, he must be the one to take the big shot. By that metric, he’s a failure. But does he even care about that metric? His pass to Udonis Haslem against the Pacers suggests he doesn’t.

It wouldn’t be the first time James’ actions suggested he’s more interested in shifting the paradigm than playing the game the way we want. As ill-considered as “The Decision” was (and boy, was it ill-considered from a lot of perspectives), the process as a whole was to a large extent about James asserting control over his career. The move itself””that is, the decision to leave his hometown team for less money to play with, instead of against, some of the league’s most talented players””was misunderstood as a failure of will or heart, when in fact it was in many ways a refutation of our accepted understanding of those things.

If we consider the side of basketball that is entertainment and accept the idea that that side can be extended into the realm of expressive creativity, there’s hardly a better example of what good collaboration can yield than Wade’s full-court lob to James for the alley-oop layup from last season. And this season, the Heat have appeared more indomitable than last, with James having a career year that should by all rights earn him the MVP, despite being on a team that should theoretically be limiting his ability to be statistically impressive (he currently has the highest season PER of all-time).

Understand, though, that forsaking individual glory to collaborate with your peers is a lock for success, even on its own terms. Witness the New York Knicks. On paper (or in NBA 2K12, for that matter), the lineup of Jeremy Lin, J.R. Smith, Carmelo Anthony, Amar’e Stoudemire and Tyson Chandler looks like it should be a beast. But instead of an interlocking set of collaborators who understand how to make the most of each other, we have a crowd of players who don’t fit. Chandler takes up space that Stoudemire used to terrorize on the offensive end of the floor, Stoudemire fouls up Chandler’s ability to pick and roll with Lin, Lin’s been shackled by Anthony’s demands for iso sets. In jazz terms, this is the all-star collaboration where the sum is not greater than the parts.

Lee Morgan’s Search for the New Land is the New York Knicks of jazz albums. Recorded in 1964 but released in 1966, the album looks like a sure thing. Or at least, it did to me when I first found out about it. It had all of my favorite players from the Blue Note stable: Wayne Shorter on tenor sax, Grant Green on guitar, Morgan on trumpet, Herbie Hancock on piano, Reggie Workman on bass and the severely underrated Billy Higgins on drums. The presence of Green and Shorter alone on one album was enough to get me excited about it. But while it has its moments, it doesn’t really come together. The title track is expansive and abstract, but goes nowhere. Morgan and Green, more at home in traditional jazz settings, seem lost. On the steadier, soulful tracks like “The Joker,” Shorter seems wasted. In places, it cooks; “Mr. Kenyatta” is particularly successful, with Hancock’s chordal stabs in the A section outlining a more unresolved tonal territory than the more trad progression of the B section. There, the blend works””consider it the winning streak the Knicks embarked on when Lin took the helm.

What’s weird about the album as a whole and its averageness is that Green performed well on some other more ambitious or angular albums like his own Solid and organist Larry Young’s Into Somethin’. And Shorter killed it in Art Blakey’s Jazz Messengers on classics like “A Night in Tunisia.” They weren’t limited by what could be considered to be their musical wheelhouses but for whatever reason, it just didn’t gel on Search for the New Land.

And that’s the thing about collaboration and its balance with competition, whether it’s in music or sports. Looking at a team as a collaboration is not a way to excuse competitive failure. Rather, it brings its own standards of success that sometimes dovetail with the way we view competition. The Heat’s meltdown in the Finals last year might have looked like a failure of the competitive spirit when assessed by the standard we typically apply to sports. But it was just as much a creative failure, a demonstration that the collaborators didn’t understand each other well enough yet to reach their full potential as a unit. But if James and company ever start hitting like Miles’ second great quintet””a unit that could push the music in any direction they damn well pleased””they might well be unstoppable.

Understanding Advanced Stats: The Difficulty Of Defense

Continuing the quest to bridge the gap, another edition in the Hardwood Paroxysm series of Understanding Advanced Stats

One of the hardest things to quantify in basketball is the value of individual defense. The eyeball test can at times be as reliable as statistics here, but it can also fool you all the same. Remember that although it helps, “intensity” doesn’t automatically equal good defense (looking at you Mr. Kobe Nine-Time All-NBA Defensive First Team Bryant).

The standard blocks or steals per-game numbers are also very misleading — a good help defender can net dozens of rejections while being a poor man-D and/or rotation-D defender, and no one in their right mind would accuse steals leaderboard regular Monta Ellis of being a good defender. Even Chris Paul, who regularly leads the NBA in steals, is something more a gambler than an actual lockdown defender as many assume when browsing numbers.

Having a preconceived notion of a player’s abilities due to the standard accepted old school stuffed box score of stats, or a prominent analyst’s opinion, can then skew the viewer creating a bias in the mind’s eye. Because individual defense is so difficult to measure in the NBA we often make assumptions and excuses for particular plays or players. Reputations often rule masses, single spectacular plays net new contracts (has anyone made more money and gotten more burn off of a single clothesline than Raja Bell?).

Unlike on offense, there is no one place to go to get a fairly definitive defensive feel of a player — it really takes trips to a few different sites before we have enough information assimilated to even begin getting an accurate feel for a player on the D end that we can then take with us to the game.

Let’s start by taking a look at an All-NBA Defensive First Team selection from last season, one Kobe Bean Bryant, at BasketballReference. As you may recall from previous posts here at HP, lower is better for DRtg (defensive rating).

Kobe actually looks pretty on par by this rating, right at his career average. Let’s dig deeper, next stop 82Games, and opponent PER (player efficiency rating).

While PER isn’t universally accepted as an accurate offensive measure, it lends itself as a very useful tool as a piece of the defensive stats puzzle — there isn’t, after all, “opponent win shares,” or “opponent wins produced” — and while imperfect, it does have a place in furthering our quest. Keep in mind that we are always wary of small sample sizes.

Kobe Bryant, 2010-11 season

Bearing in mind that 82Games says “all stats reflect assigned responsibility to a player” when positional assignments are charted, Kobe looks pretty good here as well (15.0 is considered the “average NBA player” PER). As with DRtg, opponent PER can’t be trusted as a stand alone D-stat — there’s just too many variables, such as maybe his counterpart simply stinks at shooting the ball, a big portion of the PER formula, or that a team’s D-scheme may include a couple of towering seven-foot beasts that tend to force opposing guards to want to take a lot more lower-percentage long twos than they normally would, etc. Just because Kobe is assigned an offender on paper doesn’t strictly mean he defensed that player on a particular play.

For comparison, since we brought him up, Chris Paul’s opponent PER

My eyeballs have been telling me a different story concerning Kobe for some time, so since we’re seeking truth and not confirmatory bias, and knowing now that D-stats are difficult to quantify, we will continue on to another metric to see if it again holds up.

Over at mySynergySports we find dedicated cameras recording every play by every player in every game, then categorized by type. The result is a comprehensive points-per-possession rating, otherwise known as PPP, with accompanying video.

Note: While quite comprehensive, the calculation of PPP, as with any stat, does have it’s flaws as well, one of which is the inclusion of turnovers as a negative mark. This has the unfortunate effect of having a tendency to rate high usage guards, such as Kobe and point guards, lower offensively since they handle the ball much more, therefore turning it over more often, generally speaking. But that has no effect on defensive stats other than that maybe a particular player may have a penchant for floating around in passing lanes or anticipating passes, like say, Kobe or Chris Paul. While this is technically defense, it’s not exactly what one peruses when pursuing defensive measures of a player.

Kobe Bryant, 2010-11 season

Giving up 0.89 PPP overall isn’t awful. It’s not great either, especially when one considers that of the approximately 450 players in the NBA at any given time only about 300 or less are getting significant playing time (Kobe ranked 216 overall on defense, as you can see).

Kobe is good at isolation D and quite often guarded the opposing point guard, as we can glean from his second-largest sample size of 24.1% on the P&R (pick-and-roll) Ball Handler (duh, Derek Fisher. If I was Phil I’d have put Kobe on ‘em too). The best way to expose Kobe on defense is to come off a screen (he doesn’t like chasing guys around. At all.), or make your spot-up shot, where he allowed 1.01 PPP, which was by far the most used method to take advantage of the aged wonder at 40% of the time Kobe defended opposition.

You see, Kobe will play off you, dare you to shoot, because he just loves getting in those kinds of contests where he excels. They get him goin’. He thrives on ‘em. What he doesn’t thrive on is playing defense. Sure, he’ll gnash his teeth,  jut his jaw, talk smack, and stare you down something serious, but when it’s time he mostly just likes to occupy a spot to one side of the free throw line and take jabs at the ball as it passes in the paint. If he has to, he’ll offer a token couple of steps at a close-out with one hand up at the jump shooter. He’s not wasting precious offensive energy playing defense these days.

This is typical of a Bryant defensive setup. He’ll mostly just stand right about there waiting for the ball to come back to him on offense.

Kobe’s man here is CJ Miles, whom Bryant is playing way off of. Bryant has little or no respect for opposing shooters (notice he has his back to his man, granted Kobe knows his scouting reports and all, but this is also typical of Bryant on defense regardless), opting to occupy a space he doesn’t have to move much more than a couple of steps at.

Miles sees Kobe’s manner of defense on him and will astutely take advantage of it a few possessions later. No, not with an ill-advised three. Watch.

Again, same basic setup.

Paul Millsap has the ball, and Kobe’s full attention, inexplicably, on the low block. Pau Gasol has had a little trouble with Millsap this night, but Ramon Sessions is right there ready to cheat down on a double if necessary. Yet Kobe floats over anyway, and as he does he opens up a huge lane that Miles recognizes.

As Miles makes his move Kobe continues to gravitate toward the ball, y’know, cause it’s Kobe and all. He can’t help it. Notice the passing lane Millsap now has thanks to Kobe as Miles cuts to the paint.

You could drive a Kia through that passing lane and a Mack truck through that cutting lane. Millsap takes full advantage of his underrated court vision after pulling three of the floor’s five defenders to him and dishes off to the cutting Miles for an easy layup attempt.

Watch where you're pointing that finger, Mike Brown

No, Bryant doesn’t always make it this easy on opposing players to get clean looks, but he rarely challenges with more than a token effort. If you can shoot even a little, Bryant will let you try.

Watching every defensive spot-up play defended by Bryant in last season’s playoffs, Kobe’s man made 23, missed 26, and fouled three times. Assigning one point per foul, Bryant gave up 49% shooting to his man in the playoffs last year.

Perspective? Only three qualified shooting guards in the NBA last season made at least that from the floor, Dwyane Wade, Arron Afflalo, and Ray Allen, the latter two extremely good mid-range-to-long shooters by perimeter player standards (here’s your cue to go check em out at HoopData). After that the drop-off is pretty steep to DeMar DeRozan and Kobe himself, at .467 and .451 respectively. The median qualified shooting guard last season shot 44% from the floor, so Kobe gave up at least 5% more than he should have in the playoffs with his “defense.” To guys like Trevor Ariza, Marco Belinelli, Peja Stojakovic, and Jason Kidd, who together averaged .405 from the floor in the regular season.

And yes, he gave ‘em plenty of room to do it in. Ring up another victory for advanced stats.

_____

• Chris Paul’s 2010-11 Synergy defensive numbers

• Kobe’s current Synergy defensive numbers for the 2011-12 season. Interesting to note here that while spot-up and iso numbers remain about the same we see a pretty big drop-off in his ability to cover the ball handler this year. And while his overall rank is better this year than last, that’s as likely attributed to a league-wide fall-off in FG% due to the shortened season as anything else

• Handy sortable “simple ratings” from 82Games already sorted for you by opponent PER (remember, click the column heading)

• Dozens of sortable team and player stats by position from HoopStats based on efficiency differential (which they call Diff. Eff. Same thing), yet another metric you can use to fill in a piece to the D-puzzle

• A little something I’d like to see revisited and updated from Rohan Cruyff, defensive pace factor

HoopIdea: Embrace The Assist, Everyone Wins

Via Flickr - Toban Black

Over at the mothership Henry Abbott and the boys have begun a fan input session known as HoopIdea whose purpose is to further the game by expanding resources into the cyberworld, taking in new ideas on how to improve the basketball experience.

Assist:

A pass that directly leads to a basket

-Basketball U, NBA.com

 

Only the pass directly before the score may be counted as an assist… A pass that leads to a shooting foul and scoring by free-throws does not count as an assist.

-Hoopedia, NBA.com

But why? That last is counter-intuitive, seemingly penalizing a good play resulting from teamwork. Considering the often isolation-heavy nature of the NBA game today wouldn’t we want to promote and reward good teamwork? Not to mention that it’s simply common sense in the purest form in the spirit of the assist stat itself.

Long a staple of team play, the NBA big man is passing less and less these days, even as overall field goal percentages have been on the rise. David Stern has been very conscious of, and sensitive to, where his teams’ points-per-game stand on an annual basis, even tweaking defensive rules for several years to promote up-tempo pace and scoring, and to much success; this odd, shortened season aside, scoring in the NBA has hovered around the hallowed 100 PPG mark for several years now.

However, these same rules have also in part had the unintended effect of creating a brand of basketball that tends to reward hero-ball and somewhat selfish play. That’s not good basketball. Good basketball includes a lot of movement, not a lot of dribbling resulting in a low percentage clanker or hefty doses of momentum-freezing free throw line stoppages from ball-dominant, high usage players. When did we forget that a passed ball moves faster than a man?

Let’s say Andrew Bynum receives the ball on the low block and spots a streaking Matt Barnes as the double-team comes, whom he then dumps off to. Barnes, ahead of his man, finishes the play at the rim. Bynum is rewarded with an assist.

But what if the beat defenders aren’t happy about it, deciding they’d rather burn a foul than let Barnes and Bynum pad the stat box? Well, then Barnes is still rewarded for his part with a trip to the free throw line. Bynum, however, is not rewarded for making an unselfish play instead of forcing up an awkward attempt.

Just one of dozens of possible scenarios, give the assist-man some love here by rewarding him with 0.5 assists per made free throw. Isn’t that, after all, “a pass that directly leads to a basket,” the very definition of a basketball assist? Once that whistle blows the play is paused, officially resuming again only after leather meets iron or twine (or in the worst-case scenario, for the shooter at least, he draws no iron nor twine, essentially turning the ball over).

The man at the line is suddenly more motivated to help a teammate want to help him more by making this fundamental freebie, thereby also raising a game’s overall scoring at the same time as it leaves a man beaming for getting something in return for his unselfish play in the flow of an offense, while also causing a potentially cheap-shot defender from thinking twice about putting a more motivated shooter to the line.

Unselfish play is rewarded. Teammates are more motivated. The product is improved.

Everyone wins.

 

 

Starting Over Again

Image via christopher.peplin on Flickr

I find myself looking at this Wizards trade and thinking to myself “OK, now we’re heading in a good direction. Throw out the old mindset, and bring in some high-level thinking.” Then I read things like this, and I feel a little cheated. Not completely cheated, but more like “Wow. My GM was totally outsmarted by that other GM, but it’s OK because that other GM sounds like he’s smarter than everyone.” But this isn’t the first time my GM has been outsmarted, and usually the other person outsmarting him isn’t as cunning as Ujiri (or at least as cunning as Mark Deeks paints him). The phrase “God, why doesn’t Ted Leonsis just freakin’ fire Ernie Grunfeld already?” has crossed my mind numerous times over the past two seasons, and that thought crossed my mind again after this trade went down.

This is the first of a few sensible moves the Wizards need to make. The next step is firing Ernie Grunfeld. Why fire him instead of letting his contract expire at the end of the season? Because this team needs to rebuild NOW and acquire rebuilding assets NOW, and Grunfeld (and his former boss, the late Abe Pollin) had been bad at managing both personnel and finances. The sooner a new GM is in place that has a vision for rebuilding and clearing the books, the better for Washington. Grunfeld is not that man. He’ll find a place somewhere, but not in Washington.

-Me, after Flip Saunders got fired in January

As a Fan, I want my team to move forward, and it cannot do so with bad personnel and with a management structure that’s responsible for bringing in that bad personnel and the lousy contracts for each person.

As a Person, though, why do I want this other person to be fired? Why do I want him to lose his livelihood, to no longer be able to provide for his family? I don’t know Ernie Grunfeld. I know of him. I’ve never met him. I know his resume, and I know his experience in the league. I’ve read his press releases, I’ve seen his work, and I’ve listened to his interviews. But I don’t know him. How can I wish so much ill on this man that I’ve never met?

I sat down wanting to write some sort of brash open letter, one that specifically broke down Grunfeld’s errors as GM of the Wizards. It’d be a long list, for sure. And there aren’t that many good moves. Most of the good moves he made were no-brainers (drafting Wall) or trading away players that he drafted or signed to absurd contracts. Cleaning up your own mess shouldn’t get you commended. My mom never praised me for cleaning my room after I destroyed it, it was just expected of me. And after all the listing of what he did for the Wizards and did to the Wizards, I would have said something like “And Ted Leonsis, this is why you have to fire him.”

But the man who put the “talent” together, Grunfeld, has been holding this team back for years. He held the Butler/Jamison/Arenas core together long after it had gone rotten. I don’t think he’s got much of a mind for advanced stats; if he did, why would they have traded FOR Jordan Crawford? Why was Blatche given a multi-year extension? These guys are not efficient, and they don’t play well off Wall, the supposed focal point of this team.

Ernie’s contract winds up at the end of this season. If he were to stay til then, I’d imagine he wouldn’t be resigned. Leonsis likely kept him because he wanted to be prudent about managing the team finances, so firing him and paying another GM when this team is lottery bound and in transition anyway seemed like not enough of an investment. But if this team is lotterybound, wouldn’t you want a GOOD GM, who can eye good draft and trade talent, to get you a core going forward? Regardless, if Ernie stays on, I rescind my cult worship of Leonsis.

-Me, again, being a jerk

Who the f*** am I to decide his fate?

So as my Fanaticism and my Humanism battle it out for supremacy in this uphill path towards season-ticket renewal, here’s my attempt to level the two sides out:

The Wizards are an organization that is still suffering from the aftereffects of some bad personnel decisions. These decisions were both in contract distribution and in the attitudes of some players and other personnel. With a marquee point guard, a new coach on the horizon, and a new owner, this franchise needs to move in a direction away from that past. The team needs to rid itself of assets and acquire draft picks and flexibility in the process. Even if the draft picks are low, they can often be packaged later on for higher ones–picks around which a team can build a new core. The future of the franchise as a winning organization, a free-agency target, and a championship contender depends on moving away from that past. I hope the decision to bring the Wizards down that path are responsible, measured, and fair.

Welcome to the Clutch Cube – Part III: Kobe Bryant

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKDdIJcSSQ0 w=750]

Using data from NBA.com’s StatsCube, I will be digging into the clutch time stats of a different player each week and highlighting what things other than making game-winning shots he is doing to help his team win games. In the first edition of the Clutch Cube, I dug into LeBron James and wrote a long-winded introduction to the reasoning behind this exercise, which I recommend reading if you’re new to this series. Last week, I took a look at Chris Paul‘s changing role in the clutch with his new team. Here, what’s the same and what’s different in Kobe Bryant’s clutch time performance in the last two seasons?

What’s the same

Unsurprisingly to anyone who watches much Lakers basketball, Kobe’s usage rate takes a jump in the clutch. We know this. In crunch time, Kobe is usually Option 1, Option 1A, Option 1B, Option 1C, Option 2 and Option all on his own. Last year, he took a shot, turned it over or got to the free throw line on 53.0% (!!) of the Lakers’ crunch time possessions. That represented a 13.5% bump in usage rate over the rest of the season.

This year, Bryant’s usage rate still rises in clutch, though not nearly as much as it did last season. He’s using 42.2% of the Lakers’ crunch time possessions this season, a 10.8% drop from last year, though still a 5.6% increase over his season’s average. For all the attention paid to Bryant’s lack of passing in clutch time this year, he was actually even more of a hero-ball, me-first player last season.

The rise in usage rate should mean it’s no surprise that Kobe also attempts more 3-pointers per-36 minutes in the clutch. This year, he raises his 3′s per-36 slightly from 4.7 to 6.0, but last year those 3′s per-36 took a huge jump from 4.6 to 8.5. He compensated for that increase by also getting to the free throw line at a 65.8% higher rate in the clutch than he did during the rest of the game. His 12.6 free throw attempts per-36 minutes would have been the best mark in the NBA if it had been extended to the full season. His 87% clutch time free throw percentage (FT%) made those attempts pretty much automatic points. That’s a huge asset to have at the end of close games, and part of the reason Bryant has a reputation as one of the most clutch players in the league. He’s also seen an increase in his FT rate this season, though not quite as large as the jump he took last year. Still, 10.5 free throw attempts per-36 minutes is nothing to sneeze at – it’s actually a pretty incredible number of attempts – and he’s still connecting on them at a very good 81% clip.

Another thing that is consistent about Kobe’s clutch time performance is the drop in his field goal percentage (FG%). It is important to note that a drop in FG% is a league-wide phenomenon, not something that is exclusive to Kobe. The reason behind this drop does seem to have changed from last season to this season, however. We’ll come back to this later.

In each of the last two seasons, Bryant has grabbed a higher percentage of available rebounds in the clutch than during the rest of the season. Whether this is because he’s more highly engaged or he saves an extra gear for crunch time, it has consistently shown up over each of the last two years. He also assists on a higher percentage of the Lakers’ baskets in crunch time, unsurprising since he has the ball in his hands so often down the stretch.

Lastly, Bryant’s plus/minus has seen a large increase in the clutch in each of the last two seasons, suggesting that the Lakers played better down the stretch with him on the floor than they did for the rest of the game. While last year that jump was pretty significant as Bryant went from +5.5 to +9.6 in the clutch, this year’s jump is insane as he goes from +3.1 to +16.2. This suggests, as has been suggested many times by many others, that the Lakers are much better off when Bryant isn’t hi-jacking every crunch time possession. Spreading the wealth is a good thing. It also suggests that more often than not, when Kobe and the Lakers play a close game, they win.

What’s different

If you combine Bryant’s usage rate and AST% from last season, you see that he accounted for 88.7% of the Lakers’ clutch time possessions last season with either a field goal, assist, free throws or turnover. This season, that number is down to 71.6%. Somewhat surprisingly, however, LA’s offensive rating in the clutch with Bryant on the floor has stayed almost exactly the same: 111.23 last year and 111.6 this year. What has changed, as I just detailed above, is the Lakers’ point differential, though that seems to have more to do with their crunch time defense than their offense. LA allowed 103.53 points per-100 possessions in the clutch with Bryant on the floor last season, and that number is all the way down to 93.8 this season. The presence of new head coach Mike Brown has undoubtedly helped LA’s crunch time defense.

Also different: Kobe’s ASTRatio (the percentage of his possessions that end in an assist) is up slightly in the clutch this season, whereas his career norm was for it to take a dip like it did last year. This may suggest that he’s recognizing that he can’t possibly take every shot in the clutch  It also may suggest that he couldn’t possibly sustain last season’s 53.0% Usage Rate, a number which is 14.3% higher than the highest full-season usage rate of all time (Bryant’s own 2005-06 campaign). However, he does seem to be more willing to pass late in close games this year; just inside of the last few weeks he has made some fantastic passes to Andrew Bynum in the lane and underneath the basket for easy buckets. Considering Bynum is 28-32 in the clutch this season, that seems like it would be a good strategy (FWIW, Bynum attempted just 4 clutch time shots all of last season, and he made all 4).

Let’s get back to that FG% now. Kobe, like just about everyone else in the league, shoots worse in crunch time (39.8% since 2000). Last year, the drop in Bryant’s FG% in the clutch was almost entirely attributable to taking way too many 3-pointers. Hitting 32% of 4.6 3-point attempts per-36 minutes isn’t great, but it’s almost acceptable because it’s Kobe. But when you take 8.5 3′s per-36 minutes, it becomes unacceptable. And when you’re taking so many 3′s, hitting 35% starts to become a drag on your FG%, even if he did hit at a higher clip in the clutch than the rest of the season. That, coupled with only a slight dip in his 2-point FG% meant only a small drop in overall FG% (to 40.2%, right in line with his career average) in the clutch for Bryant last season.

This year has been an entirely different story. Although he seems to have recognized that he was taking far too many 3′s in the clutch and scaled those back, he’s hitting a futile 19% of those attempts, and he’s still taking 6.0 per-36 minutes. That’s pretty much inexcusable. Well, not pretty much. It’s inexcusable. That’s just part of the reason for his huge FG% drop in the clutch this season. Last year, Bryant shot 48.8% on 2-point attempts during the season and 42.2% in the clutch. That’s a significant drop. You can live with that, though. This year, however, is another story completely. His 2-point FG% for the season is 47.1%, but that number plummets all the way down to 34.8% in the clutch. This is largely due to the ridiculous amount of mid and long-range 2′s Bryant attempts (you know his patented baseline fade-away over three defenders). Those shots are low percentage to begin with, he’s making himself even less likely to hit by shooting over multiple defenders and fading away, and the reward for hitting them is not as high as if he was taking a three. It’s just about the worst shot you can take.

Other impressions

It should also be mentioned, however, that Bryant’s insistence on taking shots during clutch time can also work to the Lakers’ advantage; even if the shot is low percentage and even if he winds up missing it. Because opponents know that Bryant will likely take the shot, they often send two or even three defenders his way during clutch time. This, obviously, takes two or three potential rebounders away from the basket and opens up second chance opportunities for Pau Gasol and Andrew Bynum (I’m thinking particular of a Pau tip-in of a Bryant miss in the 2009 NBA Finals as an example). Just as a player like Derrick Rose’s penetration of the lane draws defenders off their man so they can challenge his shot at the rim and opens up Rose’s teammates for offensive rebounds, so too can Bryant’s predilection for long, contested jumpers.

Another thing that must be discussed is Bryant’s willingness – really, insistence – on taking key shots late in close games. This simple fact alone is a huge part of the reason many basketball fans consider him to be clutch. They see LeBron James pass the ball to a teammate in winning time and deride him for not having the same confidence in his own abilities as a guy like Kobe, even though LeBron is making the smart basketball play. That overriding belief in his own capabilities is a big part of Kobe’s legend as a clutch player, even if it’s not particularly accurate in terms of game-winning shots, which is what most people judge “clutchness” on. By doing this, however, they often undermine their own argument.

Rather than espousing Kobe’s penchant for hitting game winning shots, something he hasn’t been particularly good at over the course of his career (34.6% since 2000; We remember the ones he hit because they’re awesome and they affirm our belief in Kobe’s greatness as a basketball player. We largely forget the misses because, well, they don’t live on in highlight reels), Kobe supporters would do better to talk about how he shows a greater commitment to rebounding, passing, defending and getting to the free throw line in the clutch. Those things aren’t as flashy, but they are important in the grand scheme of playing winning basketball, and Kobe performs well in all those areas in the clutch. Rebounds on the defensive end prevent a team from scoring on that possession, offensive rebounds create extra possessions, free throws are – literally, for Kobe – free points. So far this season he looks to be a better and more willing passer in crunch time. We value these things so much over the course of the game and yet often forget about them in this discussion and instead only care about game-winning shots.

Kobe is such a lightning rod in the clutch discussion because his ardent supporters usually maintain that he IS clutch because of the game-winners and the championship rings, while statheads maintain that he ISN’T clutch because he usually doesn’t hit those game-winners and “count teh ringzzz isn’t an argument.” The track record on game-winners is indisputable. He doesn’t have a very good one. But he’s still an excellent shot creator – one of the best in the league at getting himself an open look – who routinely draws double and triple teams down the stretch of games, gets to the free throw line at an elite rate, steps up his rebounding and passing and usually wins. In other words, he’s a really, really good clutch time player, just not for the reasons his biggest supporters seem to think he is.