Ask, NBA blogosphere, and ye shall receive. After a few days of intensifying speculation and rumors, the first real trade of the 2012 deadline went through on Tuesday evening, and it’s a doozy. Let’s unpack:
If Andrew Bogut can stay healthy (kind of a big if, but it’s not at all out of the realm of possibility), he and David Lee will make up one of the better 4-5 combos in the league. Bogut isn’t expected back for a while, but the back end of the Western Conference playoff race is close enough that Golden State has a shot at sneaking in, and if they do, his presence could make them a tough first-round matchup for one of the top seeds.
As unlikely and questionable as Stephen Jackson’s return to Golden State seems on the surface, perimeter D is a need that he fills. There are risks involved with bringing him back, but getting a center as talented as Bogut makes it worth the gamble. Worst-case scenario, they can negotiate a buyout.
If the Warriors do decide to buy Jackson out (which isn’t the plan as of now, according to Yahoo!’s Marc Spears), he instantly becomes the most intriguing candidate to be picked up for cheap by a contender.
The biggest downside to this trade for the Dubs: the future of their franchise now depends entirely on the health of Bogut and Stephen Curry, the very definition of a high-risk/high-reward proposition.
The second-biggest downside to this deal for Golden State is losing Epke Udoh. But if the Warriors are in win-now mode, it’s worth giving up an unpolished prospect for a known quantity like Bogut.
The Bucks save some money by unloading Jackson’s contract and getting back Kwame Brown’s expiring deal.
Think about the prospect of a Brandon Jennings/Monta Ellis backcourt for a second. Has any guard combo ever posted a usage rate over 100? Will they combine for 70 shots per game? Is this the black-holiest backcourt since Marbury and Francis? The Bucks just became everyone’s favorite League Pass team for the final third of the season, purely from a morbid entertainment standpoint.
Of course, though they deny it now, there’s always the chance this deal could foreshadow a Jennings trade. I wrote about his future in a post yesterday, and now the Bucks may have to answer the question sooner than we thought. If it doesn’t happen before Thursday, we’ll definitely be hearing increased talk about moving the third-year guard this summer, when he becomes eligible to sign an extension.
In the grand scheme of things, this trade will probably become a footnote to whatever does or doesn’t happen with Dwight Howard in the next 36 hours. However, if Howard does get traded, this could be viewed as the first domino. The Magic had been making a hard push for Ellis in the past few days, in hopes that it would placate him. Now that that’s off the table, who else can they target to try and keep Dwight happy? Even if Phoenix has a change of heart at the last minute and decides to move Steve Nash, Orlando doesn’t have great assets. The Ellis/Bogut trade might be the thing that finally convinces Otis Smith to pull the trigger on a Howard deal, in which case the Bucks and Warriors can claim a small piece of the credit in helping to end the tiredest story of this season.
Continuing the quest to bridge the gap, another edition in the Hardwood Paroxysm series of Understanding Advanced Stats
A new statistical category rarely makes it’s way into the mainstream, the box score. But that’s what +/- did relatively recently. This easily misunderstood stat can be useful if cited properly. Sadly, it gets misused more often than not.
Really transcendent players tend to have overall pluses simply because they are that good, but in the normal course of events really good players can often end up with a negative or about even +/-. This is due to teammates, not an individual, in most cases. One cannot simply look at a box score and assume that because a particular player had a negative +/- that they had a poor game; they may have won their matchup fairly handily, but if most of the teammates he was on the floor with at the time had a bad game it reflects poorly on everyone.
+/- is best used a couple of ways that we’ll explore here, in large sample sizes, in lineups, and in individual matchups, but only if you are looking specifically at that matchup alone and not in the context of a box score.
Steve Nash and the Phoenix Suns have had a rough year (even though they have found a rhythm of late). Â The standard box score from a recent close loss to the Golden State Warriors leaves Nash looking like he got smoked, even though we know he’s one of those transcendent players with the sixth-best season-long +/- as of March 6.
Nash’s opponents’ box score tells us little more about what really happened except that Curry had a nice, if short stint.
From these stats it would appear that Robinson outplayed Nash. Let’s look closer, at PopcornMachine‘s Game Flow from that particular tilt. Note: If you mouse-over a particular player’s stint you get specifics. I’ve Photoshopped in several players’ stints in order to be more succinct
What we find is that it wasn’t so much that Curry was really good, or Nash really bad, as that David Lee had a spectacular first quarter stint. Curry wouldn’t play again after the first Q. Go ahead and mouse over the rest of Nash’s, and Curry’s replacement, Nate Robinson’s, stints  to get a better feel for how the game unfolded in the backcourt.
Alternately,  before we move on, you can check the stint by the man who’s job it was to be guarding Lee, assuming Gentry had the Suns playing man-D, Channing Frye (something you can confirm by checking mySynergySports or watching a replay). Frye would finish the game at a mere -1, so you can see how one can be deceived by a simple box score +/- stat, when in fact Frye was largely responsible for the early big deficit that Nash and Co. spent the rest of the game making up. The standard box may have you believing that Lee and Frye got in a personal shootout, however, by checking the PopcornMachine box score, and clicking on the specific players, we find that Frye got hot himself later in the contest helping to redeem that heinous first Q and rebound his game-long +/-.
In looking at the game flow, that graphed line between the two teams, we see that as the flow began to favor Nash and the Suns in the second half, Warriors coach Mark Jackson began experimenting with lineups to try and slow the comeback roll.
As we close this session, you can get a head start on a future post by checking at 82Games to see how these twoteams’ lineups have stacked up playing together on the season, another of the fruitful and less suspect uses of the +/- stat.
In closing I would caution you to always be wary of small sample size numbers all by themselves. Until next time, happy advanced statting.
According to team sources, the Warriors are preparing to make a play for Milwaukee’s center. He’s high on their list, but one source didn’t sound too optimistic.
First off, Bogut is hurt.  Thanks to an injured left ankle, he could be done for the season. Ideally, the Warriors would like to trade for someone who can help  now.
A common theme in reports of rumored trade deals is the overwhelmingly arduous, difficult work that a significant NBA trade requires to reach completion. Aligning money and player additions to a trade in such a way that is both pleasing and possible for two or more teams is a considerable task, one that often necessitates revisited details upon revisited details. Because of the wide variety of variables in play and the reluctance of many GMs to take on significant risk, most discussed trades never reach the final stage of actual completion.
Upon first glance, this trade appears to fall in line with others that never reached completion. The Warriors desperately need a center like Andrew Bogut. Bogut isn’t the player he once was, but he remains one of the best defensive centers in the league, and capable of strong offensive production, though no longer with regularity. Though Ekpe “Plus-Minus Superstar” Udoh has acquitted himself well defensively for the Warriors, he’s undersized and often a liability on offense. The Warriors need a transforming center, one that can fully change the game on defense and who matches up well with offensively-focused power forward David Lee. If he’s healthy, Bogut could easily be that player, a player who shifts the Warriors from perennial mediocrity to something more hopeful, something mired in playoff contention.
But with so many moving pieces, things are always more complicated than an immediate solution.
But even if the Warriors come up with a package the Bucks might like – for instance Andris Biedrins, Kwame Brown’s expiring, Dorell Wright and Ekpe Udoh — Golden State would have to take back on of two players they really don’t want.
Stephen Jackson or Drew Gooden.
When “Stephen Jackson or Drew Gooden” becomes a necessary concession, things become infinitely more complicated.
But maybe the Warriors would, and should, be willing to accept the 3-year, $20 million cap-draining deal of Gooden. If the Warriors give up Udoh and Biedrins in the deal, as Thompson suggests in his post, the team will be left with one less power forward or center in the rotation. Gooden has served as a decent rotational player for the Bucks this season, but his all-too-frequent stretches of odd ineffectiveness and inefficiency make his sizable contract appear as a timid albatross. Still, the Warriors could do worse than adding a player like Gooden to act as the team’s third or fourth big.
Is the possible price of one intermediately bad contract and the lurking threat of continued injury to Bogut enough to keep the Warriors from finally adding a significant interior defensive presence? In the realm of necessary change and the coalescence of players that meld well together, as Lee and Bogut likely would (and as Monta Ellis and Stephen Curry unfortunately do not), it isn’t an overly high duty to pay, especially for the sum of transformative defense. But it involves tangible risk and sizable change, something the Warriors’ franchise has often shied from in years past.
Faced with an opportunity to break free from an unsuccessful trend, the Warriors must either choose the path of Andrew Bogut and the unknown, or the understood path of waiting and hoping for a preferable, safer opportunity. Risk duels with stagnation within the confines of a franchise, and the NBA wheels continue to turn.
In the spirit of HP’s own NBA historian, Curtis Harris, today we have a very special guest who takes a look back at an historic time in the NBA: One of the most dynamic offensive battles to have ever taken place in the game of basketball.
Steve Smith is an award-winning Australian basketball writer who recently shared an inside look at this most prolific of battles with me, and asked me to share it with you. What follows is an exclusive inside peek into this, one of the greatest games ever played. We’d like to thank Smitty for taking the time to dig up this bit of previously unpublished history of the game for Hardwood Paroxym, and we encourage you to follow him on Twitter at @smittys07 for more scintillating nuggets and great conversation about the beloved game.
Let ‘Em Loose: The 1990-91 Denver Nuggets
by Steve Smith
Conceding an average of 130.8 points per game, the 1990-91 Denver Nuggets have, over time, been dismissed as a statistical anomaly wrought by an eccentric coach intent on bringing a college fast-break system to the pros. Think you’ve got a good grip on run-and-gun basketball? Think again.
On Saturday, November 10, 1990, the Denver Nuggets made their way to the team’s morning shootaround at Phoenix’s Arizona Veterans Memorial Coliseum. Players shuffled on to the floor in dribs and drabs, still weary from the previous night’s 135-129 defeat to Seattle.
Their NBA campaign was just a week old and they were already the talk of the league, for all the wrong reasons.
Having conceded an average of 148 points in their first five games – including 162 to the Run TMC-powered Golden State Warriors in the season opener – NBA analysts from Orlando to Oakland and everywhere in between were wondering just what the hell new coach Paul Westhead was doing.
In his own mind, Westhead was certain he knew what he was doing, saying before the season started, “We’re gonna run, we’re gonna keep on running, if the pace ever slows down, we’ll speed it up and we’re gonna run and run and run some more! … There will be 200-point games. I feel very confident that we will be on the upside of that score but 200 points is gonna happen.”
With a furrowed brow, the 51-year-old coach watched rookie Chris Jackson prepare for his first NBA game, his mind racing as fast as his hyper-kinetic offense …
What followed that evening was an offensive gala for the ages, as the Suns and the Nuggets broke all the borders of the boxscore.
Unfortunately for Denver, Phoenix was a team perfectly built to exploit the idiosyncratic nature of Westhead’s warp-speed tactics, and racked up 50 points in the first 12 minutes.
And they were just getting started.
By half-time, even Phoenix fans were wondering what in the world had just happened as the Suns poured in another 57 points in the second period to take a remarkable 107-67 lead at the main intermission. That’s 107 points. By one team. At half-time.
More than twenty years later, Paul Westhead sits in his office at the University of Oregon – where he is entrenched as the women’s basketball head coach – and, looking back at that game, recalls not being overly concerned at having conceded a century-plus in just 24 minutes of defense-deficient ball.
“I remember one of my assistants, Jim Boyle, said to me, ‘We have a problem here. They’re gonna score 200 points!’ Westhead says. “And I said, ‘Well, I always wanted to be in a 200-point game, just not on the losing end!’
“So I said, ‘Don’t worry about it, don’t worry about it, they can’t keep the pace, that’s not the worry’, I knew they couldn’t keep that up.â€
And while the white-hot Suns cooled off a little after the break (see, Westhead knew what he was talking about), Denver were left to lick their wounds yet again when the final horn sounded.
At first glance the 30-point margin looks like an ordinary November blowout, except the score was an unfathomable 173-143.
Two decades after the fact, the boxscore still reads like something out of fantasy hoops heaven. Rookie Cedric Ceballos tallied 32 points and backcourt duo Kevin Johnson (23 points, 17 assists) and Dan Majerle (21 points, 13 assists) feasted on the non-existent Denver defense.
For the Nuggets, high-flying forward Orlando Woolridge led all scorers with 40 points, while debutant Jackson had 26 points and six assists but gave up seven turnovers in a first game that probably still has him shaking his head at the sheer absurdity of it all. To this day, the 173 points scored by the Suns is the equal highest in NBA history for non-overtime games; the 107-point outburst stands alone as the greatest scoring splurge for the opening half of any NBA game.
But for Westhead, the game remains the prime example of why he always felt – and still feels – that 200 points is not only possible but probable.
“I only say that because we created that run,†Westhead says. “We could sustain it but we weren’t good enough to score well enough and defend well enough but that’s an example where it’s possible. You’ve got a game where it’s 173, well, had we’d been better we’d have been above 173, into the 180s, the 190s or perhaps even 200. So I wouldn’t say it’s as difficult as the four-minute mile that no-one ever thought we could do, it’s like that though, people say, ‘nah that’s crazy, that’s impossible’, but sure you could!â€
“Let em loose†was the Nuggets’ pre-season slogan and could not have been more prescient.
Unfortunately, the slogan applied more to the opposition than it did for Denver, as the Nuggets proved in the space of eight days the absolute audacity of their shoot-first-and-ask-questions-much-much-later style.
In the NBA record books, the top-three games for “Most points, both teams, first half†read as follows:174 — Phoenix (107) vs. Denver (67), Nov. 10, 1990; 173 — Denver (90) at San Antonio (83), Nov. 7, 1990; 170 — Golden State (87) at Denver (83), Nov. 2, 1990. Eight days, three records. It’s a record for offensive blitzkriegs and defensive futility all rolled into one crazily endearing up-tempo package.
Giving up 130.8 points per in the pros beggars belief but as Westhead noted at the time, “We want to create a pace in the game that will break anybody – except us.â€And remarkably, for Westhead anyway, the squad actually performed better than he expected, despite winning just 20 games all season and never once keeping an opposing team to under 100 points.
“Well, we had an interesting team,†Westhead recalls. “The Nuggets, prior to my arrival, were a good established team but their players got old, they were retired or were traded off so the team we had when I arrived was a couple of young players and some veteran free agents so it was kind of a put-together team.â€
Having previously coached the Lakers to a title in 1979-80 before moving on to the pre-Jordan Bulls, Westhead arrived in the Mile High city in 1990 after successfully implementing his turbo-driven offense at Loyola Marymount.
“When I arrived I kind of changed the approach,†Westhead says. “We tried to play breakneck fast-break basketball, you know, try to shoot the ball every four or five seconds, as quickly as we could get down the court. The players did a better than average job in doing that, it’s not an easy thing to do but they picked up the speed game and responded pretty well.â€
Westhead swears to this day that the system works – with the right personnel and the right environment.
He knows within himself his plan was sound: get his players ultra-fit in training camp and then leave opponents in their dust in the thin air of the McNichols Sports Arena with a tempo that was supposed to make Showtime look like Slowtime.
In hindsight though, should the fact that some of the key rotation players on his roster included Joe Wolf, Blair Rasmussen and Todd Lichti have sounded a warning bell? Or that his best scoring options were Woolridge (who had a well-earned reputation for a Tarzan-like physique and a Jane-like ability to avoid contact), pint-sized point guard Michael Adams (who had injury problems throughout the season), an out-of-shape Jackson in his rookie season and a 36-year-old Walter Davis, who could be generously described as only just past his prime?
Not according to Westhead.
“I wouldn’t say it didn’t work,†Westhead counters. “I would say if you looked at wins and losses then you’ll say it didn’t work because you didn’t win enough games. My easy answer to that is to say we just didn’t have a top-level player or two to win the game in the last two or three minutes when you needed to close out games. It’s a little bit of both but nonetheless, the players did a good job in running the ball and causing problems with opponents who weren’t accustomed to playing at that fast pace.â€
In fact, Westhead maintains his system rejuvenated the careers of veterans like Woolridge and Davis.
“Orlando Woolridge, was an example of a player who was a free agent, he’d left the Lakers because he was too old, he was 33-34 years old and he came to us,†Westhead says. “Because he ran our system, half-way through the year he was leading the NBA in scoring, he was averaging 32 points a game. He then got injured, he had an eye injury and had to sit out a couple of weeks, when he came back he had to wear a mask and his scoring went down. But he was like the perfect example of a player rejuvenated with a speed game that allowed him to score at will.
“If Orlando (Woolridge) had played in a slow game, at his age, he would’ve struggled to get 10-15 points in a game and now here he is getting 30 points a game, easy. So for a player like that, it was the perfect thing for him.â€
As for Davis, Westhead smiles at the thought of putting new life into the old Greyhound.
“I have a fond memory,†Westhead remembers, “of Walter Davis coming to me – his knees were gone – and saying to me he could only play a certain amount of minutes, he could barely practice, in fact one time he came to me and said ‘Do you want me to practice or play games?’ So I said, ‘OK, let’s just play games.’ So he was in one game and he had made six or seven shots in a row and he put his fist up.
“Now, in his world, when you put your fist up – the Dean Smith/North Carolina world – meant he wanted to come out of the game. And I yelled out to him, ‘I’m not Dean Smith, and you’re not coming out until you miss!’ So I think he made about three or four more shots and then he missed and then I took him out. He came out with this big smile on his face but he was exhausted.â€
And interestingly, Westhead theorises that any chance of extended success was only stymied by injuries to Adams, his floor general, who was the ignition sequence to his offense.
“Michael Adams was the key player for us,†Westhead says. “When he was fit and played well, he was a great fast-break point guard. But when he had to sit out – he had hamstring problems – our effectiveness went down, oh, maybe 50 per cent, because the point guard is the key to that system.”
But would his system work in today’s NBA, where even the quote-unquote 07 Seconds Or Less Suns could never quite get over the play-off hump?
“I have a couple of reflections,†the ever-Shakespearean Westhead muses. “Yes, it could work with the right group. That pace can be very effective because teams aren’t accustomed to it, teams don’t like to defend against that. The hitch always is, ‘will players agree to do it for the long haul?’ It’s an 82-game season plus playoffs and exhibition games, so a normal NBA team may play 100 games in one year.
“I’m convinced that if they would buy into the speed game, they would be – if they had enough quality – they would be very successful. Will they do it? There’s the rub. And if they back off on it, then it immediately turns south on you and it turns against you.â€
And turn against him it did.
Even with the drafting of Dikembe Mutombo and a belated effort at a more conventional offensive system, Westhead was fired at the conclusion of the following season with a two-year record of 44-120.
Following his departure from Denver, Westhead went back to the college ranks at George Mason, rather less successfully than with Loyola, as it turned out. He became something of a coaching nomad after being replaced at Mason in 1997, taking the reins of the LA Stars in the ABA and then heading to Japan’s Pro League.
Westhead made a return to the NBA coaching ranks with Orlando (under Johnny Davis) in 2003 before the WNBA’s Phoenix Mercury handed him the top job in 05.With the Mercury’s title run in 2007, Westhead became the first man to coach both a NBA and WNBA team to a championship.Nowadays, the 72-year-old Westhead is still pushing his teams to run – getting his Oregon girls to score 100 points rather than the magical 200-mark is the aim – but the memory of a bold (critics might be less generous) experiment in the Mile High City remains etched in his memory.
“Denver doesn’t seem that long ago,†Westhead laughs. “I don’t know if it’s because you play a fast game everything goes fast, the years go fast. I can clearly picture our attempt to get out and run and some of the fast games we played. And some of the teams we played, see, teams just don’t like to play against you, they ultimately may beat you if they’re better than you but it’s not an easy win for them.”
Even today, deep down, Westhead knows there’s no middle ground with what he runs, that his hyped-up offence will only work if everyone is on board and the talent level matches the intensity.
“There is some truth that it can be doomed to fail,†Westhead admits, somewhat echoing ESPN’s Guru of Go documentary about his coaching career. “This style of play, you either get it or you don’t. You either do it or you don’t, there’s no in-between. So, if you’re gonna try this as a coach and as a team, when it works, you win, you win championships.
“But when it doesn’t work, you’re doomed, there’s no in-between.â€
“Jeff Mullins reminds me of a cat. His moves on the basketball floor, if transferred to written words, would be classified as poetry. He is never bad. Only good and better.â€
One of the finest college players in the country while at Duke and a member of the 1964 Olympic team, the 6’4″ Jeff Mullins was perhaps the most coveted guard entering the ’64 draft. The St. Louis Hawks pounced on him with the 5th pick, ahead of such luminaries as Willis Reed, Wali Jones, Jerry Sloan, and Mel Counts.
However, that lofty draft position belied the Hawks’ ultimate utilization of Mullins. The team was bursting with veterans and player-coach Richie Guerin elected to let Jeff ride the pine. He played a grand total of 88 games during two seasons with Saint Louis while scoring just 5.3 points in 12 minutes per game. Frustrated with his lack of playing time, Mullins informed owner Ben Kerner of his intention to quit if not allowed to play more.
Fortunately, it never came to that. With the expansion Chicago Bulls joining the league for the 1966-67 season, Mullins was left unprotected in the expansion draft by the Hawks. Chicago plucked the swingman, but then sent him packing west to the San Francisco Warriors in a trade for outstanding PG Guy Rodgers. The Hawks would come to rue their handling of Mullins.
 ”What did I get the most thrill out of? It was winning the championship. Individual honors are nice but it’s not like winning. Winning and making a positive contribution is, I think, the most satisfying thing I’ve ever experienced. It’s just a shame we couldn’t have kept that team.”
- Paul Arizin on the 1956 NBA champion Warriors
No matter how great three players are, they cannot write, tell or compose the whole story of a franchise. Before their move to San Francisco in 1962, the Philadelphia Warriors revolved around the trio of Joe Fulks, Neil Johnston and Arizin, but there was certainly more talent in the fold. Those three men played with of some of the finest players of the era and even a couple of other hall of famers and all-time greats.
There was PF/C Woody Sauldsberry. After college ball at Texas Southern University and a stint with the Harlem Globetrotters, Sauldsberry was the 60th pick in the 1957 draft and would surprise everyone by turning in 12.8 points and 9.4 rebounds in his three seasons with the Warriors from 1958 to 1960. His unexpected play made the transition from Neil Johnston to Wilt Chamberlain smoother than it otherwise would have been. An all-star in 1959, he remains to this day the lowest draft pick to ever win Rookie of the Year. And my goodness, does he have a story to tell that sadly reminds of the racism, particularly of the St. Louis Hawks, in the 1950s and 1960s NBA.
Youngsters Tom Meschery and Al Attles made some noise in Philly that would soon become a cacophony when the Warriors moved west. Meschery debuted in the Warriors’ last season in Philly to the tune of 12 points and 9 rebounds. The eventual all-star wasn’t the least bit gun shy that postseason averaging 20 points and 11.5 rebounds as the Warriors went down in 7 games to Boston in the Eastern Finals. Tom also has a personal story worth reading up on. Spending part of your childhood in a Japanese prison during World War II tends to warrant a read.
Attles was a defensive pit bull (nicknamed the Destroyer) with the crew cut to match. He spent two seasons in Philadelphia and would be with the Warriors organization until 1970 as a player, then was coach (winning the 1975 NBA title) until 1983 and was a team executive until… well, until the present. It’s 50 years and going strong for Attles and the Warriors.
Philly native Guy Rodgers was another of the late-50s youngbloods that re-invigorated the Warriors following Neil Johnston’s retirement. The point guard would eventually play in 4 all-star games and lead the league in assists twice. And if anyone can take a heap of credit for aiding Wilt Chamberlain in his 100-point game it was Rodgers who dished out 20 assists that night in Hershey, PA. Rodgers accomplished a Wiltonian feat of his very own the next season in 1963 when he dished out 28 assists to tie Bob Cousy’s single-game record.
Jack George was the man that Rodgers succeeded in the Philadelphia backcourt. Not as dynamic as Rodgers, George was nonetheless the steady hand that routinely gave 12 points, 5.5 assists and 4 rebounds a night. 1956 was his third pro season and his banner campaign. He averaged career highs of 14 points and 6.3 assists, led the league in minutes played, made his first of two all-star teams and earned his only All-NBA selection. His ascension perhaps explains the Warriors’ breakout as NBA champions that year.
Or maybe it was rookie F/G Tom Gola who put Philly over the top in 1956. Debuting with 11 points, 9 rebounds and 6 assists per game, he would remain an all-around presence to fill in the holes in Philadelphia as his play barely wavered from that rookie campaign. During his 400 games in Philadelphia, Gola averaged 13.5 points, 10 rebounds and 5 assists, made three straight All-Star games (1960-62) and was a member of the 1958 All-NBA 2nd Team.
The final big piece on the ’56 title team was PF Joe Graboski (a name that screams early 50s NBA). He was the third player to enter the NBA straight from high school back in the 1948-49 season with the Chicago Stags. Taken in by the Warriors in 1953, Joe never appeared in an all-star and his shooting percentage was atrocious, but he bruised with the best of them down low. In his six seasons as a starter (1954 – 1959), Graboski averaged 14 points and 10 rebounds.
And the man that sent Graboski to the Philly bench in the 1959-60 season was none other than the Big Dipper, Wilt Chamberlain. It was as a Philadelphia Warrior that Wilt set the single-season records for points per game (50.4), rebounds per game (27.2) and minutes per game (48.5). In 1961 he was the first Warrior and NBA player to shoot above 50% from the field for an entire season.
Of these Philadelphia Warriors greats, only those who spent time in the Bay Area (Chamberlain, Attles, and Merschery) have been recognized by the Warriors franchise with jersey retirements. That’s Golden State’s prerogative, of course, but I disagree with it. Even the Kings have done justice to their previous stops and have jersey numbers retired from their Rochester, Cincinnati, Kansas City and Omaha days.
It’s particularly galling with Arizin who is still splattered all over the Warriors’ record books. He’s top five in games (4th), minutes (3rd), field goals made (4th), free throws made (1st), rebounds (5th), points (3rd), and win shares (2nd). If he stands no chance, the others certainly don’t.
Not that most of these fellows would be around to bask in their own glory. Joe Fulks was murdered in 1976. Neil Johnston passed away in 1978. Jack George exited this world in 1989. Arizin, Chamberlain, Rodgers, Graboski and Sauldsberry have left us too in the past dozen years. Of these greats, only Attles, Gola and Meschery can still attest what it meant to be a Philadelphia Warrior.
And make no doubt about it, they were great times. 16 years, 12 playoffs, 6 Eastern Finals appearances, 3 NBA Finals appearances and 2 titles. As individuals these men collected 27 All-Star games, 18 All-NBA teams, 10 scoring titles, 4 rebounding titles, 2 Rookie of the Year awards and 1 MVP. That’s quite a nice haul from some pretty nice players…
“We went out to San Diego to play the San Diego Recruit Depot for the Marine Corps championship. And we were told ‘If you don’t win, you’re not coming back. You’re going to Korea.’ Now talk about playing under pressure. That is playing under pressure. Fortunately, we won…”
Career Stats: 22.8 ppg, 8.6 rpg, 2.3 apg, 42.1% FG, 81% FT
Accolades: 10x All-Star (1951-52; 1955-62), 3x All-NBA 1st Team (1952, 1956-57), All-NBA 2nd Team (1959), All Star Game MVP (1952); 1956 NBA Champion; 2x PPG Leader (1952, 1957), FG% Leader (1952)
Paul Arizin’s Hall of Fame resume began rather inauspiciously, if not down right ignominiously. A native of Philadelphia, Arizin tried out only once for his high school basketball team, during his senior year, but failed to make it. Enrolling at Villanova University as a chemistry major, Arizin continued to play basketball in various intramural, Catholic and independent leagues. Scouting the local talent, Villanova’s head coach, Al Severance, spotted Arizin during one of the games and offered him a chance to go to Villanova. Arizin politely informed him he already attended the school and the next year as a sophomore, Arizin joined the team.
Arizin rapidly progressed to become the nation’s best college player. As a junior he leveled 85 points in a single game. He even topped the 100 point mark in a single game, but the feat isn’t recognized because it came against a junior college. Nevertheless, his scoring average escalated from 11 to 22 to 25 by his senior year when he was declared Player of the Year and selected to the AP All-America 1st Team in 1950.
(note: this is one of my absolute favorite photographs of all time)
 ”I doubt if Johnston will ever receive the recognition that Mikan got because Neil didn’t come into the league with the fanfare and blowing of trumpets that accompanied Mikan.” And the fact that Chamberlain came immediately after him, in the same city, also didn’t help.
Via Eddie Gottlieb and Alex Sachare from the 100 Greatest Basketball Players of All Time
Years Active: 1952 – 1959
Career Stats: 19.4 ppg, 11.3 rpg, 2.5 apg, 44.4% FG, 76.8% FT
Accolades: 6x All-Star (1953-58), 4x All-NBA 1st Team (1953-56), All-NBA 2nd Team (1957); 3x PPG Leader (1953-55), 3x FG% Leader (1953, 1956-57), RPG Leader (1955); Championship (1956 Philadelphia Warriors)
Joe Fulks was the pivot man to establish the Philadelphia Warriors as a force in the NBA, winning the inaugural title and being the league’s first superstar in 1947. However, as Fulks aged and wore down, the Warriors struggled to contend. The addition of F/G Paul Arizin in 1951 began the process of renewal. Then in 1952, a 6’8″, 210-pound center was added to the mix. He played a scant 15 minutes his rookie year, but thereafter, Neil Johnston would prove an indomitable force in leading the Warriors back to prominence alongside Arizin.
Career Stats: 16.4 ppg, 5.3 rpg, 1.2 apg, 30% FG, 77% FT
Accolades: 3x All-BAA 1st Team (1947-49), All-NBA 2nd Team (1951), 2x NBA All-Star (1951-52), 1947 BAA Champion (Warriors); 2x BAA PPG Leader (1947-48), NBA FT% Leader (1951)
Nearly two months ago, I wrote that the stories of Joe Fulks and Paul Arizin would have to “wait for another day.” Well, while adding Neil Johnston to the mix, that day has come. Welcome to the Forgotten Warriors mini-series! Arizin, Fulks and Johnston are unquestionably three of the greatest Warriors players yet they are generally forgotten due to playing in the 1940s and 1950s and also playing for the Warriors when they were in Philadelphia. The 1st of this trio to join the Warriors, “Jumpin’ Joe” Fulks will thus be the first chronicled.
Now, you may look at Fulks’ statistics and not be particularly amazed. You could lead the league in assists with less than 4 a game back in the 1940s. Rebound stats weren’t kept at all until 1951. Minutes played weren’t logged until 1952. But, they did keep track of field goal attempts and Fulks’s field goal percentage is startlingly bad by today’s standards. However, context is golden.
Consider that Joe Fulks, even if he was a pioneer, was still a product of his era. In 1947, only four players shot over 33% from the field. In 1948, only 2 accomplished the feat. Finally in 1949, a significant amount of players breached the barrier of 33%, with some even reaching the 40% mark! Basically, chiding Fulks for atrocious field goal percentages would be like getting on the Wright Brothers for not being able to fly a 747. We wouldn’t have the 747 without the work of the Wright Brothers and we wouldn’t have the NBA of today without Fulks.
There is an interesting dichotomy characterizing this year’s MVP race. There’s an assumed winner in Derrick Rose, but there are several worthy candidates. Nobody’s really a clear-cut winner. The reality of it, though, is that all the popular choices are clear-cut options.
Mike Wilbon’s clear-cut winner is Rose. John Hollinger’s clear-cut winner is Dwight Howard. Ethan Sherwood Strauss’ clear-cut winner is LeBron James. The thing is, none of them is wrong. When there are no fewer than three arguable candidates, that might be a problem. This year’s MVP race is kind of like a multiple-choice question that has no right answer — you answer it because that’s the nature of the thing, but later on you’re told that there wasn’t a correct answer, so you should have abstained.
If the MVP voting process for the NBA is at that point, a change is necessary. Right now, the MVP vote has no definition. There are no official qualities inherent to the award. Without some directional guidance, it’s useless to elect a winner. The voting is based entirely on speculation, personal opinion, and newsworthiness. That seems a bit off.
As Matt Moore was quick to point out, that’s probably the way the league wants it. The openness of the award facilitates discourse, which generates popularity for the relevant players, their teams, and the league as a whole. The more candidates there are, the more fan bases start to rally and promote the NBA, however indirectly.
That’s all fine and dandy to a degree, but what happens if things get worse? The MVP is a media-driven award, and the landscape and scope of the media is ever evolving. As the generation gap continues to widen between the traditional print writers and the up-and-coming bloggers, it’s within the realm of possibility that candidacies could get ridiculous. The example I used last night was this: what happens if we start voting Ryan Gomes MVP for best mohawk? Or Kyle Lowry for best internet meme? It seems absurd now, but down the line it could be feasible.
The NBA is supposed to be fun for the viewers. Entertainment creates good business, which circles back to fun. It’s a mutually beneficial cycle. What’s ignored, though, is that the greatness of the NBA isn’t just based on fun. There’s a necessary factor of legitimacy. The Harlem Globetrotters are fun, but they aren’t very successful. Slam Ball was fun, but it wasn’t successful. When Golden State Warriors fans herald Monta Ellis at their MVP at Oracle Arena, that’s a rather tame violation of the legitimacy of the award and the NBA, but it’s still outrageous.
Better yet, take a look at the All-Star Game. Every year, one or more undeserving players get voted in to the starting lineup because of personal allegiances or Lifetime Achievement Awards (Yao Ming and Allen Iverson have fit those categories, respectively, in recent years). Without a doubt, the game has taken a hit in relevance of late, and the joke of the voting process is no small factor. The MVP’s on the same track.
I don’t mean to suggest that there should be a list of robotic criteria for a player to be voted MVP in a process that takes all the life out of things. But marginal reform would be the best thing at this point. The Rookie of the Year Award is a good model. It has a controversial condition that players are eligible for the award even if they are playing in a year other than their first. The pertinent example? Blake Griffin, who garnered every first-place ROY vote from the contingent of ESPN writers. If that weren’t the case, every one of those writers would have to reconsider his or her vote.
Getting a push in the right direction from the NBA wouldn’t be a detriment to fun, and it would help to avoid the pitfalls of illegitimacy — a balance of which even this year’s MVP race could be jealous.