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Understanding Advanced Stats: Shedding Light On Lineups

Continuing the quest to bridge the gap, another edition in the Hardwood Paroxysm series of Understanding Advanced Stats

Often we see fans and media alike speculating that a certain player tweak in a lineup could make the team better overall. How can we know, or how can we support this assertion properly without watching it actually play out?

The first thing I’m going to want to know is how these players match up in efficiency differential, measuring the difference between what they score on offense to what they give up on defense. Let’s pick on the Suns today.

On hoopstats.com we find Marcin Gortat ranked as the sixth-best center in the NBA at eff diff with a +21.0 on the season and Channing Frye the 28th-best in the category at a +12.7 (click on the “Full” lists located at the bottom of each category).

It would seem like Frye would put up enough points on a regular basis to supplement that potent pick-and-roll from Gortat to make the Suns frontcourt fairly highly ranked. By clicking on “Top Frontcourts, Full Frontcourt Rankings,” then column heading “Pts” to sort results automatically we see that indeed the Suns have the 11th-highest scoring frontcourt in the league.

But we have a problem. The Phoenix Suns, while scoring plenty also seem to be giving up too much on defense when we find they’re one of only two frontcourts in the top 15 in scoring that also carry a negative eff diff of -2.4. This means they’re allowing more points collectively from the power forward and center positions than they’re putting up.

Of course, this is collectively, as a team, so we can’t simply pin it on one or two guys and call ‘em out on Twitter for sucking at defense. There’s also second and third unit personnel that contribute to these overall results, even if the bulk of it is on the ones that garner the bulk of the PT.

Since both starters in the Suns’ frontcourt carry a positive eff diff it’s likely the backups causing the team’s overall rating to drop into the red. BasketballValue holds virtually endless sortable tools that take us a step deeper into our quest to uncover the truth of the matter. Here we can see each individual’s long-term effect on the team’s overall ORtg and DRtg (offensive and defensive rating, which you should understand already if you’ve been following along with the series. Because you have, right? Right?!) On and Off the court.

Over at 82Games we can see simple +/- ratings for our target players, Gortat, Frye, and their backups Robin Lopez, Markief Morris, and occasionally Hakim Warrick.

 

Sortable “Simple Ratings”

 

While we never advocate reliance on ‘overall rating’ type metrics for players since we believe that “fit” within a team’s roster and coaching schemes, financial considerations and other factors play a considerable part in player evaluation, it can be useful to gauge quickly how a player stacks up in certain statistical categories.

The main components of the ‘Simple Ratings’ are a production measure (a variant of John Hollinger’s PER rating) for a player’s own stats versus the counterpart player on the other team while he is on the court, as well as a simple on court/off court plus minus. This rating is actually more of a placeholder until the more sophisticated analysis we produce is made public, but still offers a good fast read on player performance.

By clicking on “5-Man Units” we are able to go more in-depth, glean insight into who does and doesn’t work together better on the court both on offense and defense. These are laid out by position from point guard to center, left to right. For these next few images, remember, sample sizes.

Legend:

  • Min = the total minutes the unit was on the floor.
  • Off = the unit’s points per possession.
  • Def = the unit’s points per possession allowed.
  • +/- = the team net points for the unit.
  • W = number of games a unit outscored its opponents while on the court.
  • L = number of games a unit was outscored by its opponents while on the court.
  • Win% = the winning percentage for the unit based on Wins versus Losses.

 

The first result (1) is basically a control we’ll measure the rest of the lineups against since it’s the most used by a lot, the starters who play the bulk of the minutes.  We find that as Morris is subbed in for Frye as rotational substitutions begin to take place that the defense gets better, pretty good in fact, giving up an estimated 0.97 points-per-possession, but somehow, as Ronnie Price is subsequently subbed in for Jared Dudley anything gained by the starting unit is suddenly lost.

Popping over to Price’s page we can see the top 20 5-man units he’s been used in.

Looking at result lines 1-5 we see that it’s not so much Ronnie Price himself destroying the productivity of the lineup, but where head coach Alvin Gentry has played him. Price at the point with any lineup of bigs isn’t so bad, it’s whenever Gentry has opted to play Price in the backcourt opposite Nash that things go to hell in handbasket.

Price is a little guy at the 2 by NBA standards, listed at a generous 6’2″ soaking wet (trust me, he’s not), leaving him at a disadvantage as a defender aside from his slippery quickness and freakish bursts of energy that net a few passing lane pick pockets, so putting him next to Steve Nash leaves undue pressure on the Suns bigs to make up for unheeded penetration by the opposition.

As the bigs are forced to rotate over to help, opposing players penetrating have a plethora of options inside a few feet out in which to convert an easy attempt. The big men on the floor are then penalized as a whole for a defensive breakdown on the perimeter they could truthfully do little about if the opposing offense is in any way the least bit competent at decision-making.

While Price, Shannon Brown, Morris, Warrick, and Lopez all individually carry season-long minuses in simple +/- rating, something interesting emerges when we revisit the most-used lineups.

This group actually plays very well together as a backup unit with a collective positive +/- and competent offensive and defensive PPP ratings.

The moral of the story here is that Alvin Gentry should never, everrrrrr, play Ronnie Price in the same backcourt as Steve Nash. Unless he doesn’t like winning.

 

"We got him, Alvin. You want we should put him in a locker?"

_____

Sebastian Telfair would like a word with you.

Sort the Suns’ best and worst On-Off Court defenders. Go ahead. You could use the practice.

 

Understanding Advanced Stats: Not All Stats Are Created Equal

Continuing the quest to bridge the gap, another edition in the Hardwood Paroxysm series of Understanding Advanced Stats

A new statistical category rarely makes it’s way into the mainstream, the box score. But that’s what +/- did relatively recently. This easily misunderstood stat can be useful if cited properly. Sadly, it gets misused more often than not.

Really transcendent players tend to have overall pluses simply because they are that good, but in the normal course of events really good players can often end up with a negative or about even +/-. This is due to teammates, not an individual, in most cases. One cannot simply look at a box score and assume that because a particular player had a negative +/- that they had a poor game; they may have won their matchup fairly handily, but if most of the teammates he was on the floor with at the time had a bad game it reflects poorly on everyone.

+/- is best used a couple of ways that we’ll explore here, in large sample sizes, in lineups, and in individual matchups, but only if you are looking specifically at that matchup alone and not in the context of a box score.

Steve Nash and the Phoenix Suns have had a rough year (even though they have found a rhythm of late).  The standard box score from a recent close loss to the Golden State Warriors leaves Nash looking like he got smoked, even though we know he’s one of those transcendent players with the sixth-best season-long +/- as of March 6.

Nash’s opponents’ box score tells us little more about what really happened except that Curry had a nice, if short stint.

 

From these stats it would appear that Robinson outplayed Nash. Let’s look closer, at PopcornMachine‘s Game Flow from that particular tilt. Note: If you mouse-over a particular player’s stint you get specifics. I’ve Photoshopped in several players’ stints in order to be more succinct

What we find is that it wasn’t so much that Curry was really good, or Nash really bad, as that David Lee had a spectacular first quarter stint. Curry wouldn’t play again after the first Q. Go ahead and mouse over the rest of Nash’s, and Curry’s replacement, Nate Robinson’s, stints  to get a better feel for how the game unfolded in the backcourt.

Alternately,  before we move on, you can check the stint by the man who’s job it was to be guarding Lee, assuming Gentry had the Suns playing man-D, Channing Frye (something you can confirm by checking mySynergySports or watching a replay). Frye would finish the game at a mere -1, so you can see how one can be deceived by a simple box score +/- stat, when in fact Frye was largely responsible for the early big deficit that Nash and Co. spent the rest of the game making up. The standard box may have you believing that Lee and Frye got in a personal shootout, however, by checking the PopcornMachine box score, and clicking on the specific players, we find that Frye got hot himself later in the contest helping to redeem that heinous first Q and rebound his game-long +/-.

Is what Curry did in his matchup with Nash this night usual? Click that last link and we can get a clue to that by using BasketballReference’s Head2Head Finder found under the Play Index tab.

In looking at the game flow, that graphed line between the two teams, we see that as the flow began to favor Nash and the Suns in the second half, Warriors coach Mark Jackson began experimenting with lineups to try and slow the comeback roll.

As we close this session, you can get a head start on a future post by checking at 82Games to see how these two teams’ lineups have stacked up playing together on the season, another of the fruitful and less suspect uses of the +/- stat.

In closing I would caution you to always be wary of small sample size numbers all by themselves. Until next time, happy advanced statting.

 

 

The Lost Season: Boris Diaw, 05-06

[flash http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRJNUueNoao&feature=BFa&list=PL2A8E6EC888408C7A&index=33]

With the threat of a shortened or even cancelled season upon us, there is very little we can do other than watch U19 tournaments or read books to restore a shred of basketball into our lives. What we can do, though, is reminisce over other “lost” seasons. Seasons which saw players or teams achieve extraordinary things that go beyond titles or awards, only to fade back into the background one year later. Here we will bring the tale of these lost seasons, the ones that touched us on a personal level, the ones we will never forget, though history itself might. we start with the story of Boris Diaw, and his magical 2005-2006 showing.

Steve Nash is a 2 time MVP, one of the greatest point guards ever, and the operating force on what most people would concur were the funnest offenses of all time. And yet somehow, though if you ask him he’s certain to tell you he doesn’t want to, he may be even better as a martyr.

Everybody and everything has taken a shot at Steve Nash throughout his unique NBA career. Mark Cuban passing up on re-signing him because Erick Dampier was just too attractive to gloss over. Joe Johnson breaking his face in the 2005 playoffs. Amar’e Stoudemire’s microfracture surgery in 2006. Tony Parker’s head, Robert Horry’s hip, and Stu Jackson’s gavel in 2007. Duncan’s 3 pointer in 2008. Shaq’s primadonna routine to go with Terry Porter’s Terry Porter routine in 2009. Kobe Bryant airballing a shot straight to Ron Artest’s hands in 2010. Hedo Turkoglu. Vince Carter. 3 different all-star players – Johnson, Stoudemire, and Shawn Marion – all separately deciding that for whatever reason, getting the ball wherever they want it and whenever they want it just wasn’t fun. Robert Sarver selling away draft picks, players, and childrens’ souls. The list goes on and on.

But through all the dirty blows, the infuriating stupidity, and yes – the bad luck – nobody did more to harm Steve Nash’s NBA career than Boris Diaw.

The Arrival

July of 2005. The Phoenix Suns are coming off a 62 win season, one that netted Mike D’Antoni a Coach of the Year award, Steve Nash his first MVP, and brought back joyous, offensive minded basketball to the forefront of the league. Momentum is at its peak, legions of fans have gathered behind them, and yet – the San Antonio Spurs knocked them out of the playoffs in 5 games, and still loom in the background. To deal with this robotic behemoth, sharpshooter Quentin Richardson is sent to New York for Kurt Thomas, giving Phoenix a defensive big man who can match up with Finals MVP Tim Duncan. A promising line-up of Nash, Johnson, Marion, Stoudemire and Thomas – 3 all-stars, a defensive anchor, and an up-and-coming, all-around 24 year old in Johnson, who is coming off a season of 17 points per game with 47% shooting from 3 – completes a picture as bright as the Arizona sun.

Only Johnson wants out.

With the bright lights promising roster opportunity to be the number 1 option on a terrible team proving too tempting to resist, Joe asks the Phoenix Suns not to match the 5 year, 72 million offer the Atlanta Hawks offered him in restricted free agency. Phoenix is almost saved by Atlanta’s minority owner Steve Belkin, but a judge steps in, sending Johnson in a sign-and-trade deal to Lotteryville, Georgia. The Suns save face with two future first round picks (which would eventually become Rajon Rondo, sold off to Boston, and Robin Lopez), and a French guard from the end of the bench named Boris Diaw.

The Preamble

Over his first two NBA seasons, Boris Diaw neglected to show any indication that he was, indeed, an NBA player. Fitting perfectly with the profile of the early 2000s international draftee, Diaw was nabbed with the 21st pick of the 2003 draft with a rare combination of natural size and European-honed skill. Diaw was supposed to be a 6’9” guard who could handle the ball, set up his teammates, rebound when asked, and be back in time for tea.

Instead, he took the international draftee stigma one step further and was awful. Shots were missed. Turnovers were turned over. Instead of providing the passing-shooting-guard to Jason Terry’s shooting-point-guard, Diaw played a bench role, and played it miserably. 25 minutes a game in his rookie year became 18 the next, and when Phoenix asked for the disappointing Frenchman as a throw in in the Joe Johnson trade, the Hawks were more than happy to abide.

Phoenix had supposedly liked Diaw ever since the 2003 draft, and were intending to use him as part of an ensemble cast to replace Johnson. The newly signed Raja Bell would fill in the starting 2 shooter/perimeter stopper role. Leandro Barbosa, then still on the upward curve of his career arc, would be the team’s secondary ball handler. Jim Jackson and James Jones had the alliteration corner all covered. And Diaw? Diaw would hopefully give them a little bit of everything in as many minutes as he would be able to play without becoming a liability. For the Mike D’Antoni definition of depth, this was enough.

And then Amare (pre-apostrophe! Man, those were the days) had microfracture surgery.

The Breakthrough

Amare’s injury changed everything. From a team with hopeful depth in the backcourt, no depth in the frontcourt, and a 3 star launching pad that rivaled any trio in the league outside of San Antonio, the Suns were diminished to “Steve Nash runs the show, Shawn Marion does everything else, and dear lord that’s all we have”. When a murderer’s row of an early schedule sent the Suns stumbling to a 4-5 start to their season, it seemed as if the magical Seven Seconds or Less campaign was a distant memory.

But as all this was happening, something else, something bigger had just taken place.

Boris Diaw decided that he’s a passing savant.

It started with a 5 assist performance against the Lakers in the second game of the season. Then it was 6 against Utah. Then, out of absolutely nowhere, an 11-9-11 implosion in a loss to the still-good-but-no-longer-great Sacramento Kings. 6 the next game. Then 5. Then 7. The sort of assists that just didn’t belong at the fingertips of a 6’9” player, not in their sheer volume, and especially not in their quality. On a team with only one creator – even a historically great one like Steve Nash – playing Diaw just enough for him not to become a liability was both no longer a limitation, and no longer an option.

On November 23rd, one night after defeating the Toronto Raptors to get their record back to .500, the Phoenix Suns faced the Houston Rockets. Houston was in a moribund state, without star Tracy McGrady, starting the likes of Luther Head, Ryan Bowen, David Wesley and Juwan Howard next to Yao Ming. The Suns, on the other hand, were starting Boris Diaw.

Phoenix won 100-88, the second in a 9 game win streak. Boris Diaw had 17 points, 10 rebounds, and 6 assists.

Starting Small Forward, Backup Point Guard, Backup Center

Diaw’s elite passing game was his newfound claim to fame, but even in its brilliance, this was hardly the work of a one-trick pony. During his inaugural month of Sundom, Diaw indeed averaged a whopping 5.8 assists in just under 29 minutes per game, but his impact was felt virtually everywhere. Those assists came with 6.3 rebounds, 10.5 points on 53% shooting, and solid defensive work. More importantly, the Steve Nash Magic Show had given Diaw a nasty streak that he never displayed off the bench in Atlanta, aggressively looking to score and distribute instead of lurking in the background, hoping he isn’t subbed back out for the likes of Dion Glover.

As the games drew on by, fluke talk was dying out and sheer amazement was emboldening its stand. But Diaw wasn’t done. On a team with so little depth everywhere, and specifically in the frontcourt, a 6’9” player who does virtually everything couldn’t be laid to waste solely in the backcourt.

When he was given the starting job for good that night against Houston, Diaw was registered as a small forward, a minor shift from his previous shooting guard billing. But as Diaw’s game grew stronger, Phoenix’s desperate need for size grew as well. The shift to backup power forward – those 8 or so minutes in which Marion was catching his breath – was seamless. Then came yet another bump, this time as Kurt Thomas’ backup at the 5. One has to imagine that even D’Antoni himself had to be skeptical as to how far this could be stretched, and yet, there Diaw was, manning the pivot, and there were the Suns, winning basketball games.

Prior to the 2003 draft, Diaw was projected as an outlier at shooting guard. Now he was an outlier on virtually every level, bordering on ridiculous. The man legitimately played 5 positions, starting smack dab in the middle at the 3, sprinkling in some 1, seasoning with 5, spending time in between when necessary, his long reach giving other starters a hand both as Nash’s secondary ball handler and as Thomas’ paint dwelling companion.

February 2006. The Suns are 36-17, coming off a win against the Paul-Pierce-and-garbage Boston Celtics, when it is announced that Kurt Thomas has been diagnosed with a stress fracture in his foot. Normally, one would have to plug his backup center into the starting line-up. Except the Suns’ backup center already started at small forward. Not anymore.

When Kurt Thomas was ruled out and Boris Diaw officially became a starting NBA center, the Suns were riding a 5 game winning streak. They extended it to 11, finishing the season with a Kurt-less 18-11 run, and grabbing the second seed in the Western Conference playoffs. Steve Nash, still the architect, still the master, wins his second straight MVP award (to the chagrin of many, and we’re not having this discussion here). Diaw, who finished the season averaging 13.3 points on 56.4% true shooting, 6.9 boards, and 6.2 assists a night, wins the NBA’s Most Improved Player award, in one of the easiest votes that the ridiculous award has ever had (with apologies to David West, who had an incredible breakout campaign, and teamed up with a rookie Chris Paul and fellow waiver wire pickup Diaw to single-handedly win me my fantasy league).

But in the playoffs, you need to have size, right? Diaw just can’t be a playoff center, right? Right?

The Peak

In the first round, the Suns faced a Lakers squad with very little frontcourt strength. Lamar Odom was never truly an inside presence, Kwame Brown was starting at center and still every bit the laughing stock. But Phil Jackson saw a weakness, and exploited it. Kwame and Lamar routinely got the ball against Phoenix’s 6’9” and 6’7” starting big men, and with Kobe Bryant at his peak, it was very nearly enough. The Suns had to become just the 9thteam to come back from a 3-1 playoff series deficit, and withstand a 50 point game from Bryant in an overtime Game 6, just to get to the next round. Yet another 7 game series against a Los Angeles squad followed, this time against the one hit wonder Elton Brand-Sam Cassell Clipper team, and again, the Suns prevailed, barely.

In both series, the Suns – and Diaw as their center – were severely outrebounded. Diaw posted 5.8 boards a night in the playoffs, understandable for a former small forward but disappointing for a center, and while his scoring increased and his passing remained every bit as crisp, the Suns were exhausted and outmatched entering their Western Conference Finals match-up with the Dallas Mavericks. Heck, they needed the Daniel Ewing debacle to take place, and a miraculous resurgence from February free agent pick up Tim Thomas, just to get past the Clippers. Tim Thomas! THE CLIPPERS!

May 24th. The 2006 conference Finals tip off in a raucous American Airlines Arena in Dallas, the result of the Mavericks somehow being the conference’s 4thseed with it’s second best record. The Mavs have just defeated the defending champs, with the deciding Game 7 taking place in San Antonio. Dirk is at what was then the top of his game. Avery Johnson is still a coaching mastermind. Josh Howard is still relevant.

Steve Nash was his usual brilliant self, dominating the game from start to finish, going off for 27 points and 16 assists, including one of the ballsiest 3 pointers ever seen in the playoffs, down 7, with 2:14 left on the game clock, 19 left on the shot clock, and absolutely nobody set to take the rebound. But we’ve seen Steve Nash do these things on this stage before.

Boris Diaw, however, had done something he was not supposed to do. Guarded by a combination of the lumbering Erick Dampier, the too slow Dirk, and the comatose Keith Van Horn, Diaw obliterated all that was in his path. Off pick and rolls, in isolations, from the elbow, from the post. Nobody on earth could stop Boris Diaw that night. With 5 seconds left in the game and the Suns down 1, Diaw received an inbounds pass from Tim Thomas in the right block, his back to the basket, Jerry Stackhouse all over him. Diaw power dribbled to the middle, spun towards the baseline, sent Stackhouse flying in the air, and calmly netted the 6 foot jumper to seal the deal. Those were his 33rd and 34th points of the night, to go with 6 rebounds and a surprisingly meager 2 assists (though with Nash getting 16, they were hard to come by).

5 games later, the shorthanded Suns eventually saw their demise at the hands of the Mavericks, but Boris Diaw had cemented his status as a force to be reckoned with. 24.2 points on 52% shooting (76% from the line), to go with 8.5 boards and 1.7 blocks a night left basketball fans wondering whether Diaw could actually play center on a regularly sized team, on a regular basis. His assists had suffered throughout the series – just 3.2 a game to go with 3.3 turnovers – but that was what we already knew Diaw could do. It was the rest that he had to prove, and he had. Diaw was given a 5 year, 45 million contract extension before he could even taste free agency. For the Diaw we saw against Dallas, this was an absolute steal.

The Downfall

The 2006-2007 Suns campaign once again projected to be a promising one. Amare was back. Kurt Thomas was healthy. The Nash/Marion/Diaw nucleus remained, bolstered by Bell and Barbosa. And indeed, the campaign was a relative success, with a hard fought and controversial exit at the hands of the same old Spurs, in a de-facto NBA Finals that just happened to be a second round series.

But Diaw was never the same. With Stoudemire back on board, he struggled in a dimished role as the 3rdoffensive option. His production dropped in almost every way possible, and his mood soured. The fragile child from his first two NBA seasons emerged once again, and whether this was the result of guaranteed money or a supposed lack of trust from the coaching staff was irrelevant. One year later, he was traded to Charlotte, where doing-it-all was replaced with lethargy and munchies. Athleticism turned into girth, the player who played all 5 positions became a slow-footed power forward, and short of a desperate run to a 7thseed in 2010 and a bunch of fat jokes on online chats during the 2010 World Championships, Boris Diaw never got anywhere ever again.

It’s easy to dismiss Diaw’s 05-06 campaign as a flash in a pan that was later converted for the making of pastries (do you even use a pan to make pastries? The metaphor worked too well to check), yet another one of Steve Nash/D’Antoni ball’s many creations. Let us not forget, says this theory, as Diaw was doing his thing, Tim Thomas was playing himself into a 4 year 24 million contract just mere feet away. But that would be selling Diaw short. So much of what Diaw did was independent of Nash and the mustachioed mastermind. Diaw was handling the ball when Nash wasn’t, creating for his teammates while the immortal Canadian was lying down near the bench or spotting up in the corner. Diaw was just as instrumental to the success of the Suns’ offense as they were to his.

Where Transcendence Lies

In a game where size plays such a huge factor in everything that occurs, that size often leads us to very direct definitions. Big men do this, little men do that. Put all these roles together and you got yourself a team. When boundaries are crossed, we feel that evil is afoot, and our standards are raised impossibly high. Andrea Bargnani may not be a star, but if he were 6 inches shorter, his style of play would be understandable. Once he broke out of the predetermined mold, he is deemed incompetent until he achieves success.

As the game evolved, however, we’ve seen those boundaries crossed more and more, and that same success has started to arive as well. And when the supposedly impure hybrid becomes an unmitigated winner, we praise them. Michael Jordan was a guard who took the above-the-rim game up a notch, and when it left him, he mastered the post. Dirk Nowitzki led a fringe contender to a championship by being an unstoppable scorer from absolutely everywhere, though traditionally his range would end at around 15 feet and his jumpers would only fall when flat-footed.

Amazing plays are amazing plays, no matter who they come from. It’s what makes us love basketball. Blake Griffin hanging in the air long enough to complete an entire game of Monopoly set on a Russian man’s scalp, or Jason Terry inexplicably succeeding at throwing an orange ball into a round hoop from 30 feet away with a 6’8”, 270 pounder draped all over him in the waning moments of a Finals game, make our jaws drop in awe and our hearts bless Dr. Naismith again and again.

But true greatness lies in these hybrids. My personal basketball fetish is the passing big man. I cheer and I yell and the endorphins flow like crazy when I see a superhuman dunk or a fadeaway taken at a 45 degree angle, but nothing compares to seeing a guy like Al Horford or Pau Gasol place a perfectly constructed bounce pass right in the grasp of a moving target. For others, it’s the diminutive Derrick Rose driving into the paint, where giants roam and pain is guaranteed, only to flip the ball to the edge of the backboard, where it gains a spin that leads it straight into the hoop.

Just as Larry Bird and Magic Johnson were two of the greatest players of all time as one-in-a-generation-that-just-happened-to-be-two-in-the-same-generation passers and team players working within bodies that were built for other skills, just as Lebron James separates himself from today’s field with his elite ability to see the game and find his teammates while working from Karl Malone’s body, so was Boris Diaw.

Obviously, Diaw was not at the level of these legends – he was more of a Lamar Odom, falling just barely short of physical specimen, but with skills that ranged all over the basketball map, skills that promised the world, leaving us yearning for so much more. While the Larrys and the Magics and the Lebrons have transcendence oozing from every pore, the Borises and Lamars are transcendent for their uniqueness, perhaps resonating with us in an even greater way, until they inevitably disappoint.

There will never be another Boris Diaw. That is why it pains us so that we got to see the original and only version show its true form for just a 7 month period. And as we watch the diminished shell of what was once greatness labor around in a Charlotte uniform (or wherever, post-lockout), and we see a rare glimpse of what was with a nice alley-oop to Bismack Biyombo (hopefully) or brilliantly finding a wide open Tyrus Thomas for a clanged 20 footer (hopefully not), we must remember that this was the true Boris Diaw. The one who let Steve Nash down, the one who let us all down, but not before taking to a basketball court and tantalizing our minds with things that shouldn’t be possible.

On Steve Nash And Assumptions

Photo via Rain City Girl on Flickr

Assumptions are a funny thing. They invade the mind, spawn and manifest themselves in ways that affect our thought process in manners beyond our scope of comprehension. Our day to day existence is very much impacted whether we know it or not. A bad experience as a child can alter the way we perceive things later in life. A faulty product leaves us believing the worst about the company as a whole. Assumptions aren’t always a bad thing they simply alter our acuity, often shifting perception, with the variable being the size of the scale.

Perhaps one of the most widespread assumptions as they pertain to professional sports – and one that has traditionally proven to be accurate – is that advancement in age results in a drop-off in production. Sooner or later, every athlete in every sport hits that wall. Shots don’t fall like they used to, the familiar spring in the legs is evanescent and the bumps linger longer than they used to. We simply assume that once our stars start creeping closer to 40 that it’s all over, whether or not they age gracefully or leave us cringing, they start fading to black.

What happens when they don’t get that memo? The Celtics Big 3 continue to produce at a high level despite being on the down slope of their playing days and have been lauded for it – rightfully so. Kobe Bryant and Dirk Nowitzki remain among the NBA’s most revered players even being past their expected primes (though Dirk at 32 is still technically there). How is it then, with this crop of aging superstars still very much dominating the league’s spotlight that Steve Nash – in the midst of arguably his best season ever from a statistical standpoint – has managed to fade from the discussion of best active point guards?

With all due respect to Derrick Rose, Chris Paul, Rajon Rondo, Deron Williams, Russell Westbrook, et al, Nash’s production at the ripe age of 37 makes him the most impressive floor general still lacing them up. Playing for a Suns team that is a shell of the thrilling Phoenix teams of a few years ago, the modern day Godfather of the pick and roll is “quietly” putting together a line of 16 points and 11 assists while shooting nearly 51% from the floor and 38% beyond the arc. His per-36 numbers are right up there with his best seasons during his prime and his assist numbers have never been better. The sage veteran ranks in the top ten among all point guards in scoring, assists, field-goal percentage, three-point field goal percentage and free throw percentage and yet isn’t good enough to make the All-Star team.

Some may call it the passing of the torch to a new generation of point guards, I call is subconscious ageism. Our image of Nash’s greatness is so convoluted with what we perceive him to be rather than what he is, that in the midst of another brilliant season in the expected twilight of his career, he is lost in a sea of youthful exuberance and explosiveness at the point guard position. We’re blinded by our own assumptions of one of the game’s great playmakers.

What we’re seeing has never been done before and like so many new and unfamiliar entities that we encounter, we misjudge what is in front of us. In this “Golden Age of the Point Guard” we’re blessed to witness explosive, young players equally as capable of dolling out 15 assists as they are of completing jaw dropping forays to the rim. Nash’s beautiful gift of playing angles and seeing passing lanes that no one else does is overshadowed by individuals who simply obliterate the geometry of the game. But above all else, Nash simply isn’t falling in line with our preconceived notions of an aging point guard.

It’s acceptable for Ray Allen to remain a marquee individual because we all know the jumper is the last thing to go. Kobe is one of the fiercest competitors of his or any generation, so he can will himself to the basket until he is 50 for all we care. But for Nash, playing a position that requires speed, athleticism and the latest trend a 36-inch vertical, he manages to stay elite in a world that assumes otherwise.

The greatest hope for every fan is that their favorite stars can play forever, but the mortality of their greatness is constantly present in our understanding of them. We watch because we know what is, won’t always be. Yet somehow, Nash has managed to outlive our predestined conceptualization of his career, but rather than pay witness to this remarkable aberration, the public’s state of mind forges on to the latest and greatest.

Maybe it’s time to take a step back.

Have Ball, Will Travel: Steve Nash

In today’s Have Ball, Will Travel, we have the elusive double-whammy. Two demonstrations of the enforcement of the traveling rule, one correct and one incorrect, coming from Tuesday night’s game between the Phoenix Suns and the Portland Trailblazers.

This first clip is an easy non-call, and the officiating crew judged it correctly. In most casual basketball circles, this would surely be called a travel; the “can’t stand up with the ball” rule is a pretty popular, but in this case incorrect, interpretation of the traveling rule. I’m not exactly sure if this particular rule has evolved over time or if it’s always been misunderstood, but in today’s NBA (and at least as far back as a few years ago, based on the clips used for the NBA Video Rulebook), it’s perfectly legitimate to stand up with the ball, establish a pivot foot, and go about your business.

Now, here’s where things get tricky. Players receiving the ball on the move frequently get a ridiculous free pass on traveling calls, but here the official calls the play tightly…and incorrectly. Here’s the language used in the rulebook:

A player who receives the ball while he is progressing must release the ball to start his dribble before his second step.

The first step occurs when a foot, or both feet, touch the floor after gaining control of the ball. The second step occurs after the first step when the other foot touches the floor, or both feet touch the floor simultaneously.

Alright, pretty straightforward there. Nash clearly receives the ball on the move, though in his usual side gallop rather than a full sprint. If you look carefully, both of Nash’s feet are planted when he gains possession of the ball; it’s hard to see because of his shuffle, but if you watch the movement and angle of his feet, it’s clear that neither one should count as an established step. That makes the plant of Nash’s right foot his “first step” as defined by the rule.

Nash’s “second step” is an insanely close call, but he does indeed release the ball before his second step occurs, as the rule demands. I’ve freeze-framed the video where the ball is out of Nash’s hands while his other foot (which will eventually take that second step) is still in the air. Hard to blame the official for not being able to see that insane bit of detail, but in this case that level of precision would have been necessary to make the correct non-call.

Thanks to Monsieurs Sebastian Pruiti and Henry Abbott for recommending these plays.

Conference Finals Lakers-Suns Game 2 Recap: Pau Gasol Is The Best Big Man In The NBA

As I watched a blowout disguise itself as a close game Wednesday night, I couldn’t help but be drawn to the job that Pau Gasol was doing all over the floor.

Two years ago when the Los Angeles Lakers traded Marc Gasol, something called a Kwame Brown that people claim was once the number one pick of the NBA Draft, and a first round pick to the Memphis Grizzlies for Pau Gasol, people were infuriated at the fact that the Lakers could be given such a heist of talent. It’s almost like the Memphis Grizzlies had been cultivating this prized crop and the Lakers swooped in to harvest when nobody was looking. Some of called for a conspiracy while others just thought it was Chris Wallace doing Chris Wallace type things.

The uproar was sort of weird because even though Pau Gasol was clearly a talented All-Star capable of getting a defunct franchise into the playoffs most years, it wasn’t like the Spaniard was one of the top players in the NBA. Perhaps, we all knew something that none of us actually recognized yet. Putting Pau Gasol second fiddle to someone like Kobe Bryant is like telling MacGyver to screw the dental floss, flashlight and Pop Rocks and just handing him over Batman’s utility belt.

Now that Phil Jackson and Kobe have been able to integrate Gasol into the system all while winning a championship and letting him earn some true playoff chops, we’re all starting to see the fallout of this trade. Pau Gasol has simply become the best big man in the game today.

Yes, there are plenty of cases to be had for Dwight Howard, Kevin Garnett, Dirk Nowitzki, Tim Duncan, and of course Johan Petro (insert Matt Moore joke about Greg Oden here too while you’re at it). And all of those guys are really good. Dirk is a wiz on the offensive end of the floor. KG and Duncan still have a lot left in the tank as they adapt to injuries and old age. Dwight Howard is getting better all the time while filling the role as best defensive big man in the league. But Pau Gasol has the ability to truly dominate in the playoffs game after game after game.

After a very solid 21-point performance in Game One, Gasol came out in Game Two and decided to put a hurting on Amare Stoudemire and company. Even with defensive stalwarts like Dwight Howard and Kevin Garnett trying to defend him, I don’t think there’s any real way to stop Gasol on offense. He’s simply too good and has too many weapons at his disposal. So put him in front of someone like Channing Frye or Amare Stoudemire and he’s going to feast on human flesh like Hannibal Lecter.

He’s constantly showing new parts of his repertoire as a sort of tease of the dominance he could exude if he had to carry a team every night in the Association:

He can turn around over his left shoulder and shoot a should-be impossible fadeaway for any other big man on the planet like he did in the middle of the first quarter against the Suns.

He can flash to the middle of a zone, catch a quick pass in the paint and instantly toss up a little runner before the defense can react like he did towards the end of the first quarter before Robin Lopez could react.

He can turn over his left shoulder and put up the right-handed hook in the middle of the paint or he can go over his right shoulder after drop-stepping to the baseline and shooting a left hook that is impossible to block.

He catches the ball in traffic on lobs over the top when he’s being fronted and keeps the ball high to make a layup opportunity extremely easy for him.

And he moves so well without the ball that he’s like a big man version of Richard Hamilton.

In the fourth quarter against the Suns in Game Two, he utilized pretty much every weapon he owns. He scored 14 points in a game in which the Suns had come roaring back in the third quarter to tie it going into the fourth quarter. He made five of his seven shots in the period and four of his six free throw attempts. The only times he was stopped in the period were on a missed jumper just below the free throw line and a left-handed hook shot away from a double team in which it looked like he got fouled by Amare.

I can’t think of a more perfect big man to have on just about any team with his ability to score from all over, defend with great length inside, rebound at a high rate and move the ball around the halfcourt like a point guard. Unfortunately for the Suns, they have to face him and they don’t have an answer for him.

NBA Playoffs Lakers vs. Suns Game 1 Recap – Lamar Odom Does His Thing Like We All Knew He Should/Would/Could

There are plenty of things to talk about in Game One of a Lakers blowing out of the Phoenix Suns.

Kobe Bryant went off in a very scary way for Suns fans.

David Arquette somehow became the post-game story.

Andrew Bynum’s knee was tested and rested.

Jordan Farmar and Shannon Brown not only looked like NBA players throughout most of their time on the court but they actually looked like they were ready to help this Lakers team hoist up a 16th banner.

And Pau Gasol proved that he’s most likely the deadliest post player in the NBA.

However, none of that was as important as the playoff sighting of Lamar Odom. We all know the enigmatic tale of Lamar Odom. More so than most NBA players, Lamar Odom was a child prodigy the likes of which we’ve rarely seen. He was a power forward with the skills of a point guard. He wasn’t Magic Johnson by any means but he certainly was capable of shattering any proverbial mold set before him so that he could make a new one in his likeness.

After bouncing around high schools and colleges, Odom found his way into the NBA by being selected fourth in the 1999 NBA Draft. Unfortunately for him, he was picked by the Clippers and destined to be one constant conundrum wrapped in an enigma trapped in one of those super hard Sudokus. He showed flashes of brilliance in which he’d dominate guys like Kevin Garnett even though he had a far inferior team, while trying to balance the delicate building of a team of lottery picks and hope.

Fast-forward 10 years and he’s still as confusing as ever. Any time you start analyzing the Lakers roster and what they’re capable of with any NBA fan, you’re bound to come across the “what if” question concerning Lamar Odom. What if he maximized his talent and potential? What if he was motivated every time on the floor? What if he actually tried to Power Bar his way to the moon?

Lamar Odom has always been the NBA equivalent of The Riddler. He might as well be wearing an ambiguous green jump suit with question marks all over. Or should the jumpsuit be forum blue and gold?

Even though Lamar has been lauded as a shoulda-woulda-coulda over the past decade, the Lakers success has never been truly contingent on him showing up to play. Yes, the Lakers are a better team when he’s playing well but they’re also a better team when Kobe is taking smart shots, Pau Gasol is obliterating the concept of post defense and Andrew Bynum is being a big lug of a man that is impossible to keep away from the rim.

Against the Suns in Game One, Lamar Odom continued his career-long eradication of the Phoenix Suns. He’s played 827 games in the NBA (including playoffs) and racked up averages of 14.6 points, 8.9 rebounds and 35.8 minutes per game while shooting 46.5% from the field. But when he’s faced the Suns as a member of the Lakers, he’s taken his game to a whole other level.

In 32 career games against the Suns while playing in a Lakers uniform, Lamar Odom has upped his averages to 16.4 points, 11.7 rebounds and 38.3 minutes per game while shooting 48.3% from the field. Monday night, he posed the exact same problem for the Suns that everyone hoped would be a constant threat during his entire NBA career.

Lamar Odom finished with a spectacular line of 19 points and 19 rebounds off the bench in just 31 minutes of play. But it wasn’t the line he posted as much as it was the way he posted it. Seven of those rebounds came on the offensive boards. He feasted inside with 7/10 on his shots around the rim (Hoopdata). Simply put, the Phoenix Suns see a perfect weapon in Odom for what they do and have to watch while he has his way with them.

When Lamar Odom is on the court against the Suns, he’s able to slip into any spot on the floor that he needs. He can stay back and take long jumpers, even if they are a horrific shot for him to be taking. But most of all, he’s going to dive into the lane and create havoc against a Suns defense that still can’t defend the paint. I know we all like to think this Suns team is improved defensively in some way but regardless of what stats you want to use, when Amare and Frye are on the floor together you’re just not going to be able to match the length of a guy like Odom.

The Suns are designed to one thing and one thing only – that’s score a ton of points. When the tempo was high at the beginning of the game, it looked like the Lakers were going to have a real contest in front of them. Maybe it wasn’t going to be the same heart-pounding threat that the Thunder were in the first round but it wasn’t going to be far from it either. With Odom on the court, the tempo is no longer an option. He controls the boards and if he controls the boards then he controls the tempo of the game. He can get back on defense, end the Suns possession if they miss and get the momentum going the Lakers way.

We’re not necessarily sure that he’s going to show up and do this again in Game Two because that’s just not what he guarantees on a basketball court. He leaves us guessing, which adds to the drama of the NBA playoffs.

The confusion adds to not only his mystique but the Lakers mystique as well.

NBA Playoffs Suns Spurs Game 3: The Rising Action of Goran Dragic

During rising action, the basic internal conflict is complicated by the introduction of related secondary conflicts, including various obstacles that frustrate the protagonist’s attempt to reach his goal. Secondary conflicts can include adversaries of lesser importance than the story’s antagonist, who may work with the antagonist or separately, by and for themselves or actions unknown.

“The way for a young man to rise is to improve himself in every way he can, never suspecting that anybody wishes to hinder him.”- Abraham Lincoln


We close the third act of our tale with the most unfamiliar of turns. The unknown to many but familiar to his kin, comes forth in a blaze of fury with rod and whip in hand, and drives the horses beyond the horizon. We approach the climax of our story, suddenly, much faster than we anticipated, stunned at how this progressed. Seriously, this has gotten out of hand, fast. We’re now facing a reality where the Suns… the SUNS, led by Steve Nash, could sweep the San Antonio Spurs, led by Tim Duncan and Manu Ginobili. It’s a bizarre landscape, and I find myself seeking shelter. I had abandoned all hope for a Suns victory in this game long ago, as soon as the buzzer sounded to end Game 2. No way a Spurs team lets one go at home down 2-0. And then they won.

Behind Dragic.

Dragic was taken with a draft pick acquired from the San Antonio Spurs and looked absolutely lost his rookie season. He seemed like  another lost draft pick by the Suns to many (and by many, I mean me, who constantly mocked the pick). And Dragic was insane tonight. He started heating up, and then this happened:

BOOM.

That kicked off a surge of confidence where Dragic essentially took over the game. He relentlessly took whoever was guarding him to the rack, and thanks to a bizarre strategy by Gregg Popovich to religiously switch, he found hmself guarded by players who had no business trying to check him on the outside. Like, oh, say, DeJuan Blair. There was a play late where the Suns set the offense in motion, made three perimeter rotations and when Dragic was chased off the three, he didn’t settle for the mid-range J. He lunged straight for the rim and banked it in off-glass. He was fouled on the play but no call was made. Instead of complaining to the refs, he simply sprinted up court.

Parker needs to be addressed here.

I pointed out last game that Dragic had the ability to rattle Parker. And it continued in this game. Parker’s obviously is hurt, dragging and trying to play through plantar fasciitis. But he’s still capable of slicing up the Suns if there’s not a perimeter defender that can check him. Dragic can. And did. Dragic blocked the Parker baseline floater that I’ve seen Parker nail on the Suns about a million times. And for him to absolutely take over on the other end, with no one able to check him, that gave the Suns a counter they’ve never had.

For years it’s been “if the Suns get Nash to have a good game, and STAT takes over, and they hit their threes, and they don’t get killed on the glass and if puppies turn into rainbows and if you clap your hands, they can win.” While with the Spurs, it was “they’ll get consistent performance from the Big 3 throughout the series and a few games where an unlikely player steps up. But their defense will consistently keep them in games.” And thus, we have the formula fully reversed and used against itself.

I cannot say enough about how much fool’s gold Matt Bonner is. At PBT, I introduced the Matt Bonner Blown Assignment Drinking Game. It’s a quick way to the hospital. What’s worse, you can actually see the Spurs cheating on their own assignments, going to try and cover for Bonner. “I’d better be ready in case Matt isn’t where he needs to be.” And yet, he played 20 minutes! At what point do you not recognize how big a liability he is on both sides of the floor, even if he is knocking down the three, and go with a more versatile player for minutes? Huge fail for Popovich.

We now face an uncertain end to our story, because if any team, if ANY team, can come back from 0-3, it’s the Spurs, and if any team can surrender a 3-0 lead to the Spurs, it’s the Suns. But the Suns have now come back twice from double digit deficits to win by double digits. We see history being unraveled before us and the light of the Suns piercing the shrouded wasteland. This will either become the final and most crushing defeat of the Suns by the Spurs, or the final, unequivocal redemption for Nash’s Suns, regardless of their Western Conference Finals result. To go from lottery to besting the Spurs? That’s better than their wildest dreams. And as the action rose, they found themselves believing in that ideal.

The future is not set. It is what we make for ourselves.

Tim Duncan’s Decaying Pick-and-Roll Defense

Just stellar, stellar stuff here from Kevin Arnovitz and David Thorpe of ESPN. They break down Timmy’s defensive breakdowns both visually and verbally better in three minutes than most people could do in a whole book.

Thorpe talks about how the Spurs are attempting to stop the Nash/Amar’e pick-and-roll by having Timmy smother the ball handler while at the same time taking away the lob/pass. This, for those of you who have never tried it, is an incredibly difficult thing to do. You’re asking one NBA player to guard two NBA players. Because of Duncan’s still-underrated greatness — particularly on the defensive end — this is something that the Spurs have previously always relied on. And it’s something that, much as his nickname Groundhog Day would suggest, was always able to do. Like clock work. How? None of us mere mortals have any idea. That’s between him, Pop and the basketball gods. But being the best power-forward of all time and all, Timmy was indeed able to pull it off consistently throughout his career.

Now? In 2010?

Well, he’s old. And he doesn’t react quickly enough to do it anymore — at least not when the two offensive players running the screen/roll are Steve Nash (one of the quickest, most elusive, most decisive ball-handlers in NBA history) and Amar’e (one of the most athletic, high-flying big men in NBA history).

And David Thorpe says that it’s time for the Spurs to recognize this and adjust their defensive strategy:

They’ve asked [Duncan] to do something that very few people in history could really accomplish, and he’s no longer able to do that. San Antonio now has to make a change … The old Tim Duncan would have been able to smother Nash’s shot — or make him shoot it so awkwardly that he wasn’t going to make it. Now, in that exact moment when he has to make a decision, he is left grounded and can’t react. And that’s why San Antonio now will have to do what the rest of the free world has to do, which is they’re going to have to ask him to take one guy away or the other.

It’s sad to see greatness decay.

But it is inevitable, Mr. Anderson.

NBA Playoffs Spurs Suns: Act Two, In Which We Encounter The Inciting Moment

The exposition ends with the inciting moment, which is the incident without which there would be no story.

“It is a magnificent feeling to recognize the unity of complex phenomena which appear to be things quite apart from the direct visible truth.”-Albert Einstein

We witness, in act two of our intense narrative, the inciting action, where the tone is set for our fair tale, the players fully established, and turns safely guarded in mystery. Our story is not the continued clash of pace versus defense, stodge versus vigor, nor some sort of coming-of-age for Amar’e. Instead it’s about unity, the centralization of effort from man to man, because for the first time, since the game which ended under the cloud of THE HIPCHECK, the Suns have pushed the Spurs against the wall and landed a haymaker. They’re not dangling off a cliff, but that breeze at their back ain’t the gentle sea.

Thing was, the game was mince meat. Easy to swallow Spurs domination. And then Jared Dudley took cover completely for a quarter and things were never the same. Dudley crashed the glass and brought with him the same attitude back to the Suns they had in Game 1: “We will not be bullied, we will not be frustrated, we will not be out-worked. If you defeat us, it is because you hit contested shots and things went your way again. But we’re not losing by beating ourselves. Not this time.” And the Suns responded.

I had several conversations with Graydon throughout this game, and after the third I called and told him “The Spurs are making super athletic plays and the Suns are lying in the weeds, tracking them by making the extra pass and running efficient offense. Where the hell are we?!”

The final five minutes though, were absolutely insane. There was no sense to it. None. Channing Frye picks up his fifth foul, and the Spurs fail to capitalize on it. The Suns run the pick and roll, the Spurs take six tries to figure out a solvent for it. The Spurs turned to George Hill’s perimeter game… and it worked. But The Suns had every answer, including two huge Amar’e Stoudemire rebounds. That’s right. Amar’e Stoudemire collected huge rebounds down the stretch. Please collect your bottled water on the way to the bomb shelter.

The role reversal in this game is what has Spurs fans stunned today. It was the Suns’ blue collar bench coming in to outwork the Spurs. It was Goran Dragic doing a remarkably great job on Tony Parker for the first six minutes of the fourth. It was the Suns fighting back from a deficit. It was the Suns overcoming the Spurs’ athletic dunks by Richard Jefferson with well-timed passes and cohesion. In essence, the moon flipped to the ground, did a handstand, smoked a bowl, and then ran away with the spoon.

Up is down, hell is heaven, and the Suns have their first 2-0 lead over Duncan’s Spurs.

There is not a person, not a single one, that thinks this is over. But what has happened is relevant. Because if the Suns are to defeat the Spurs, it has to start with something. It has to start with confidence, and they have that. They took a shot from San Antonio, a Tim-Duncan-rocking, Tony-Parker-midranging, George-Hill-treying shot and beat them on the glass and from the arc.

The point where it was over? Alvin Gentry sent Amar’e Stoudemire and Jason Richardson to join Steve Nash on the bench early in the fourth quarter. Popovich stuck with Tony Parker, Manu Ginobili, and re-inserted Tim Duncan. From the 9:30 mark of the 4th quarter until 5:47, the Suns faced the Big 3 with not a single one of theirs. The result?

+1.

The Suns bench unit outplayed the Big 3 plus Jefferson and George Hill. Even if it’s just a point, it means the Big 3 came back in rested and ready to work the pick and roll. Which they did, to the tune of one of Amar’e fiercest dunks and a final +5 run to put the foot to the throat. The same foot that’s been missing for so, so long against the Spurs.

Another interesting sideplot to that stint without Nash was this: via Synergy Tony Parker, two turnovers, 0 field goals with Goran Dragic defending.

Goran Dragic was the counter to Tony Parker that Nash wasn’t. Let that one rattle around in your brain. Dragic has the youth to maintain speed ahead of Parker, and is bigger than Nash to keep a physical edge on LeBaguette. It may have only been for a game, but Dragic’s work on Parker deserves considerable notice.

Meanwhile, everything Matt Bonner is not, Channing Frye is. Confident, able to knock down shots with a defender closing, a good inside defender, capable, actually belonging on a professional basketball floor. If the hope is that Bonner will counter Frye, the early results indicate a knockout for the Suns.

All this, and Lopez still didn’t play.

There is plenty to be concerned about. Ginobili is still creating havoc, and while the Suns have done a good job of focusing on not allowing layups at the rim like the Mavericks rolled the red carpet out for, the weakside clean-up by Duncan is pretty devastating. There’s still a lot of work to be done, and all of that is before the fact that George Hill is getting his feet under him and knocking down threes, both of which can be devastating if they become consistent. But also recognize that after all the talk of D’Antoni’s super-tight rotations and their failure to win in the playoffs, Popovich only had seven players play double digit minutes last night, and one of those was Matt Bonner. So really, he only had 6.25 NBA players play double digit minutes last night.

So now our scene changes and we begin the rising action, wherein the conflict is introduced. Whether that conflict will be the vicious response of a wounded Spurs team in front of a home crowd or the crescendo of Phoenix’s finest hour on the road, we honestly don’t know. The question as to the result of this series has been re-opened. Hope, glorious hope is on the horizon. But beyond it lies the same dark cloud of history. As I told Graydon, “All this means is the Spurs are bent on finding a new way to kill their souls.”

Fin. Act II.

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